Browsing by Author "Quelhas, Ana Cristina"
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- 40th Anniversary of Mental Models TheoryPublication . Quelhas, Ana CristinaIn 2023, on July 21 and 22, a meeting was organised in honour of Phil Johnson-Laird, celebrating the 40th anniversary of the mental model theory, at the University College London. This book collects the testimonies of many fellow colleagues who wanted to celebrate these dates, and it shows that Phil Johnson-Laird is a unique personality.
- Advice conditionals about tips and warnings: Interpretations and inferencesPublication . Couto, Marta Barley de La Cueva; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Byrne, Ruth M. J.Two experiments examine how people interpret and reason about advice conditionals, such as tips, for example, “if you study more your grades will improve”, and warnings, for example, “if you stop exercising you will gain weight”. Experiment 1 showed that when participants reason about whether a tip or warning could be true in different situations, their judgments correspond to a biconditional or conditional interpretation on about half of all trials, but to an enabling or tautology interpretation on many others. Experiment 2 showed that participants make few modus ponens and tollens inferences from tips and warnings, and more modus ponens inferences from tips than warnings. The implications for alternative theories are discussed.
- An explanation of or-deletions and other paradoxical disjunctive inferencesPublication . Rasga, Célia; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Johnson-Laird, P. N.Some inferences of the sort: A or B; therefore A, which are invalid in standard logics, are sensible in life: You can enter now or later; therefore, you can enter now. That these "or-deletions" follow necessarily or only possibly is a by-product of a theory of mental models. Its semantics for "or" refers to conjunctions of possibilities holding in default of knowledge to the contrary. It predicts new sorts of or-deletion, such as: He likes to drink red wine or white wine. So, he likes to drink red wine. and: You are permitted to do only one of the following: You can enter now. You can enter later. Therefore, you are permitted to enter now. They are invalid in standard logics, and neither previous pragmatic nor semantic theories predicted them. Four experiments corroborated their occurrence.
- Children’s reasoning about other’s intentions: False-belief and counterfactual conditional inferencesPublication . Rasga, Célia Maria Batalha Silva; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Byrne, Ruth M. J.We report four experiments on children’s reasoning about intentions using a new change-of-intentions task, in which an observer witnesses an actor carrying out an action, e.g., Maryhears her brother Tom say he wants to switch on the TV to watch a cartoon DVD. Mary goesaway and the reason for the action changes, Tom’s grandmother tells Tom to switch on theTV to watch the news. The experiments examine reasoning about false beliefs, e.g., What willMary believe is the reason that Tom is switching on the TV?, and counterfactual reasoning,e.g., If Tom’s grandmother hadn’t asked Tom to switch on the TV to watch the news, whatwould have been the reason he was switching it on? Experiment 1 reveals three effects,first,children aged 6 years make more mistakes than those aged 8 years, second, they makemore mistakes in false belief than counterfactual reasoning, and third, they make moremistakes for a desire changed to an obligation, compared to an obligation changed to adesire. Experiment 1B shows that the effects also occur for children aged 7 years comparedto 9 years. Experiment 2 shows that the effects occur for unfamiliar make-believe content,and Experiment 3 shows that they occur in stories with a simpler structure. The implicationsfor understanding the cognitive processes underlying children’s reasoning about intentionsare discussed.
- Conditional content, explicit information and generating cases: Sources for suppressing inferencesPublication . Gómez-Sánchez, Jesica; Moreno, Sergio Moreno; Couto, Marta; Quelhas, Ana CristinaIn the present study, we evaluate the suppression effect by asking participants to make inferences with everyday conditionals ("if A, then B"; "if Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre"), choosing between three possible conclusions ("she went to the theatre"; "she did not go to the theatre"; "it cannot be concluded"). We test how these inferences can be influenced by three factors: a) when the content of the conditional induces us to think about disabling conditions that prevent us from accepting the consequent (A and ¬B) or alternative conditions that induce us to think about other antecedents that could also lead to the consequent (¬A and B), b) when explicit information is given about what really happened (e.g. Ana found a friend but they did not go to the theatre; or Ana did not find a friend but she went to the theatre) and c) when participants have to look for concrete disabling (e.g. Ana's friend had to work) and alternative cases (e.g. Ana's sister wanted to go to the theatre) before making the inferences. Previous studies have shown what were called "suppression effects": disabling conditions reduced valid inferences while considering alternatives led to a reduction in fallacies. These two "suppression effects" were shown in Experiment 1: a) in an Implicit condition that included just the content factor of the conditional and b) with a greater magnitude in a second Explicit condition that included the three factors (content, explicit information and search for counterexamples). Experiment 2 compared the same Explicit condition with another in which participants, instead of looking for counterexamples, completed a control task of looking for synonyms. In addition, half the participants looked for a few items (2 cases) and the other half for many items (5 cases). Results again showed the suppressing effect in all the conditions, but the magnitude was greater in the counterexample condition. No relevant differences were obtained according to the number of cases generated; the most relevant result was that the factors provided an additive effect on the suppression.
- Conhecimentos, modelos, e raciocínio condicionalPublication . Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Johnson-Laird, Philip N.A interpretação de frases, e em particular a interpretação de frases condicionais, pode ser modulada quer pelo significado das mesmas, pelos referentes, ou pelos conhecimentos gerais. O presente estudo examina o efeito pragmático dos conhecimentos no raciocínio a partir de pares de premissas condicionais. De acordo com a teoria dos modelos, inferências com a mesma forma, mas com conteúdos diferentes, deverão gerar um padrão de inferências diferente. Consideremos as seguintes premissas: Se a Maria não está em Paris, então ela está em França. Se a Maria está em França, então ele é estudante. A primeira premissa explora a inclusão espacial (Paris é em França), pelo que numa possibilidade Maria não está em Paris mas está em França, e noutra possibilidade Maria está em Paris e portanto está também em França. Assim, é impossível a Maria não estar em França, pelo que os indivíduos tenderão a inferir a partir da segunda premissa que ela é estudante. Em contraste, se considerarmos as seguintes premissas, que tem a mesma forma que as do exemplo anterior, mas um conteúdo diferente: Se o João não está em Roma, então ele está em França. Se o João está em França, então ele é estudante. A primeira premissa explora a exclusão espacial (Roma não é em França), pelo que numa possibilidade João não está em Roma e está em França, e noutra possibilidade ele está em Roma e não está em França. Assim, os indivíduos não têm nenhuma base para a inferência categórica de que ele é estudante, e deverão tender para a conclusão condicional de que Se o João não está em Roma então ele é estudante. Os problemas de inclusão geram menos possibilidades do que os problemas de exclusão, pelo que a teoria dos modelos prediz que os problemas de inclusão deverão ser mais fáceis do que os problemas de exclusão. O artigo relata duas experiências que corroboram as previsões da teoria dos modelos. Na Experiência 1, os participantes dão mais conclusões categóricas nas premissas de inclusão, mas apenas algumas conclusões condicionais nas premissas de exclusão. De facto, com as premissas de exclusão, obtém-se muitas conclusões outras. Para evitar isso fizemos uma segunda experiência, onde os participantes escolhem a conclusão a partir de quatro que são fornecidas: conclusão categórica; conclusão condicional; ambas; nenhuma (ao contrário da Experiência 1, onde os participantes escreviam a conclusão). A Experiência 2 replica a superioridade de conclusões categóricas com as premissas de inclusão, e encontra a superioridade de conclusões condicionais com as premissas de exclusão. ***** ABSTRACT ***** Meaning, reference, and general knowledge can all modulate the interpretation of assertions, and in particular the interpretation of conditionals. The present study examines the pragmatic effects of knowledge on reasoning from pairs of conditional premises. According to the theory of mental models, inferences of the same form but different content should yield different patterns of inference. Consider the following premises, e.g.: If Maria is not in Paris, then she’s in France. If Maria is in France, then she’s a student. The first premise exploits a spatial inclusion (Paris is in France), and so in one possibility Maria is not in Paris but is in France, and in another possibility Maria is in Paris and so she is also in France. Hence, it is impossible for Maria not to be in France, and so individuals should tend to infer from the second premise that she is a student. In contrast, consider the following premises that have the same form as those in the previous example, but a different content: If João is not in Roma, then he’s in France. If João is in France, then he’s a student. The first premise exploits a spatial exclusion (Roma is not in France), and so in one possibility João is not in Roma and is in France, and in another possibility he is Roma and so not in France. Hence, individuals have no grounds for the categorical inference that he is a student, and they should tend to infer the conditional conclusion, i.e., that If João is not in Roma, then he’s a student. The inclusion problems yield fewer possibilities than the exclusion problems, and so the model theory predicts that the inclusion problems should be easier than the exclusion problems. The paper reports two experiments that corroborated the predictions of the model theory. In Experiment 1, participants drew more categorical conclusion in the inclusion premises, but only a few drew the conditional conclusion from the exclusion premises. In fact, with de exclusion premises, we obtain many “other conclusions”. To avoid this we have made a second experiment, were participants chose a conclusion from four possibilities: the categorical conclusion, a conditional conclusion, both conclusions, or neither, instead of what happens in Experiment 1, were participants drew the conclusions for themselves from the premises. Experiment 2 replicated the superiority of categorical conclusion in the inclusion premises, and found the superiority of conditional conclusion in the exclusion premises.
- Counterfactual thinking : Study of the focus effect of scenarios and blame ascriptions to victim and perpetratorPublication . Marques, João Amaral; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Juhos, Csongor; Couto, Marta Barley de La Cueva; Rasga, Célia Maria Batalha SilvaIn two different studies we examined the focus effect of a scenario (i.e., the fact that a given character is the protagonist of a story) on two interconnected domains: the generation of counterfactual thoughts and the ascription of blame. It was hypothesised that being the focal agent of a story would not only lead to more counterfactuals centred on him or her, but also to greater ascriptions of blame as it would be easier to imagine how that actor could have behaved differently had he chosen or wanted to, and thus avoided a deleterious outcome. Different negatively-valenced scenarios depicting a certain misfortune such as a mugging were created in which victim, perpetrator or both characters, were the centre of the story. Results showed that placing either victim or perpetrator as the protagonist of a scenario increases the number of counterfactual thoughts centred on that character, but does not necessarily increase the blame attributed to him or her as the perpetrator was always ascribed more blame than the victim, irrespective of who was the protagonist. Study 2’s findings replicate those of Study 1 even with a different experimental design, modified materials, and various counterbalancing measures, hence suggesting that being the protagonist enables one to easily consider counterfactual alternatives involving that actor, but does not prevent one from identifying who is rightfully to blame for a given misfortune. The results and their implications were interpreted according to different theoretical perspectives and possible future avenues of research are discussed.
- Counterfactual thinking and functional differences in depressionPublication . Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Power, Michael J.; Juhos, Csongor; Senos, JorgeThe purpose of the studies reported in this paper was to evaluate the function of counterfactual thinking (CT) in depression. In Experiment 1, depressed and non-depressed participants were asked to imagine themselves as the protagonist of a hypothetical situation, and to think counterfactually about three different scenarios. The results showed that there was a similar CT style (in terms of direction, structure and focus of mutation) for the depressed and the nondepressed groups. It was also found that the perceived preparation for a future similar situation increased after CT and, contrary to our hypotheses, this effect was observed in both groups. In Experiment 2, a real-life situation was used (a course examination) in which participants experienced a negative outcome (a poor score on the test). Again, it was observed that depressed and non-depressed participants showed the same CT style, but non-depressed participants were more likely to use CT spontaneously. In addition, the second study showed further differences between the two groups: depressed participants not only showed a lack of cognitive benefi ts from thinking counterfactually (i.e., after CT they do not feel more prepared for future similar events, nor able to avoid a similar bad outcome, in contrast to the non-depressed participants), but also show a lack of behavioural changes (both intentions to change and actual changes over the subsequent week). In conclusion, these results provide evidence about the function of CT both in depressed and in non-depressed thinking, and highlight both the similarities and differences for these two groups.
- Desenvolvimento do raciocínio condicional e modelos mentaisPublication . Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Juhos, Csongor; Senos, Jorge; Rocha, Teresa AlmeidaDe acordo com a teoria dos modelos mentais (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) a interpretação de uma frase condicional, do tipo Se p, então q, gera os modelos iniciais: p q ... em que os três pontos representam um modelo sem conteúdo explícito. A representação completa da condicional compreende os seguintes modelos explícitos: p q ¬p ¬q ¬p q em que “¬” serve aqui para indicar a negação. A partir deste quadro teórico, e da suposição de que uma inferência é tanto mais difícil quanto maior o número de modelos explícitos que requer, é possível colocar hipóteses sobre diferenças no nível de dificuldade nas inferências com os quatro silogismos condicionais. Na experiência que iremos descrever pretende-se testar essas hipóteses em sujeitos de diferentes níveis etários (8, 11 e 15 anos). A partir dos resultados obtidos serão adiantadas hipóteses sobre o progressivo desenvolvimento da capacidade de representar os três modelos mentais de interpretação das condicionais. Serão ainda realçadas diferenças na resposta dos sujeitos que derivam de diferenças no conteúdo das frases condicionais. Um último objectivo, de carácter exploratório, prende-se com a comparação das respostas em sujeitos de duas nacionalidades (Portuguesa e Húngara). Assim, o grupo de variáveis independentes define um plano factorial misto 2X3X2X4 (Nacionalidade X Idade X Conteúdo X Silogismo), dado que a última variável é intra-sujeitos.
- O efeito de ordem temporal no pensamento contrafactual das criançasPublication . Rasga, Célia Maria Batalha Silva; Quelhas, Ana CristinaQuando os adultos pensam contrafactualmente, acerca do que poderia ter sido diferente numa sequência aleatória de acontecimentos, como por exemplo num jogo de moeda ao ar (cara ou coroa), são influenciadas pela ordem em que esses acontecimentos ocorrem, exibindo um efeito de ordem temporal, e consequentemente atribuem emoções como a culpa (no caso de perderem) ao último jogador (ver Byrne, 2005, para uma revisão). Neste âmbito, iremos apresentar duas experiências. Numa primeira experiência estudámos se o efeito de ordem temporal ocorria nas crianças, assim como os julgamentos emocionais de tristeza e culpa decorrentes deste efeito. E, por outro lado, também queríamos saber se este efeito pode ser eliminado, tal como se verifica em adultos quando o jogo é interrompido e depois recomeça do início. Verificámos que o efeito de ordem temporal se cumpre desde os 6 anos de idade, mas a sua redução/eliminação surge apenas aos 10 anos de idade, tal como se esperava, dada a maior capacidade representacional destas crianças face às mais novas. Ao nível dos julgamentos emocionais, estes diferem ao longo das idades. Numa segunda experiência, estudámos se o efeito de ordem temporal ocorreria nas crianças aquando de um resultado positivo, bem como os julgamentos emocionais de felicidade e orgulho. E encontrámos que desde cedo as crianças também exibem um efeito de ordem temporal para resultados benéficos. Ao nível dos julgamentos emocionais, estes aparecem congruentes com o efeito de ordem temporal. Estes resultados serão discutidos em termos das suas implicações para a compreensão do desenvolvimento das representações mentais.