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Abstract(s)
If cooperation often involves investment, then what specific conditions
prevent selection from acting on cheaters that do not invest? The mutualism
between the Indo-Pacific cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus and
its reef fish clients has been a model system to study conflicts of interest
and their resolution. These cleaners prefer client mucus over ectoparasites
– that is, they prefer to cheat – but punishment and partner switching
by clients enforce cooperative behaviour by cleaners. By contrast,
clients of Caribbean cleaning gobies (Elacatinus spp.) do not to use punishment
or partner switching. Here, we test the hypothesis that the
behavioural differences between these two cleaner fish systems are
caused by differences in cleaner foraging preferences. In foraging choice
experiments, we offered broadstripe cleaning gobies Elacatinus prochilos
client-derived parasitic isopods, client mucus and a control food item.
The cleaning gobies significantly preferred ectoparasites over mucus or
the control item, which contrasts with cleaner wrasses. We propose that
the low level of cleaner–client conflict arising from cleaning goby foraging
preferences explains the observed lack of strategic partner control
behaviour in the clients of cleaning gobies.
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Citation
Ethology, 116, 1244-1248