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Abstract(s)
A investigação tem mostrado que afirmações repetidas são avaliadas como mais verdadeiras
do que afirmações novas, no entanto, a familiaridade e fluência subjacente ao efeito têm uma
valência positiva e indivíduos deprimidos são marcados por um sentimento de tristeza e
priorizam informação negativa e congruente com o seu humor no processamento cognitivo. O
objetivo deste tudo é não só verificar se o efeito de ilusão de verdade é menor em indivíduos
deprimidos, mas também testar se informação negativa e congruente com o humor tem
impacto no valor de verdade atribuído e estender os mesmos objetivos à fluência percetual. O
nível de depressão dos participantes foi considerado através do Inventário de Depressão de
Beck-II e por diagnóstico clínico. Os participantes avaliaram a verdade de dois tipos de frase,
Neutras e Depressivas: no Estudo 1, nas condições de Frase Old (repetida) e Frase New
(nova); no Estudo 2 nas condições de frase Fluente e Não Fluente. O Estudo 1 detetou um
efeito de ilusão de verdade, mas a hipótese de este ser moderado pela depressão não foi
corroborada. O Estudo 2 não replicou o efeito de ilusão de verdade. Em ambos os estudos,
observa-se uma tendência para indivíduos deprimidos avaliarem frases Depressivas como
mais verdadeiras do que frases Neutras. As implicações da verdade atribuída à informação
negativa e congruente com o humor na autossustentação da depressão e no contexto
terapêutico são discutidas e são propostas ideias de estudos futuros que considerem este
problema.
ABSTRACT: Research has shown that repeated statements are rated as more true than new statements, however, while the familiarity and fluency underlying the effect have a positive valence, depressed individuals are characterized by a feeling of sadness and prioritize negative mood congruent information in cognitive process. The goal of this study is not only to verify if the illusion of truth effect is lower in depressed individuals, but also if negative mood-congruent information has an impact on the attributed truth value and extend the same objectives to perceptual fluency. The participants' level of depression was assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory-II and by clinical diagnosis. Participants rated the truth of two types of sentences, Neutral and Depressive: in Study 1 under the conditions of Old and New sentences; in Study 2 under the conditions of Fluent and Non-Fluent sentences. In study 1 the illusion of truth effect was detected but the hypothesis that this effect is moderated by depression was not supported. In Study 2 the illusion of truth effect wasn’t detected. In both studies there is a tendency for depressed individuals to rate Depressive sentences as more true than Neutral ones. The implications of the truth attributed to negative mood-congruent information in self-sustenance of depression and in the therapeutic context are discussed, and ideas for future studies considering this issue are proposed.
ABSTRACT: Research has shown that repeated statements are rated as more true than new statements, however, while the familiarity and fluency underlying the effect have a positive valence, depressed individuals are characterized by a feeling of sadness and prioritize negative mood congruent information in cognitive process. The goal of this study is not only to verify if the illusion of truth effect is lower in depressed individuals, but also if negative mood-congruent information has an impact on the attributed truth value and extend the same objectives to perceptual fluency. The participants' level of depression was assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory-II and by clinical diagnosis. Participants rated the truth of two types of sentences, Neutral and Depressive: in Study 1 under the conditions of Old and New sentences; in Study 2 under the conditions of Fluent and Non-Fluent sentences. In study 1 the illusion of truth effect was detected but the hypothesis that this effect is moderated by depression was not supported. In Study 2 the illusion of truth effect wasn’t detected. In both studies there is a tendency for depressed individuals to rate Depressive sentences as more true than Neutral ones. The implications of the truth attributed to negative mood-congruent information in self-sustenance of depression and in the therapeutic context are discussed, and ideas for future studies considering this issue are proposed.
Description
Dissertação de Mestrado realizada sob a orientação da
Professora Doutora Teresa Garcia-Marques no Ispa – Instituto
Universitário para obtenção de grau de Mestre na
especialidade de Psicologia Clínica.
Keywords
Efeito de ilusão de verdade Familiaridade Fluência Depressão Illusion of truth effect Familiarity Fluency Depression