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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
A recent game theoretic model akin to an iterated prisoner’s dilemma explored situations in which 2 individuals (the service
providers) interact simultaneously with the same service recipient (the client). If providing a dishonest service pays, then each
service provider may be tempted to cheat before its partner, even if cheating causes the client’s departure; however, a theoretical
cooperative solution also exists where both partners should reduce cheating rates. This prediction is supported by indirect
measures of cheating (i.e., inferred from client responses) by pairs of Indo-Pacific bluestreak cleaner wrasses Labroides dimidiatus.
Here, we examine how inspecting in pairs affects service quality in Caribbean cleaning gobies Elacatinus spp. We measured
dishonesty directly by examining the stomach contents of solitary and paired individuals and calculating the ratio of scales to
ectoparasites ingested. We found that the propensity to cheat of females and males differed: females always cleaned relatively
honestly, whereas males cheated less when cleaning in pairs than when cleaning alone. However, overall, the cleaning service of
single and paired individuals was similar. Our results confirm that cleaners cooperate when cleaning in pairs; however, our
findings differ from the specific predictions of the model and the observations on L. dimidiatus. The differences may be due
to differences in mating systems and cleaner–client interactions between the 2 cleaner fish species
Description
Keywords
Cooperation Elacatinus spp Honesty iterated prisoners Dilemma Singles versus pairs
Citation
Behavioral ecology, 20(6), 1343-1347 Doi: 10.1093/beheco/arp138
Publisher
Oxford University Press