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O paradigma de atribuição de atitudes
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Abstract(s)
O paradigma de atribuição de atitudes (Jones & Harris, 1967) deu origem à identificação de um efeito
incontornável na área de estudos da percepção de pessoas: o enviesamento correspondente. Neste
paradigma os participantes são confrontados com a opinião de outra pessoa que supostamente pôde
escolher emitir aquela opinião ou foi constrangida a emiti-la. A tarefa dos participantes é tentar
inferir a verdadeira atitude da pessoa. Consistentemente, ao longo de várias aplicações deste
paradigma, tem-se verificado que as pessoas inferem que a atitude da outra pessoa corresponde à
opinião que emitiu, mesmo nos casos em que foi constrangida a fazê-lo, ou seja, o enviesamento
correspondente tem-se replicado. Neste artigo traçam-se as principais características do paradigma,
descrevem-se duas das suas variações, referem-se alguns dos exemplos de aplicação do mesmo,
enumeram-se algumas das variáveis estudadas como moderadoras do enviesamento correspondente e
discutem-se as explicações teóricas deste efeito.
ABSTRACT: The attitude attribution paradigm (Jones & Harris, 1967) led to the identification of an unavoidable effect in the person perception research field: the correspondence bias. In this paradigm participants are confronted with the opinion of another person who supposedly could either choose to offer that opinion or was constrained to offer it. The participants' task is to try to infer the person’s true attitude. Consistently, over several applications of this paradigm, it has been found that people infer that the other person’s attitude matches the opinion that was offered, even in cases in which the other person was constrained to do so. In other words, the correspondence bias has been replicated. In this paper I sketch the main characteristics of the paradigm, describe two of its variations, refer to some examples of its application, list a few of the variables studied as moderators of the correspondence bias, and discuss the theoretical explanations of this effect.
ABSTRACT: The attitude attribution paradigm (Jones & Harris, 1967) led to the identification of an unavoidable effect in the person perception research field: the correspondence bias. In this paradigm participants are confronted with the opinion of another person who supposedly could either choose to offer that opinion or was constrained to offer it. The participants' task is to try to infer the person’s true attitude. Consistently, over several applications of this paradigm, it has been found that people infer that the other person’s attitude matches the opinion that was offered, even in cases in which the other person was constrained to do so. In other words, the correspondence bias has been replicated. In this paper I sketch the main characteristics of the paradigm, describe two of its variations, refer to some examples of its application, list a few of the variables studied as moderators of the correspondence bias, and discuss the theoretical explanations of this effect.
Description
Keywords
Atribuição causal Atribuição de atitudes Enviesamento correspondente Inferência disposicional Attitude attribution Causal attribution Correspondence bias Dispositional inference
Citation
Laboratório de Psicologia, 10, 339-352
Publisher
Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada