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I know the rule but I'll just go with my gut: People explicity agree with the use of a heuristic despite normative knowledge
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Abstract(s)
Meio século de investigação em julgamento e decisão demonstrou que o pensamento humano é frequentemente enviesado por julgamentos heurísticos (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). De acordo com a perspectiva de monitorização lassa (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), as pessoas falham na detecção do conflicto entre considerações intuitivas e normativas, não se apercebendo de que as suas intuições estão enviesadas. Teorias contrastantes (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996) assumem que a via heurística e analítica são simultaneamente activadas e as pessoas experienciam este conflicto. Evidência existente sugere que as pessoas detectam, pelo menos implicitamente, este conflicto apesar do enviesamento generalizado (ver De Neys, 2012). Evidência empírica que sugere que a preferência heurística pode mesmo atingir um nível explícito (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), suportou a nossa hipótese de que quando os dois modos de processamento são colocados em conflicto, apesar de conscientes da regra normativa, as pessoas respondem de acordo com julgamentos intuitivos. Direccionámos a nossa abordagem para cenários em que o conflicto entre respostas heurísticas e normativas foi conscientemente percebido pelos participantes e analisámos os níveis de concordância e confiança para com estas respostas. Os resultados demonstraram maior concordância com respostas heurísticas mesmo quando contrastadas com regras normativas, apesar da tendência para lhes atribuir menor confiança nesta condição. Tal sugere que uma das maneiras pelas quais as pessoas poderão resolver este conflicto é sustentando as suas respostas nestes atalhos cognitivos, evidenciando processamento heurístico explicito apesar de conhecimento normativo. Implicações para as teorias de duplo processamento são discutidas.
ABSTRACT: After half a century of research on reasoning and decision-making, it is well established that human thinking is often biased by heuristic judgments (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). According to the lax monitoring perspective (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), people fail to detect the conflict between intuitive and normative considerations, not noticing that their intuition is biased. Contrasting theories (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996), assume that heuristic and analytic routes are simultaneously activated, through a parallel activation, and people experience this conflict. Available evidence suggests that people detect, at least implicitly, this conflict despite the widespread bias (see De Neys, 2012). Empirical evidence suggesting that heuristic preference may ultimately reach an explicit level (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), supported our hypothesis that when two modes of thinking are put into conflict, although aware of the normative rule, people respond in accordance with intuitive judgments. We directed our approach to scenarios where conflict between heuristic and normative responses was consciously perceived by participants and analyzed agreement and reliability levels towards these responses. Results showed greater agreement towards heuristic answers even when explicitly contrasted with normative rules, despite the tendency to accredit them lower reliability in this condition. These data suggest that one of the ways through which people might be resolving conflict is by sustaining their answers on these cognitive shortcuts, evidencing an explicit heuristic processing despite normative knowledge. Implications for Dual-Process theories are discussed.
ABSTRACT: After half a century of research on reasoning and decision-making, it is well established that human thinking is often biased by heuristic judgments (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). According to the lax monitoring perspective (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), people fail to detect the conflict between intuitive and normative considerations, not noticing that their intuition is biased. Contrasting theories (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996), assume that heuristic and analytic routes are simultaneously activated, through a parallel activation, and people experience this conflict. Available evidence suggests that people detect, at least implicitly, this conflict despite the widespread bias (see De Neys, 2012). Empirical evidence suggesting that heuristic preference may ultimately reach an explicit level (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), supported our hypothesis that when two modes of thinking are put into conflict, although aware of the normative rule, people respond in accordance with intuitive judgments. We directed our approach to scenarios where conflict between heuristic and normative responses was consciously perceived by participants and analyzed agreement and reliability levels towards these responses. Results showed greater agreement towards heuristic answers even when explicitly contrasted with normative rules, despite the tendency to accredit them lower reliability in this condition. These data suggest that one of the ways through which people might be resolving conflict is by sustaining their answers on these cognitive shortcuts, evidencing an explicit heuristic processing despite normative knowledge. Implications for Dual-Process theories are discussed.
Description
Dissertação de Mestrado em Psicologia Social e das Organizações, apresentada ao ISPA - Instituto Universitário
Keywords
Heurísticas Julgamento e decisão Conflicto Duplo processamento Heuristics Judgment and decision Conflict Dual-process