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Dever fazer ou querer fazer, eis a questão : Como as crianças raciocinam sobre as intenções: Inferências de falsas crenças e contrafactuais
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Abstract(s)
O nosso trabalho propõe explorar a compreensão das crianças acerca das razões que
os outros têm para as acções. Trabalhos anteriores mostraram que as pessoas tendem a
pensar sobre as acções de forma diferente quando têm conhecimento sobre as razões
para uma acção. Um passo importante para a compreensão das acções de outras
pessoas é o raciocínio sobre as suas intenções (Walsh & Byrne, 2007; Juhos, Quelhas
& Byrne, 2015). Ao longo de seis experiências, pretendemos explorar este efeito do
conhecimento sobre as razões para as acções, aquando de raciocínios contrafactuais e
de falsas crenças, ampliando-o ao desenvolvimento das crianças.Transversal a todas as experiências, as crianças foram testadas com uma nova tarefa:a tarefa de mudança de intenções, a qual analisou cenários onde um actor tem uma razão inicial (desejo ou obrigação) para uma acção, que é posteriormente alterada. A
primeira experiência demonstrou que crianças de 6 anos não compreendem que os
outros podem ter falsas crenças sobre as razões de um actor para uma acção, enquanto
aos 8 anos evidenciam uma compreensão de falsas crenças sobre intenções.
Adicionalmente, a experiência mostrou que aos 6 anos as inferências contrafactuais
são mais precisas sobre as razões para as acções. A experiência mostrou ainda que as
crianças mais novas tendem a centrar-se nas obrigações quando sustentam o seu
raciocínio em falsas crenças.A segunda experiência, com crianças de 7 e 9 anos, mostrou que esta compreensão continua a desenvolver-se ao longo destes anos. A terceira experiência reforça o
padrão encontrado na primeira experiência, mesmo quando a tarefa é simplificada, ou
seja, quando não existe um conflito entre razões para a acção. A quarta experiência
explorou os resultados encontrados anteriormente num contexto socioeconómico
baixo. Esta experiência mostrou que as crianças de 6 anos cometem mais erros nas
inferências de falsas crenças do que nas inferências contrafactuais, no entanto, estas
crianças tendem a centrar-se mais nos desejos aquando de inferências de falsas
crenças, contrariamente às experiências anteriores. A experiência cinco, analisou um
contexto de um planeta distante, e os resultados foram consistentes com os anteriores.
As crianças mais novas fazem menos inferências de falsas crenças que contrafactuais,
e estas crianças tendem a centrar-se mais nas obrigações aquando de inferências de
falsas crenças, mesmo num contexto desconhecido e distante, e na ausência de uma
figura parental. A última experiência explorou este efeito em crianças com diagnóstico de autismo de
alto funcionamento. Os resultados revelaram que as crianças mais novas, de 6 e 8
anos tendem também a centrar-se nas obrigações e fazem menos inferências correctas
de falsas crenças do que contrafactuais, quando comparadas a um grupo de crianças
em desenvolvimento normal. Estes resultados contribuem para a discussão aberta
sobre a relação entre o pensamento contrafactual e a teoria da mente, como também
traz alguma luz sobre como as crianças pensam as diferentes razões para as acções.
ABSTRACT: Our work aims to explore children's comprehension of the reasons that others have for actions. Previous work has shown that people tend to think differently about the actions when they have knowledge about the reasons behind those actions. An important step towards understanding the actions of others is reasoning about their intentions (Walsh & Byrne, 2007; Juhos, Quelhas & Byrne, 2015). We have explored this effect of the knowledge about the reasons for actions over six experiments, during counterfactual and false beliefs reasoning, and extending it to children's development. Transversal to all the experiments, children were tested with a new task: the change of intentions task, which included scenarios where an actor has an initial reason (desire or obligation) for an action, which is subsequently changed. The first experiment showed that children aged 6 do not understand that others may have false beliefs about the reasons for an actor to act, while at the age of 8 they show an understanding of false beliefs about intentions. In addition, this experiment has shown that the six year-olds counterfactual inferences are more precise about the reasons for the action. This experiment has also shown that younger children tend to focus on the obligations when they based their reasoning on false beliefs. The second experiment with 7 and 9 year-olds showed that this understanding continues to develop over the years. The third experiment reinforces the pattern found, even when the task is simplified, that is, when there is no conflict between the reasons for an action. The fourth experiment explored the previous results in a low socio-economic context. This experiment has shown that 6 year-olds make more mistakes in the false beliefs inferences than in the counterfactual inferences, however, these children tend to focus more on the desires when they make false beliefs inferences, contrary to the previous experiments. Experiment five analysed the context of a distant planet, and the results were consistent with the previous ones. Younger children make less false beliefs inferences than counterfactuals, and these children tend to focus more on the obligations upon false beliefs inferences, even in an unknown and distant context, and in the absence of a parental figure. The last experiment explored this effect among children diagnosed with highfunctioning autism, showing that younger children, aged 6 and 8 years also tend to focus on the obligations and make less correct false beliefs inferences than counterfactuals, when compared to a group of children with normal development. These results contribute to the open discussion about the relationship between counterfactual thinking and theory of mind, but it also brings some light on how children think the different reasons for the actions.
ABSTRACT: Our work aims to explore children's comprehension of the reasons that others have for actions. Previous work has shown that people tend to think differently about the actions when they have knowledge about the reasons behind those actions. An important step towards understanding the actions of others is reasoning about their intentions (Walsh & Byrne, 2007; Juhos, Quelhas & Byrne, 2015). We have explored this effect of the knowledge about the reasons for actions over six experiments, during counterfactual and false beliefs reasoning, and extending it to children's development. Transversal to all the experiments, children were tested with a new task: the change of intentions task, which included scenarios where an actor has an initial reason (desire or obligation) for an action, which is subsequently changed. The first experiment showed that children aged 6 do not understand that others may have false beliefs about the reasons for an actor to act, while at the age of 8 they show an understanding of false beliefs about intentions. In addition, this experiment has shown that the six year-olds counterfactual inferences are more precise about the reasons for the action. This experiment has also shown that younger children tend to focus on the obligations when they based their reasoning on false beliefs. The second experiment with 7 and 9 year-olds showed that this understanding continues to develop over the years. The third experiment reinforces the pattern found, even when the task is simplified, that is, when there is no conflict between the reasons for an action. The fourth experiment explored the previous results in a low socio-economic context. This experiment has shown that 6 year-olds make more mistakes in the false beliefs inferences than in the counterfactual inferences, however, these children tend to focus more on the desires when they make false beliefs inferences, contrary to the previous experiments. Experiment five analysed the context of a distant planet, and the results were consistent with the previous ones. Younger children make less false beliefs inferences than counterfactuals, and these children tend to focus more on the obligations upon false beliefs inferences, even in an unknown and distant context, and in the absence of a parental figure. The last experiment explored this effect among children diagnosed with highfunctioning autism, showing that younger children, aged 6 and 8 years also tend to focus on the obligations and make less correct false beliefs inferences than counterfactuals, when compared to a group of children with normal development. These results contribute to the open discussion about the relationship between counterfactual thinking and theory of mind, but it also brings some light on how children think the different reasons for the actions.
Description
Tese de Doutoramento apresentada ao ISPA - Instituto Universitário
Keywords
Teoria da mente Pensamento contrafactual Intenções Crianças Theory of mind Counterfactual thinking Intentions Children
Citation
Publisher
ISPA - Instituto Universitário das Ciências Psicológicas, Sociais e da Vida