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Agentes fictícios: Inferência espontânea de traço e suspensão da descrença
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Quando interagimos e percecionamos outros, inferimos de forma automática e inconsciente traços de personalidade; um processo conhecido como inferência espontânea de traços. Os estudos documentam a ocorrência de inferências espontâneas de traço sobre atores humanos mas não sobre personagens de livros, filmes de fantasia e ficção científica com os quais nos envolvemos, ou figuras mitológicas.
Neste trabalho colmatamos este facto contrastando o processo de inferência de traços de personalidade em relação a humanos com a sua ocorrência face a agentes fictícios. Para o efeito, utilizou-se o paradigma da recordação com pistas para ambos os atores, junto de uma amostra de 92 participantes recrutados em contexto laboratorial e online.
Os participantes leram um conjunto de frases implicativas de traços, que podiam ter uma contextualização real (e.g., “A Mariana acertou em todas as respostas do teste de matemática”) ou fictícia (e.g., “A medusa acertou em todas as respostas do teste de alquimia”) e foram solicitados a recordarem-se das frases. A recordação foi apoiada por uma pista disposicional (“inteligente”) ou semântica (“testagem”). Os resultados sugerem a ausência de diferenças entre humanos e agentes fictícios. Porém, quando se controlou para a capacidade dos participantes suspenderem a sua descrença, que é fundamental para o nosso envolvimento com mundos fictícios, os dados sugerem que a frequência desta suspensão não modera a ocorrência de inferências para agentes presentes nestes contextos, mas provoca uma melhor memorização das frases. Os dados são discutidos à luz de processos de perceção social enquanto interagimos com narrativas e da antropomorfização de personagens
When perceiving and interacting with others, we automatically and unconsciously infer personality traits; a process known as spontaneous trait inference. Studies document the occurrence of spontaneous trait inferences about human actors but not about characters from fantasy and science fiction books and films with which we engage, or mythological figures. In this work, we address this fact by contrasting the process of personality trait inference in relation to humans with its occurrence in relation to fictional agents. To this end, we used the cued-recall paradigm for both actors, with a sample of 92 participants recruited in both a laboratory and online context. Participants read a set of trait-implicative sentences, which could have a real context (e.g., “Mariana got all the answers right on the math test”) or a fictional one (e.g., “The medusa got all the answers right on the alchemy test”) and were asked to recall the sentences. Recall was supported by a dispositional (“intelligent”) or semantic (“testing”) cue. The results suggest that there are no differences between humans and fictional agents. However, when controlling for participants' ability to suspend their disbelief, which is fundamental for our engagement with fictional worlds, the data suggests that the frequency of this suspension does not moderate the occurrence of inferences for agents present in these contexts, but leads to better memorization of sentences. The data are discussed in light of social perception processes as we interact with narratives and the anthropomorphization of characters.
When perceiving and interacting with others, we automatically and unconsciously infer personality traits; a process known as spontaneous trait inference. Studies document the occurrence of spontaneous trait inferences about human actors but not about characters from fantasy and science fiction books and films with which we engage, or mythological figures. In this work, we address this fact by contrasting the process of personality trait inference in relation to humans with its occurrence in relation to fictional agents. To this end, we used the cued-recall paradigm for both actors, with a sample of 92 participants recruited in both a laboratory and online context. Participants read a set of trait-implicative sentences, which could have a real context (e.g., “Mariana got all the answers right on the math test”) or a fictional one (e.g., “The medusa got all the answers right on the alchemy test”) and were asked to recall the sentences. Recall was supported by a dispositional (“intelligent”) or semantic (“testing”) cue. The results suggest that there are no differences between humans and fictional agents. However, when controlling for participants' ability to suspend their disbelief, which is fundamental for our engagement with fictional worlds, the data suggests that the frequency of this suspension does not moderate the occurrence of inferences for agents present in these contexts, but leads to better memorization of sentences. The data are discussed in light of social perception processes as we interact with narratives and the anthropomorphization of characters.
Descrição
Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada no Ispa - Instituto Universitário para obtenção de grau de Mestre na especialidade de Psicologia Social e das Organizações.
Palavras-chave
inferência espontânea de traços suspensão da descrença ficção memória spontaneous trait inference suspension of disbelief fiction memory