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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Nas duas experiências apresentadas pretende-se
testar hipóteses com base em duas teorias: a teoria dos
modelos mentais (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird
& Byrne, 1991); e a teoria dos esquemas pragmáticos
de raciocínio (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989).
No domínio do raciocínio condicional foram utilizados
dois tipos de tarefa: silogismos condicionais (inferência Modus Ponens e Modus Tollens) e a tarefa
de selecção de cartões (Wason, 1966).
As frases condicionais que presidem a estas duas
tarefas são as mesmas, sendo em ambos os casos
apresentadas como regras. Foi manipulado o tipo de
condicional (Deôntica ou Neutra), bem como o seu
conteúdo (Familiar, Plausível ou Arbitrário), em amostras
de sujeitos de diferentes idades (8 anos, 11 anos,
14 anos e ≥ 18 anos).
A maior parte dos resultados encontrados pode ser
explicado no âmbito da teoria dos modelos mentais, e
não corrobora as previsões da teoria dos esquemas
pragmáticos de raciocínio. É ainda salientado, na
tarefa com silogismos, a utilidade de usar outras formas
de classificar as respostas, diferente da habitual
dualidade entre respostas Correctas e Não Correctas.
ABSTRACT: Two experiments were developed with the purpose of test hypotheses based on two theories: the mental models theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991); and the pragmatic reasoning schemas theory (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989). Two types of tasks were used in the domain of conditional reasoning: conditional syllogisms (Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inference) and the cards selection task (Wason, 1966). The conditional sentences that preside over these two tasks are the same and, in both cases, they are presented as rules. The type of conditional (Deontic or Neutral) as well as its content (Familiar, Plausible or Arbitrary) were manipulated, in samples of subjects of different ages (8 years old, 11 years old, 14 years old and ≥ 18 years old). The majority of the obtained results may be explained in the scope of the mental models theory and does not corroborate the predictions of the pragmatic reasoning schemas theory. In the syllogisms task, the usefulness of using other forms of answers` classification, forms that are different from the usual dualism between Correct and Non-Correct answers, is also stressed.
ABSTRACT: Two experiments were developed with the purpose of test hypotheses based on two theories: the mental models theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991); and the pragmatic reasoning schemas theory (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989). Two types of tasks were used in the domain of conditional reasoning: conditional syllogisms (Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inference) and the cards selection task (Wason, 1966). The conditional sentences that preside over these two tasks are the same and, in both cases, they are presented as rules. The type of conditional (Deontic or Neutral) as well as its content (Familiar, Plausible or Arbitrary) were manipulated, in samples of subjects of different ages (8 years old, 11 years old, 14 years old and ≥ 18 years old). The majority of the obtained results may be explained in the scope of the mental models theory and does not corroborate the predictions of the pragmatic reasoning schemas theory. In the syllogisms task, the usefulness of using other forms of answers` classification, forms that are different from the usual dualism between Correct and Non-Correct answers, is also stressed.
Description
Keywords
Raciocínio condicional Modelos mentais Esquemas pragmáticos Modus ponens Modus tollens Tarefa de selecção de cartões Conditional reasoning Mental models Pragmatic schemas Selection cards task
Citation
Análise Psicológica, 14, 533-552
Publisher
Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada