Publication
The mental model theory of free choice permissions and paradoxical disjunctive inferences
dc.contributor.author | Laird, Jennifer Ann | |
dc.contributor.author | Quelhas, Ana Cristina | |
dc.contributor.author | Rasga, Célia | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-01-27T12:05:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-01-27T12:05:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.description.abstract | Inferences of the sort: A or B; therefore A, are invalid. Yet, the paradoxes of free choice are acceptable: You can have sole or lobster; so, you can have sole. Pragmatic theories attempt to save logic. A semantic theory of human reasoning is founded on mental models of possibilities. “Or” refers to a conjunction of possibilities that each hold in default of knowledge to the contrary. A disjunction: it is permissible to do A or to do B, yields a deontic interpretation of the possibilities, and elicits mental models of a conjunction of default permissions. They yield or-deletions, such as: therefore, it’s permissible to do A. The theory predicts the paradoxes and new phenomena, which four experiments corroborated. For example, exclusive disjunctions such as: Few of the artists are brutalists or else cubists, have an intuitive model that yields or-deletions, but deliberation can construct models that refute them. | pt_PT |
dc.description.sponsorship | Fundação para a ciência e Tecnologia - FCT | pt_PT |
dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | pt_PT |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/20445911.2021.1967963 | pt_PT |
dc.identifier.issn | 20445911 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.12/8465 | |
dc.language.iso | por | pt_PT |
dc.peerreviewed | yes | pt_PT |
dc.relation | FCT/UIDB/05299/2020 | pt_PT |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | pt_PT |
dc.subject | Disjunctions | pt_PT |
dc.subject | Free choice permissions | pt_PT |
dc.subject | Mental models | pt_PT |
dc.subject | Modal logics | pt_PT |
dc.subject | Possibilities | pt_PT |
dc.subject | Quantifiers | pt_PT |
dc.title | The mental model theory of free choice permissions and paradoxical disjunctive inferences | pt_PT |
dc.type | journal article | |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
oaire.citation.conferencePlace | United Kingdom | pt_PT |
oaire.citation.endPage | 973 | pt_PT |
oaire.citation.issue | 8 | pt_PT |
oaire.citation.startPage | 951 | pt_PT |
oaire.citation.title | Journal of Cognitive Psychology | pt_PT |
oaire.citation.volume | 33 | pt_PT |
person.familyName | Laird | |
person.familyName | Quelhas | |
person.familyName | Maria Rasga | |
person.givenName | Jennifer Ann | |
person.givenName | Ana Cristina | |
person.givenName | Célia | |
person.identifier.ciencia-id | 121C-2F5E-5F46 | |
person.identifier.ciencia-id | A212-A40C-4A5D | |
person.identifier.orcid | 0000-0002-9482-7169 | |
person.identifier.orcid | 0000-0001-7698-2459 | |
person.identifier.orcid | 0000-0002-9969-6241 | |
person.identifier.rid | N-1794-2013 | |
person.identifier.scopus-author-id | 6507269378 | |
rcaap.rights | restrictedAccess | pt_PT |
rcaap.type | article | pt_PT |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | a0ef0e4c-5cee-4ba5-9482-9db6f2918dfe | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | f5924f9f-50e6-4a18-8aac-8a438ab577ea | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 6e25ea69-ae28-4926-b81f-54f34151d71b | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | a0ef0e4c-5cee-4ba5-9482-9db6f2918dfe |
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