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Publication
Raciocínio contrafactual e modelos mentais
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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
A ideia central deste estudo é de que «... raciocinar
sobre factos e raciocinar sobre possibilidades e impossibilidades,
baseia-se nos mesmos tipos de representações
mentais e processos cognitivos» (Byrne, 1997,
p. 107). Quer dizer que as pessoas raciocinam através
da construção e revisão de modelos mentais (e.g.,
Johnson-Laird, Byrne, 1991).
As condicionais contrafactuais requerem que os
raciocinadores tenham em mente não apenas o que é
suposto ser verdadeiro, mas também o que é supostamente
verdadeiro mas factualmente falso (Byrne,
1997, p. 117; cf. Johnson-Laird, Byrne, 1991, pp. 72-
-73). E a hipótese de que a representação inicial de
uma condicional contrafactual é mais explícita do
que a de uma condicional factual, permite prever que
as inferências Modus Tollens e Negação do Antecedente
deverão ser feitas com maior frequência a partir
das condicionais contrafactuais do que das factuais.
Byrne e Tasso (in press) encontraram evidência para
esta hipótese.
No estudo que apresentamos, também procuramos
replicar esses resultados encontrados por Byrne e
Tasso, e acrescentamos algumas hipóteses relacionadas
com as latências para compreender os dois tipos de
condicionais, e para escolher a conclusão. Utilizamos
condicionais neutras do tipo «Se houve um círculo,
então houve um triângulo», e apresentamos aos participantes
os quatro silogismos condicionais no programa
SUPERLAB.
The central idea in this study is that «... thinking about matters of fact and thinking about matters of possibility and impossibility are based on similar sorts of mental representations and cognitive processes» (Byrne, 1997, p. 107). That is to say that people reason by constructing and revising mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird, & Byrne, 1991). Counterfactual conditionals require reasoners to keep in mind not only what is presupposed to be true, but also what is suppositionally true but factually false (Byrne, 1997, p. 117; cf. Johnson-Laird, & Byrne, 1991, pp. 72-73). And the hypothesis that the initial representation of a counterfactual conditional is more explicit than the initial representation of a factual conditional, allows the prediction that Modus Tollens and Denial of the Antecedent inferences would be made more frequently from the counterfactual than from the factual conditionals. Byrne and Tasso (in press) found evidence for those predictions. In the present study, we look for replication of the data found by Byrne and Tasso, and we add some hypothesis related with the latencies to understand both kinds of conditionals, and to choose a conclusion. We use neutral conditionals like «If there was a circle, then there was a triangle», and we presented to participants the four conditional syllogisms in the SUPERLAB program.
The central idea in this study is that «... thinking about matters of fact and thinking about matters of possibility and impossibility are based on similar sorts of mental representations and cognitive processes» (Byrne, 1997, p. 107). That is to say that people reason by constructing and revising mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird, & Byrne, 1991). Counterfactual conditionals require reasoners to keep in mind not only what is presupposed to be true, but also what is suppositionally true but factually false (Byrne, 1997, p. 117; cf. Johnson-Laird, & Byrne, 1991, pp. 72-73). And the hypothesis that the initial representation of a counterfactual conditional is more explicit than the initial representation of a factual conditional, allows the prediction that Modus Tollens and Denial of the Antecedent inferences would be made more frequently from the counterfactual than from the factual conditionals. Byrne and Tasso (in press) found evidence for those predictions. In the present study, we look for replication of the data found by Byrne and Tasso, and we add some hypothesis related with the latencies to understand both kinds of conditionals, and to choose a conclusion. We use neutral conditionals like «If there was a circle, then there was a triangle», and we presented to participants the four conditional syllogisms in the SUPERLAB program.
Description
Keywords
Raciocínio contrafactual Modelos mentais Counterfactual reasoning Mental models
Citation
Análise Psicológica, 17, 713-721.
Publisher
Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada