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Seeing the conflict: An attentional account of reasoning errors

Publication . Mata, André; Ferreira, Mário Augusto Boto; Voss, Andreas; Kollei, Tanja

In judgment and reasoning, intuition and deliberation can agree on the same responses, or they can be in conflict and suggest different responses. Incorrect responses to conflict problems have traditionally been interpreted as a sign of faulty problem-solving—an inability to solve the conflict. However, such errors might emerge earlier, from insufficient attention to the conflict. To test this attentional hypothesis, we manipulated the conflict in reasoning problems and used eye-tracking to measure attention. Across several measures, correct responders paid more attention than incorrect responders to conflict problems, and they discriminated between conflict and no-conflict problems better than incorrect responders. These results are consistent with a two-stage account of reasoning, whereby sound problem solving in the second stage can only lead to accurate responses when sufficient attention is paid in the first stage.

2017Journal article

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Analytic and heuristic processes in the detection and resolution of conflict

Publication . Ferreira, Mário Augusto Boto; Mata, André; Donkin, Christopher; Sherman, Steven J.; Ihmels, Max

Previous research with the ratio-bias task found larger response latencies for conflict trials where the heuristic- and analytic-based responses are assumed to be in opposition (e.g., choosing between 1/10 and 9/100 ratios of success) when compared to no-conflict trials where both processes converge on the same response (e.g., choosing between 1/10 and 11/100). This pattern is consistent with parallel dualprocess models, which assume that there is effective, rather than lax, monitoring of the output of heuristic processing. It is, however, unclear why conflict resolution sometimes fails. Ratio-biased choices may increase because of a decline in analytical reasoning (leaving heuristic-based responses unopposed) or to a rise in heuristic processing (making it more difficult for analytic processes to override the heuristic preferences). Using the process-dissociation procedure, we found that instructions to respond logically and response speed affected analytic (controlled) processing (C), leaving heuristic processing (H) unchanged, whereas the intuitive preference for large nominators (as assessed by responses to equal ratio trials) affected H but not C. These findings create new challenges to the debate between dual-process and singleprocess accounts, which are discussed.

2016Journal article

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