Loureiro, Filipe PereiraGarcia-Marques, Teresa2018-04-022018-04-022018Thinking and Reasoning, 1-29. Doi: 10.1080/13546783.2018.14483001354-6783http://hdl.handle.net/10400.12/6309Material suplementar disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2018.1448300Research has established that human thinking is often biased by intuitive judgement. The base-rate neglect effect provides such an example, so named because people often support their decisions in stereotypical individuating information, neglecting base-rates. Here, we test the hypothesis that reasoners acknowledge information provided by base-rates and may use individuating information in support of a “rational” decision process. Results from four experiments show that “base-rate neglecting” occurs when participants acknowledge sample distributions; participants who prefer individuating over base-rate information perceive base-rates as less diagnostic and are more confident in their individuating-based responses; and that posterior probabilities (assigned after all relevant information is considered) predict more individuating-based responses for individuating-preference participants (suggesting a rational process). However, data also show a deeper form of base-rate neglect: even when some participants report to prefer base-rate information, define individuating information as non-diagnostic, and their posterior probabilities suggest otherwise, they still provide individuating-based responses.engJudgement and decision-makingIntuitionRationalityBase-ratesjournal article10.1080/13546783.2018.1448300