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HUMANNESS AND (IM)MORALITY IN GROUP RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Morality is a valued dimension within and between groups (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015), that has been consistently pointed out as part of what makes us uniquely human (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006). On the other hand, the extent to which we see others as fully human also impacts on other's moral status (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990). The two dimensions seem to have a narrow relation, which has recently begun to capture more attention (Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2012; Khamitov, Rotman, & Piazza, 2016; Vasiljevic, & Viki, 2014).

This thesis aims at analysing the relation between morality and humanness in group relations. A first research paper analysed the attribution and denial of moral traits to groups, integrating the role of humanness and valence in intergroup differentiation. By means of two studies we tested the hypothesis stating that within the moral domain, participants choose different strategies to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup depending on trait humanness and valence. Our results support this hypothesis, as we found that participants attributed more uniquely human traits to the ingroup, but only in case these were positive; in case these were negative the uniquely human traits were more attributed to outgroups.

In a second paper we analysed the relation between immorality and humanness, by using the evaluation of criminal behaviours as a proxy to address this relation. In our data, we found that Human Uniqueness and immorality did not correlate with each other. With this paper we also aimed at providing researchers with a range of validated stimuli to address these topics, which was exactly what we purposed ourselves to do in the last research paper presented in this thesis.

In a third paper we analysed how ingroup members deal with ingroup deviance, integrating the role of ingroup threat. Specifically, we analysed the humanness perception of a deviant ingroup member that behaves in an immoral but uniquely human way. We found that when the deviant behaviour was less threatening, the ingroup members humanised the deviant as much as the ingroup itself. However, when the deviant behaviour represented a threat to the ingroup image, the ingroup members dehumanised more the deviant member. In a second study we analysed the dehumanisation of the ingroup deviant, regarding two different types of behaviours, which vary in humanness and immorality. In both studies we also measured the perception of moral blame of the deviant member, integrating our results with previous findings (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013). Finally we addressed the different intragroup strategies that ingroup members use to deal with threats to the ingroup image.

Results are discussed in terms of their contribution to the relation between humanness and immorality, as well as the implications for dehumanisation theory. Future research is outlined.

Key-words: Dehumanisation; Morality; Immorality; Ingroup Threat

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Section I

Introduction

Chapter I. Dehumanisation

Dehumanisation is a psychological process that involves seeing others as less than human. Historically, the study of dehumanisation focused on the processes that justify interpersonal or intergroup conflicts. For Kelman (1973), one of the first authors to address this topic, dehumanisation provided an explanation for the mass violence that occurred in the context of genocidal policies, such as the Nazi Holocaust. Kelman argued that when people deprive fellow human beings of what makes them human, they are excluded from the human category. This replacement outside the category of humanness is what makes the moral restraints against killing more readily overcome. Opotow (1990) also defended that placing people outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply is what facilitates dehumanisation. The author argued that people morally excluded are seen as non-entities, denied basic humanness, and consequently harming them appears to be acceptable. Similarly, Bandura (1999) viewed dehumanisation as a psychological mechanism that allows the perpetrators to disengage from their damaging behaviour, after all dehumanised others worth less ethical treatment.

On the intergroup conflict's side, Bar-Tal (1989) proposed that dehumanisation is a delegitimization strategy, that consists in a collective shared representation of outgroups as non-human (e.g., savages, monsters), that justify extreme intergroup violence, and provide it with a sense of superiority. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered to be an example of a conflict that is fuelled by delegitimise representations of the respective sides, where the intervenients dehumanise the other group, perpetuating the violence and preventing a peaceful resolution (Oren & Bar Tal, 2006). Struch and Schwartz (1989) proposed that people are dehumanised when they are seen as lacking prosocial values or when their values are seen as incongruent with those of the perceiver's ingroup. The authors found that intergroup conflict is associated with greater perceptions that an outgroup is in violation of pro-social values (e.g., helpfulness, forgiveness, and compassion), which increases support for outgroup negativity. In line with this reasoning, Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, and Mihic (2008) found that Canadian participants express greater contempt for refugees and less support for Canadian refugee policies when refugees are described in a dehumanising manner (i.e., as violating moral values).

The theories described have in common a focus in blatant forms of dehumanisation that are believed to predict or justify violence at the interpersonal or intergroup level. Contemporary theorising, however, broadened the study of dehumanisation to more subtle

forms, emerging even in the absence of extreme intergroup violence. The main contributions for this new approach to dehumanisation were made by Leyens and colleagues (2001; 2007), with the Infrahumanisation account, and the Model of Dehumanisation proposed by Haslam (2006). Both approaches focused on the subtle tendency of scaling others on the human dimension (Haslam, 2015; Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008; Leyens et al, 2000; 2003; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012). The present work will be developed within this framework, and from now on the term dehumanisation will be used to refer to this subtle bias, except when specific terminology is required.

Infrahumanisation Theory

In the beginning of the century, Leyens and colleagues developed a framework for the study of subtle dehumanisation. The authors begun to establish what it means to be human, recognising that there are some characteristics are uniquely human, and not shared with animals (Leyens et al., 2000). Intelligence, language, emotions, sociability and values were the uniquely human categories cited more often in Leyens and colleagues sample, which found correspondence with the features identified by other authors (Chulvi & Perez, 2003).

Building on the idea that humanness is a fundamental dimension of social judgment in intergroup relations, the authors developed an approach to the study of subtle dehumanisation that they called infrahumanisation. Leyens and colleagues (2000) focused on the emotional side of humanness, considering that the attribution or denial of uniquely human emotions as a form of intergroup differentiation had not been investigated yet, unlike other uniquely human dimensions, such as intelligence (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) or language (Giles & Coupland, 1991). Furthermore, emotions are unlikely to depend on structural relationships between groups, and are not strongly associated with social norms that could enable social desirability, like intelligence or language (Demoulin et al., 2004b).

To test the infrahumanisation hypothesis that humanness is a fundamental dimension which groups reserve for their members, Leyens and colleagues analysed the differential attribution of uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions to the ingroup and outgroup (Leyens et al., 2001, for a review Leyens et al., 2007).

In a cross-cultural study, Demoulin and colleagues (2004a) tested the distinction between secondary or uniquely human emotions and primary or non-uniquely human emotions in lay theories. The results showed that people differentiate between emotions which

are considered uniquely human (e.g., admiration, pride, regret) from those which are not (e.g., joy, sadness, anger), showing a high agreement concerning the criteria that lead to this differentiation. Uniquely human emotions are caused by internal factors, are not easily observable, occur late in development, are not experienced in the same way by every people, and tend to last longer. On the other hand, emotions shared with other species are caused by external factors, are universally shared, are easily observed in others, and appear early in development. Rodriguez-Torres and colleagues (2005) also found evidence of the distinction between primary and secondary emotions, finding that it is a spontaneous categorisation used by lay people, which behaves like other meaningful categorisations. According to the authors, the distinction between primary and secondary emotions is useful for people precisely because it is an implicit differentiation which they are not aware of.

Demoulin and colleagues (2004a) also observed that uniquely human emotions are implicitly associated in memory with the human category. Participants associated uniquely human emotions to human beings faster than they did with animals. Moreover, the authors found that participants not only tend to associate more primary emotions with animals rather than humans, but also demonstrated some reluctance in associating these emotions with the human category.

Ensuring that emotions capture the essence of humanness, the infrahumanisation hypothesis was systematically studied in the last fifteen years. Using an attribution paradigm, Leyens and colleagues (2001) showed that people attribute more uniquely human emotions to their groups, and less to outgroups, suggesting that outgroups are seen as less human. No effect was found regarding non-uniquely human emotions, as these were equally attributed to both groups. Also, the greater attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroup was independent of trait desirability, indicating that what drove participants' trait choice was humanness and not ingroup bias. This effect was also tested in a within participants design (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodríguez-Torres, Rodríguez-Pérez, & Leyens, 2005; Gaunt, 2009), with the same results.

To ensure the generalisability of the infrahumanisation hypothesis, different paradigms were used, replicating the same conclusions. Paladino and colleagues (2002) used an adaptation of the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), using groups with different status. In four studies the authors found that participants were faster at associating the ingroup to secondary emotions and outgroups to primary emotions, regardless of the emotions being positive or negative, and the outgroup possessing a lower or higher

status than the ingroup. Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, and Leyens (2007) went further in a series of priming experiments by elucidating that what was causing the effect was actually the association between the ingroup and secondary emotions, and not an alternative association between the outgroup and primary emotions. Using a lexical decision task (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), the authors found that people were particularly quick in associating the ingroup with secondary emotions compared to the outgroup, while no differences were found for primary emotions.

An alternative explanation for the preferential attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup was tested by Cortes and colleagues (2005). Taking into account Demoulin and colleagues' (2004a) findings concerning the greater visibility of secondary over primary emotions, it would be reasonable to design the hypothesis that secondary emotions are more attributed to ingroup rather than outgroups because they are more difficult to identify, and are thus assigned to ingroup due to greater familiarity. However, this explanation was ruled out when the authors found that the familiar self was not more humanised than the ingroup or the outgroup, neither did participants attributed secondary emotions depending on the level of familiarity of different outgroups.

Finally, the Infrahumanisation Theory claims that what drives the differential attribution of uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions to ingroup and outgroups is the idea that one´s ingroup is fully human. Boccato, Capozza, Falvo, and Durante (2008) tested directly the association between the ingroup and the human concept in two studies, finding that participants associated the ingroup to human stimuli faster than they did with the outgroup. Vaes, Paladino, and Leyens (2006) also provided empirical support for this assumption, finding that, when primed with ingroup members (compared to outgroup members) who express themselves with secondary emotions, participants used more words related to uniquely human concepts in a word completion task. These results suggest that ingroup and outgroup members are perceived differently in human terms, and that the accessibility of the human concept is differently activated.

Although initially operationalised based on the differential attribution of uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions to ingroup and outgroups, the Infrahumanisation Theory was expanded to a non-emotional sphere. Viki, Winchester, Titshall, and Chisango (2006) used human-related (e.g., citizen) and animal-related (e.g., creature) words in a series of studies, concluding that participants differentiated the ingroup from the outgroup based on human-related words, whereas no such distinction was made regarding animal-related words.

Capozza, Boccato, Andrighetto, and Falvo (2009) also used another type of stimuli, this time human and ape faces, ambiguous and not ambiguous, finding that participants categorised ambiguous stimuli as ape more often in the ingroup than the outgroup condition. Vaes and Paladino (2010) also contributed to a different operationalisation of the infrahumanisation effect, by using stereotypical traits of the groups considered in the study.

Altogether, the infrahumanisation authors provided a tool to measure humanness, found evidence that ingroups are seen as more uniquely human when compared to outgroups, and emphasised the relative nature of the humanness intergroup differentiation, contrasting with the previous dehumanisation theories.

Although the subtle nature of this approach to dehumanisation, its consequences are not subtle at all. Indeed, seeing outgroup members as less human is a common and pervasive phenomenon that impacts negatively on people's behaviour. For instance, people are more willing to help an ingroup member that expresses himself with uniquely human emotions, than an outgrouper in the same condition (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002), demonstrate more avoidance reactions towards outgroup members (Vaes et al., 2003) and are less willing to take their perspective (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2004). The perception of uniquely human emotions also increases intergroup forgiveness in post-conflict situations (Tam et al., 2007), and impacts the support for reparation policies after wrong doing (Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008) and the empathy felt for a victim group (Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009).

Bi-Dimensional Model of Dehumanisation

Infrahumanisation represented an innovative approach to the study of humanness attribution, defining the human concept as that which is unique to our species. Haslam (2006; Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008) extended the comprehension of dehumanisation, by considering that the animal distinction was not the only way to define humanness. The author took Kagan's (2004) definition of how objects can be represented, i.e., either by its description, listing the core traits, or by comparison with the non-human, and proposed a bi-dimensional approach to represent humanness, including two senses, namely Human Nature and Human Uniqueness.

Attempting to demonstrate that the two senses of humanness did correspond to different constructs, Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, and Bastian (2005) used personality traits

from the five dimensions of the Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and Schwartz's (1992) values taxonomy. The authors found that not only the two representations of humanness correspond to different themes, but they are also uncorrelated. Human Nature referred to the central or typical traits, the core of human essence, involving emotionality, warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and depth. On the other hand, Human Uniqueness represents what is uniquely human, not shared with other species, comprehending civility, refinement, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity.

If there are two distinct senses of humanity, then two distinct forms of dehumanisation should be expected (Haslam, 2006). When a person or a group is deprived of Human Nature traits, mechanistic dehumanisation takes place, linking humans to inanimate objects, portraying individuals as lacking warmth, emotion, individuality, and human essence. When a person or group is denied Human Uniqueness traits they are deprived from what distinguishes humans from animals, thereby linked subtly or overtly, to animals, and seen as lacking refinement, self-control, morality, and rationality. This form of animalistic dehumanisations draws a parallel with the infrahumanisation bias.

The evidence found by Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, and Suitner (2008) supported this dehumanisation model. The authors developed a study in three distinct cultural samples (Australian, Chinese, and Italian) concluding that emotions and desires, Human Nature components, are the properties that best differentiate robots from humans, while properties involving high cognition and refined emotions, components considered uniquely human, are the ones that best differentiate humans from animals.

Subsequent studies demonstrated that different groups can use in a different manner the two types of humanness to differentiate their ingroup from outgroups, showing that the two types of humanness are contextually determined (Andrighetto, Baldissarri, Lattanzio, Loughnan, & Volpato, 2014; Bain, Vaes, Haslam, Kashima, & Guan, 2012; Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009).

The dual model extends beyond the Infrahumanisation Theory by incorporating the human-object distinction alongside with the human-animal distinction, which brings some innovations into the comprehension of the dehumanisation phenomena. First of all, it encompasses a new form of dehumanisation that relates to denials of Human Nature. Secondly, it can be applied to diverse forms of dehumanisation, subtle or blatant, like other models here discussed, and at the intergroup or interpersonal level, by bringing the self-humanisation effect into discussion. On the basis of Human Nature traits, the self can be

ascribed more humanness when compared with the generalised other (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam, Loughnan, Reynolds, & Wilson, 2007; Loughnan et al., 2010), which is not the case of the Uniquely Human dimension that operates at the intergroup level (Cortes et al., 2005).

Attribute, Metaphor, and Target Based Approaches to Dehumanisation

Humanness is a broad concept, as we have seen so far, and it can be either attributed or denied through different approaches.

Loughnan, Haslam, and Kashima (2009), in an attempt to integrate the different approaches to dehumanisation, started by differentiating between researches about dehumanisation that focus on the denial of human characteristics to others, the attribute-based approach, and those that focus on the association of others with non-human entities, the metaphor-based approach.

The attribute-based approach first defines and selects human characteristics and then verifies whether these are attributed differently to social targets. Research on infrahumanisation exemplifies this approach, focusing specially on the denial of uniquely human emotions to outgroup members (Boccato et al., 2007; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002), as well as the work of Haslam and colleagues (Haslam et al., 2005; 2008), which selected different personality traits to measure dehumanisation.

Metaphor-based approaches focus directly in the possibility that outgroups are linked to a non-human entity, such as animals or robots. Throughout history there have been many examples of enemy descriptions containing direct references to animal images, namely during the Second World War where the Nazis called the Jews “rats”, or usage of the term “cockroach” to designate Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide. Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson (2008) showed that this type of association still occurs today, and is not limited to intergroup conflict situations, by demonstrating that the association between Blacks and apes still persists in the mind of White Americans. The authors observed that White Americans tended to implicitly associate Blacks with ape images more often than they did with other wild animals, while none of these associations was observed on White targets. Furthermore, this association has negative consequences on Black compared with White criminals convicted of capital crimes, resulting in a higher probability of actually being executed (Goff et al., 2008, study 6).

Martínez, Rodríguez-Bailón, and Moya (2012) also focused on metaphors to measure animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. The authors used both explicit and implicit measures, concluding that while some outgroups are more associated with animal-related words (i.e., Gypsies), others are more associated with machine-related words (i.e., Germans).

Loughnan and colleagues (2009) were the first ones to show that attribute-based dehumanisation is strongly related with the attribution of the corresponding dehumanising metaphors. The authors gave participants a description of a fictitious group which either lacked one type of humanness or was associated with a non-human metaphor (animal or machine), verifying that participants were able to infer the attribute-based from the metaphor-based dehumanisation and vice-versa.

A new approach to dehumanisation was coined "target-based approach", as a reference to the target to which humanness is attributed or denied, disregarding the specific characteristic that is denied to others (for a review on this topic see Vaes et al., 2012). This approach proposes that not only uniquely human characteristics are more attributed to ingroups, but also that characteristics attributed to ingroups are judged to be more human than those same characteristics attributed to outgroups. This assumption is supported by Paladino and Vaes' (2009) findings, where the authors gave to the participants bogus information about their ingroup's typical characteristics (for instance, Italians) as well as of different outgroups (Slavs, Albanians, and Belgians), but only half of the participants were correctly informed, whereas the other half received the typical ingroup and outgroups traits reversed. The authors found that when the characteristics were said in advance to characterise the ingroup, they would be rated more human than when said to characterise the outgroup. These findings were shown to be independent of the characteristics' valence and type of traits used to describe the groups, suggesting that humanness is generalised to all kinds of things associated to our groups.

These results are in line with the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003), stating that people tend to project, and therefore to perceive the ingroup and its characteristics as more prototypical of the superordinate category (in this case humanness) than the outgroup and its characteristics.

Based on Paladino and Vaes' (2009) conclusions, Vaes and Paladino (2010) formulated an operationalisation of humanness based on group stereotypes. The authors looked at the uniquely human content of stereotypes in a large set of intergroup contexts, using the warmth and competence divide proposed by the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske,

Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Overall, Vaes and Paladino (2010) observed that ingroup stereotypes were judged more uniquely human than outgroup stereotypes, independently of the specific intergroup comparison situation, i.e., independently of the warmth or competence with which it was associated, the ingroup was seen as uniquely human. Moreover, a post-hoc analysis revealed that the ingroup stereotypes also differed in terms of competence and warmth as a function of the intergroup situation. Although similar variations in warmth and competence influenced the perception of the outgroup in human terms, the ingroup stereotypes remained invariably human.

These results reinforce the ones founded by Paladino and Vaes (2009), indicating that it matters to whom a trait is attributed, giving more support to the target-based dehumanisation. These results also highlight the distinction between the roles of ingroup and outgroup in differentiating both groups in human terms (Vaes et al., 2012).

In earlier formulations of the Infrahumanisation Theory (e.g., Leyens et al., 2000; 2003) it was defended that it comprised at the same time ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation. Indeed, the Infrahumanisation Theory was conceptualised as deriving directly from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), postulating that even in meaningless contexts the ingroup is seen as more uniquely human than the outgroup (Demoulin et al., 2009). Moreover, since the effect was consistently observed independently of valence, as we have already pointed out, it could not be explained by ingroup bias, including necessarily ingroup humanisation, and outgroup dehumanisation. Although the two biases often stand side by side, that may not always be the case (Brewer, 1999). Vaes and Paladino's (2010) results support this latter case. In their study, the humanness distinction between ingroup and outgroup was mainly created through the ingroup humanisation, whereas in other contexts what divided the effect was the combination of the ingroup humanisation and the denial of humanity to the outgroup. Vaes and colleagues (2012) pointed out that this variation suggests that what guides the process of humanness attribution may differ in the ingroup and outgroup.

Vaes and Paladino (2010) also signalised an issue which will turn out to be particularly relevant for this work. Although the literature on social stereotypes focuses largely on competence and warmth, a more recent set of studies showed that the two fundamental dimensions of perception are not the most important dimensions to positively distinguish the ingroup from the outgroup.

In fact, Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto (2007) found that morality is the most important dimension in order to feel good about the ingroup, and moreover it is largely independent of

competence and warmth. Furthermore, Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, and Yzerbyt (2012) examined the importance of the three social dimensions for predicting reactions towards outgroups, showing that while doing a global impression of outgroup, participants were mostly affected by morality characteristics.

Vaes and Paladino (2010) confronted the ingroup with several outgroups that differed on competence and warmth, unfolding changes of perception on the two dimensions. Nevertheless, the ingroup perception in the human dimension remained unchanged, regardless of the comparasion outgroup's competence and warmth. The authors considered that these results together with the ones founded by Leach and colleagues (2007) revealed the importance of deep-seated, uniquely human characteristics, such as morality, at describing one's own group.

Having that in mind, we shall devote the next chapter to discuss the importance of morality within intergroup relations.

Chapter II. Morality

Moral considerations play an important role in society by asserting what is right or wrong in human conduct. Due to its centrality in human life, morality has been a popular topic among academics, although the approaches to its study have been particularly changeable over time (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). During the middle ages morality was defined by virtue-based approaches, where honour occupied a prominent place, a heritage of Aristotle´s ethical treat *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the post-Enlightenment era the approach to morality evolved to a deontological approach, emphasising logical and universal principles, independent of individual's personal relations, or interpersonal consequences (Kant, 1797/2005). One still had to wait 200 years before the field of moral psychology departed from Philosophy, having its roots in Piaget's (1965) and Kohlberg's (1969) developmental approaches to moral intuitions and reasoning. However, it did not depart from the philosophical approach, in the sense that it did not incorporate the social-relational contexts in which moral judgements naturally occur. The cognitive-developmental approach to morality saw social influences as biases which may distort the expressions of moral judgements. Turiel (1983) put forward one of the most influential definition of morality within this approach, defining the moral domain as ''prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other'' (p. 3).

For social psychologists the study of morality was first dominated by themes were close to the moral domain and had been longstanding interests in the field, such as honesty (e.g., Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder & Coovert, 1986), justice (e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Lind, & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), pro-social behaviour (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1989; Isen & Levin, 1972), and empathy and egoism (e.g., Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). In fact, morality has become a current topic in Social Psychology ever since the 70s until now (Pagliaro, 2012), which is not surprising given its core role within social interactions (Rai & Fiske, 2011). What people consider morally ''good'' (Giner-Sorolla, 2012) is not just a purely individual question. As Leach, Bilali, and Pagliaro (2015) put it "if each individual operated under a purely idiosyncratic sense of morality, individuals would never have any sense of what others consider moral, and as a result would not know what actions to expect from others, and would have little basis for deciding how to act themselves." Morality can therefore be conceptualised in different ways (trustworthiness, cooperation, justice, or caring), but it always concerns treatment of people within social relationships.

During the past few decades social psychologists have addressed more systematically the social implications of morality in interpersonal relations and group processes, within various fields (Pagliaro, 2012). As a result, researchers have discovered the central role of morality in social judgment (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Leach et al., 2007), for instance, the importance in self and ingroup evaluations (Ellemers, Kingma, van de Burgt, & Barreto, 2011; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Leach et al., 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fisher, 2002a), and in forming impressions of other individuals or groups (Brambilla et al. 2011; 2012), or even group norms (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). These empirical researches have demonstrated the prominence of morality over other evaluative dimensions in determining the social judgments of individuals and groups (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013; Ellemers & van den Bos, 2012; Leach et al., 2015). In this chapter we will revise some of the literature from these areas, which will hopefully help to broader our understanding of morality's role within social relations.

The Importance of Morality in Social Judgements

Being moral and acting morally are parts of one's essential self (Blasi, 1983), despite of what people consider morally "good" may differ different groups and cultures (Sacheva, Singh, & Medin, 2011). What seems to be consistent is the importance that individuals attribute to morality matters. For instance, Rodriguez Mosquera and colleagues (2002a) examined samples from more (Spain) or less (Netherlands) honour oriented cultures, concluding that cultural values and norms can vary, but the importance of trustworthiness (a moral concern) is constant. The authors found that individuals were more likely to report negative feelings about themselves if they were thought to be dishonest or untrustworthy (vs. honest or trustworthy) (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002b).

People not only value morality, but also tended to see it more in themselves than in others. Epley and Dunning (2000) found that people tended to over-estimating one's own morality, the "holier than thou" effect. University students in the U.S. tended to overestimate how much they would donate to charity, cooperate with a peer, or help a peer compared to their actual behaviour. Epley and Dunning (2000) found that this sense of individual morality was achieved mainly by over-estimating one's own morality, rather than under-estimating others' morality. A similar conclusion was drawn by Balcetis, Dunning, and Miller (2008) in a study with students from individualist (western Europe, US) and collectivist (Spain, China) societies. The authors found that individualists, like Epley, and Dunning's participants, tended

to over-estimate the degree to which they would behave in a moral way. Similar to the "holier than thou" effect is the "Muhammad Ali effect", a reference to the famous boxeur and to his not less famous claim to be "the greatest, not the smartest" (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989). In Allison and colleagues studies, participants indicated they would be more likely to perform moral behaviours than other people, but not more likely to perform intelligent behaviours. Van Lange and Sedikides (1998) examined the reasons for this moral self-aggrandisement, finding that moral traits (in this case honesty) are believed to be more descriptive of the self than others, more desirable, more controlled and less verifiable than intelligence.

Morality is not only determinant to self-concept, it also dominates the impressions people form of others around them. When forming an impression of an individual or a group, people are confronted with a variety of information comprising traits and behaviours (Neuberg, & Fiske, 1987; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Several studies have shown that two fundamental dimensions of perception underlie this information, usually labelled as agency and communion (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007) or competence and warmth (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Despite differences in names there is a wide agreement on the common core underlying each of those dimensions (Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008). However, recent experimental work by Leach and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that the warmth dimension actually encompasses two distinct aspects, distinguishing between sociability and morality. Whereas sociability refers to cooperation and intention to connect with others (e.g., friendliness, likeability), morality refers to perceived correctness of social targets (e.g., honesty, sincerity, and trustworthiness). Although morality and sociability traits can be seen as falling along the same general dimension of evaluation (namely, warmth), they are conceptually distinct and play different roles at group and individual levels (Leach et al., 2007). A substantial amount of research has examined the importance attached by people to moral information when perceiving others behaviour or intentions (e.g., De Bruin, & van Lange, 2000; Martijn et al., 1992; Wojciszke, 2005; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), but generally encompassed traits that indicate both morality and sociability. Taking into account the evidence found by Leach and colleagues (2007) regarding the independence of the two dimensions, research has shown that people favour information indicating morality rather than sociability or competence in interpersonal and intergroup relations (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016). When asked to form a global impression, Brambilla and colleagues (2011) found that

participants were more interested in gathering information about individual's morality (such as sincere, honest, righteous, trustworthy, and respectful) than their sociability (such as kind, friendly, warm, likeable, helpful) or competence (intelligent, competent, efficient, skilful, and capable). Pagliaro, Brambilla, Sacchi, D'Angelo, and Ellemers (2013) examined how information about morality and competence impacts on people's behavioural intentions towards a newcomer at work. Following the procedure developed by Brambilla and colleagues (2011), employees of primary schools received a short page with trait information describing the degree of morality and competence of a prospective school manager. The school employees reported a more positive emotional and behavioural response towards the prospective new manager when he was described as a moral (vs. immoral) person. By contrast, the competence of the prospective school manager impacted less strongly on the emotional responses, and had no impact on the behavioural intentions reported by school employees.

Individuals attend to others' morality because it is an important guide on how to interact with them, but also on what to expect from them. People are so adept at inferring others' morality that they do this very quickly and spontaneously in interactions, on the basis of very little information. Willis and Todorov (2006) exposed participants to novel faces for either 1/10th of a second, half a second, or one second. Then participants would judge the faces on attractiveness, likeability, honesty, trustworthiness, competence, and aggressiveness. The authors found that even when exposed to the faces for only 1/10th of a second, participants were able to made very quickly (in about 1.7 seconds) fairly confident judgments of people's honesty and trustworthiness, whereas judging non-moral traits (such as likeability and competence) took longer. Self-reports also indicate that in social interactions people primarily express an interest in understanding whether someone's intentions are beneficial or harmful, rather than whether or not they are competent in enacting those intentions (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2008). When disclaiming others intentions are at quest, nothing is more informative than morality.

The Inferential Power of Morality

In social interactions people are primarily concerned about others' moral character, so they can infer whether someone's intentions are beneficial or harmful, whether this interaction will represent an opportunity or a threat (e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 2005; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Cottrell and Neuberg (2007) found that people consider trustworthiness as the most important

characteristic for the ideal other to have. Without information about trustworthiness it is difficult to ensure someone's moral character, and rely in their beneficial intentions (Leach et al., 2015).

When faced with negative information the inferential search about another´s morality is heightened. Those are the so called negativity effects – the greater impact of negative evaluative information rather than of equally intense positive stimuli when forming an impression of others (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990) – which are particularly pronounced in the case of morally relevant behaviours. Martijn, Spears, van der Pligt, and Jakobs (1992) found that while forming an impression of another´s morality, people place greater weight on negative information than on positive information, but do not do so with competence. In fact, people search mostly for evidence of immorality because immoral behaviours are taken to be specially diagnostic of a person's moral character (Reeder & Coover, 1986; Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999). Skowronski and Carlston (1987) found that dishonest behaviours are more diagnostic of immorality than honest behaviours are predictive of perceived morality. People expect dishonest people to act dishonestly, whereas both honest and dishonest people may act honestly because honest behaviour is normative (Reeder & Brewer, 1979).

Individuals seem to share a concern for evaluating others' morality since doing so is essential for choosing how to interact with them. This concern can be particularly relevant in the case of outgroups; knowing outgroups morality can disclaim whether we are facing a threat, or whether their intentions are beneficial.

Morality in Outgroups

A few studies addressed the moral content of outgroup stereotypes. In a cross-national research, Phalet and Poppe (1997) investigated the role of competence and morality, finding that participants viewed morality as a more desirable characteristic for outgroups to possess than competence. Leach, Minescu, Poppe, and Hagendoorn (2008) also addressed outgroup stereotypes, stressing the importance of examining both the generality and the specificity of stereotype content. The authors characterised views of two contrasting outgroups, Chechens and Jews, examining whether the power and benevolence dimensions, and the more specific characteristics that fall along them (e.g., trustworthiness, peacefulness, antagonism), offer complementary characterizations of the stereotypes of these two outgroups.

Leach and colleagues (2007) had already established the independence of morality and sociability, showing that these two dimensions represent distinguishable clusters of traits that

individuals ascribe to groups. In the third study the authors showed that the specific characteristics of morality (i.e., honest, sincere) and sociability (i.e., warm, likeable) were related to the positive evaluation of outgroups, depending on ingroup success. When an outgroup was said to be more successful than the ingroup, the perceived outgroup's morality was more important to positive evaluation than its perceived sociability. However, when this same outgroup was said to be less successful than the ingroup, it was the perceived sociability of the outgroup that was more empirically important to participants' positive evaluation of the outgroup. These results showed that although the characteristics of sociability and morality fall along the general dimension of benevolence, they capture different facets of benevolence, and hence should be treated as different dimensions of group perception (Leach, et al., 2015).

Building on Leach and colleagues' work, Brambilla et al. (2012) examined the importance of morality, sociability and competence on individual's impressions of outgroups. The authors instructed Italian students to imagine that an unfamiliar ethnic group, described as high or low in one of the three dimensions, would be immigrating to Italy in the next year. Participant´s global impression of the outgroup was most affected by morality traits; when described as morally high, the outgroup was evaluated more positively, on the contrary, when described as morally low, the outgroup was more negatively evaluated. In a third study, the authors investigated the link between morality and the experience of threat, finding that the more the members of the unknown outgroup were perceived as immoral, the more they were perceived as representing a threat.

Later on, in a new series of studies, Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, and Ellemers (2013) addressed this question. Italian students were asked to evaluate a target who was presented as an ingroup member (Italian descent) or outgroup member (Indian descent); to indicate if they felt threatened by the target (i.e., in terms of the group's identity or the group's safety); and finally, to indicate their behavioural intentions to approach (e.g., cooperate with) or avoid (e.g., distance themselves from) the target. The morality of the target was found to be the only dimension that significantly affected participants' experiences of threat, as well as their behavioural intentions. However, the impact of the target's morality differed depending on whether the target represented an ingroup or an outgroup member. The ingroup target lacking morality was experienced as a threat to the image of one's group, whereas the immoral outgroup target was seen as representing a threat to the safety of one's group. Even though both ingroup and outgroup targets raised behavioural avoidance rather than approach intentions when lacking morality, the desire to avoid the target was mediated by the

experience of group image threat in the case of an ingroup target, and by experiencing group safety threat in the case of an outgroup target.

Although people seem willing to avoid outgroup and ingroup targets which lack morality, they do so for different reasons. Avoiding immoral outgroups is a question of group safety, whereas avoiding an immoral ingroup member is a way of cutting implications for the image of the group.

Morality in Ingroups

According to the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) any dimension of evaluation can serve as basis for a positive ingroup evaluation, which has probably discouraged much of the empirical research at considering the nature of the dimensions of evaluation to be theoretically meaningful (Ellemers et al., 2013). Leach and colleagues (2007) were the first to consider the importance of morality for a positive ingroup identity, examining the role of morality for the group-level self-concept. In a series of studies the authors used different methods and different ingroups, and consistently found that participants considered morality traits (honest, sincere, trustworthy) as a primary source of ingroup virtue, and suggested that positive evaluations of a group in terms of morality can contribute more to a positive social identity than traits can indicate the group's competence (competent, intelligent, skilled) or sociability (likable, warm, friendly). Moreover, morality also revealed to be determinant for ingroup identification, with participants reporting identification with an experimentally created ingroup only depending on how moral they though it to be.

In a final set of studies, Leach et al. (2007) resorted to bogus information about ingroup level of morality, sociability, and competence, finding that ingroup pride only depended on the perceived morality of the group. Furthermore, only when the morality of the ingroup seemed deficient did participants distanced themselves from the group, by emphasising intragroup differences or claiming they were different from other group members. Informing the participants that their group lacked competence or sociability did not contribute to the tendency of distanciating the self from the ingroup. These results point in the same direction the aforementioned results of Brambilla et al. (2013).

Taken together, these evidences suggest that morality plays a role in groups' behavioural regulation. Ellemers and van den Bos (2012) addressed this topic arguing that shared moral standards help individuals defining who they are and where they belong, by providing them with self-relevant behavioural guidelines that they can use to express a

distinct and specific group-based identity. Identifying what is “right” or “wrong” can be used to judge whether the individual is a good group member, with social exclusion being the ultimate consequence for those who do not behave in line with group morals.

Pagliaro and colleagues (2011) showed that group members followed moral norms because they believed that such behaviour earned them the respect of fellow ingroup members, regardless of the specific behaviour prescribed by the norm. But when the group norms are not followed the ingroup can react against the deviant. Prior work on the black sheep effect has demonstrated that people tend to distanciate and exclude ingroup members that deviate from the group’s norms (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988).

When members of a particular social group agree upon specific moral standards, this provides them with a definition of what is considered to be right and wrong within their group - which is not necessarily shared with other groups (Ellemers et al., 2013). Taking the social identity approach into account, different behaviours, values, or goals, may be seen to characterise one’s group, depending on whether and how these may contribute to the group’s distinct identity. This means that, in principle, even negatively valenced group characteristics may fulfil the aim of establishing a distinct group identity (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). Ont the other hand, and given what was already exposed about the importance of morality, for groups and for self-concerns, to be seen as immoral may jeopardize the positive and distinct group identity. In this case, the group members will do everything to defend ingroup’s moral self-image against the threat represented by wrongdoing (e.g., Iyer, Jetten, & Haslam, 2012).

Some research has showed how groups deal with ingroup wrongdoings. For instance, Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) confronted European American students with historical evidence regarding the mass killing of Native Americans. Those who were told that the mass killing was an intentional extermination saw Native Americans as less human. The dehumanisation of the victim outgroup served to reduce the perceived responsibility of European Americans and to legitimise the violence. Because the same standards of morality are thought not to apply to sub-humans or non-humans, violence against such outgroups is not perceived as a moral violation (Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990). Despite moral norms and codes being often said to apply universally – to all people under all circumstances – it seems to depend largely on the appreciation of others humanness. If we are not seen as equally human (Leyens et al., 2007), then the moral treatment that we inspire should be different too.

It seems clear then that morality stands in relation with dehumanisation. In the next chapter we will revise some of the investigation relating these two topics.

Chapter III. Dehumanisation and Morality

By principle, every person deserves moral treatment simply by virtue of being human (Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2012). However, as we have already seen, humanness is not universally ascribed to everyone. When we see others as fully human, we see them as deserving moral treatment and concern about their well-being. However, when people are not seen as fully human, they are excluded from the moral circle, and consequently their suffering becomes less visible and our willingness to help them decreases (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Opotow, 1990). Moral standing and moral action are therefore entwined with humanness, having great consequences in various social domains.

In the beginning of the first chapter we referred to some studies that focused on moral exclusion and more blatant forms of dehumanisation. In this chapter we will cover some work that links the study of humanness and subtle dehumanisation with moral psychology.

Mind Perception, Moral Status, and Humanness

Recently research linked the perception of mind with moral status. Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007) began to demonstrate that mind attribution falls along two separate dimensions, namely Agency and Experience. In an international survey they asked people to evaluate the Agency, Experience, and the moral standing of different entities, including a dog, a normal adult, a child, a person in a vegetative state, a foetus, a robot, a dead person, a chimpanzee, and God. The authors found that moral standings tapped on moral rights, by asking which entities would be the most difficult for the participants to harm – which entities deserved more protection from harm – and which entities should be more punished for causing someone's death – moral blame. The results showed that people perceived the minds of these entities along the two mentioned mental dimensions (Agency and Experience), and more important, that those two dimensions of mind predicted the entities moral standards.

Agency is the capacity to do and intend, and includes mental capabilities such as thinking, self-control, and communication, and endows an entity with moral responsibility and warranted punishment for killing another. Experience is the general capacity for sensation and feeling, and includes attributes such as emotion, consciousness, and personality, which determine whether an entity deserves moral rights and protection from harm. Those perceived as having more agency are moral agents – entities capable of doing good or evil, right or

wrong – and those perceived with more experience are moral patients – capable of experiencing good or evil, right or wrong, done to them (Gray & Wegner, 2012).

These dimensions are generally independent, which means that an entity can have agency without experience or experience without agency. More broadly, this demonstrates that mind-having is not simply a matter of degree (less vs. more) but of type (agency, experience, or both). These two dimensions of mind map onto other dimensions through which we perceive others, including warmth (experience) and competence (agency; Fiske et al., 2007) as well as Human Nature (experience) and Human Uniqueness (agency; Haslam et al., 2008; 2012).

Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, and Koval (2011) confirmed this pattern in relation to perceived humanness, finding that people seen as lacking uniquely human traits were viewed as less blameworthy and punishable for immoral behaviour, whereas people seen as lacking Human Nature were judged less worthy of protection, less capable of rehabilitation, and less deserving of praise for moral behaviour. These results indicate that basic aspects of moral status are associated in distinctive ways with the dimensions of humanness.

Bastian and colleagues (2011) established the relation between Human Uniqueness and moral blame for immoral behaviour. However, in later studies a different pattern of results was found. Bastian, Denson, and Haslam (2013) found that the more dehumanised was the agent of an immoral behavior, the more morally blame he was considered to be.

The authors analysed the impact of dehumanisation and moral outrage in retributive justice, in response to criminal behaviour. Bastian and colleagues (2013) found that people feel morally outraged by harmful crimes, and dehumanise the perpetrators of these crimes. They also found that the more dehumanised was the agent of the criminal behaviour, the more morally blamed he was considered to be. Although they used a unique measure for dehumanisation that comprises both Human Uniqueness and Human Nature, the relation between humanness and moral blame took a different direction from the one found in the previous studies developed by Bastian and colleagues (2011). The authors later advanced the hypothesis that these differences were due to the nature of the behaviour; when dehumanisation appears in response to criminal behaviour, it can be combined with the moral character of the individual, leaving his responsibility unchanged.

Overall, it seems that the extent to which individuals or groups are ascribed or denied humanness is therefore likely to affect the everyday moral judgments involving them. On the other hand, immorality also seems to have some costs in the perception of humanness.

The Humanness Costs of Immorality

Acting or being viewed as immoral has costs for the humanness of individuals, ingroups, and outgroups. For instance, Bastian and Haslam (2010) analysed the effects of social ostracism, behaviour considered immoral, in dehumanisation. The authors found that when people were ostracised they judged themselves and those who ostracised them as less human and believed they were also viewed as less human by the perpetrators.

Bastian, Jetten, Chen, Radke, Harding, and Fasoli (2013) extended these results, by examining how people evaluated themselves in response to their own harmful behaviour. The authors found that when engaging in the social ostracism of others, people see themselves as less human. Specifically, the authors provided evidence that perpetrators of social ostracism see themselves as less human compared with when they engage in a more positive interpersonal interaction. Moreover, they showed that it was the perceived immorality of one's behaviour that which explained the self-dehumanisation process. In contrast with the moral disengagement literature, these studies highlight that self-dehumanisation also arises from engaging with the moral consequences of behaviour.

As stated in the previous chapter, dehumanising others may also serve to reduce the affective and moral consequences of one's actions. In the above cited studies, Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) used different ingroups (humans, British, White Americans) and outgroups (aliens, Australian Aborigines, and Native Americans), finding that when participants were made aware of ingroup's mass killing of outgroup members, they dehumanised the victims more. The perception of collective responsibility, not just the knowledge that outgroup members had died in great numbers, was shown to be necessary for this effect. Dehumanisation also occurred concurrently with increased collective guilt but was unrelated to it. The authors proposed that dehumanisation might be a strategy for people to reestablish psychological equanimity when confronted with a self-threatening situation and that such a strategy may occur concomitantly with other strategies, such as providing reparations to the outgroup. This follows the idea that denying full human status to the victims allows people to disengage self-sanctions (Bandura, 1999).

Immorality has also negative consequences for outgroup dehumanisation. Esses and colleagues (2008) tested the role of refugees' dehumanisation, who were claimed to be immoral, by determining emotional reactions and attitudes toward them, and toward the current refugees' policy. The authors demonstrated that dehumanising refugees lead to greater contempt and lack of admiration, resulting in less favourable attitudes toward the group and toward the nation's current refugees' policy. The authors suggested that eliciting negative emotions facilitates openly expressing negative attitudes toward the group in question and denying the group access to required resources.

The impact of moral and humanness perceptions has a wide impact in various social domains, and it may be a perverse phenomenon by affecting daily judgments that are beyond our conscience.

Overview of the Studies

Despite the extensive literature on morality and humanness, empirical evidences on the relation between these two dimensions are still limited. The set of empirical studies that form this thesis aimed at analysing the relation between morality and humanness both in inter and intragroup relations.

Morality is a valued dimension within and between groups (Ellemers et al., 2013; Leach et al., 2015) and is consistently pointed out as part of what makes us uniquely human (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006). Therefore, our first goal was to address the attribution and denial of humanness to groups in the moral domain. In the dehumanisation literature, the attribution and denial of humanness to groups is consistently referred as a process that occurs independently of the valence of the uniquely human characteristics (Leyens et al., 2001; 2007; Paladino & Vaes, 2009). Taken the importance of morality for ingroup proud and ingroup positive evaluation (Leach et al., 2007), we hypothesised that ingroup members would have some reluctance in ascribing moral traits that are uniquely human, though negative, to their groups.

In paper 1 - "More human than others, but not immoral: On the attribution of humanness with moral characteristics" - we analysed the attribution and denial of moral traits to groups, integrating the role of humanness and valence in intergroup differentiation. Across three studies we tested the hypothesis stating that in moral domain ingroup members choose different strategies to differentiate ingroup and outgroups depending on trait humanness and valence.

In paper 2 - “The relation between Human Uniqueness and Immorality: An index of behaviours” - we focused mainly on the evaluation of criminal behaviours in morality and Human Uniqueness dimensions. Criminal behaviour is considered immoral, as it involves harming another person. This immoral evaluation of the criminal behaviour is pointed out as impacting the perception of the person who practices the behaviour as lacking humanness (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013). Therefore, we used this evaluation as a proxy to address the relation between immorality and humanness.

In paper 3 - “Dealing with inside Immorality and Human Uniqueness: The role of ingroup threat” - we analysed how ingroup members deal with ingroup deviance, specifically, how they evaluate the humanness of an ingroup member that behaves immorally but uniquely human. We integrated the role of ingroup threat to address the perception of humanness of the deviant member. In two studies we manipulated the level of ingroup threat (Study 1) and used two criminal behaviours taken from paper 2 (Study 2). We hypothesised that depending on the level of threat that the deviant behaviour represents to ingroup image, the deviant would be more or less dehumanised, compared with the ingroup. In this paper we also analysed how morally blame the deviant was considered to be, integrating Bastian and colleagues’ (2013) findings. Finally, we analysed the different strategies ingroup members may choose when dealing with ingroup threat.

Section II

Empirical Section

More human than others, but not immoral: On the attribution of humanness with moral characteristics

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Abstract

Morality is a valued dimension within and between groups and is consistently pointed out as part of what makes us uniquely human. In this paper we analyse the attribution and denial of moral traits to groups, integrating the role of humanness and valence in intergroup differentiation. Across two studies we test the hypothesis that within the moral domain, participants choose different strategies to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup depending on trait humanness and valence. Our results support this hypothesis, since participants attributed more uniquely human moral traits to the ingroup, but only when positive; when negative the uniquely human moral traits were more attributed to outgroups. We did not found the same pattern of results on non-uniquely human moral traits, allowing to discard the explanation of a valence-based ingroup bias and outgroup derogation. The results are discussed within dehumanisation, ingroup bias and outgroup derogation.

Key-words

Morality, Dehumanisation, Valence, Intergroup relations

Dehumanisation has been a popular topic in Social Psychology literature. History is filled with examples of human groups pictured as closer to animals, not entirely human, as for example indigenous people stereotyped as brute savages, immigrants linked to invasive pests, or victims of genocide labelled as vermin by the perpetrators. The multiple episodes of mass murderer and ethnical conflicts during the twentieth century motivated social psychologists to analyse dehumanisation systematically, searching for an explanation for those episodes. One

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of the first authors to address this topic was Kelman (1973). He argued that when fellow human beings are deprived of what makes them human, we are excluding them from the human category. This replacement outside the human category is what makes the moral restraints against killing more readily overcome. The idea that moral exclusion is a form of dehumanisation was also defended by Opotow (1990). She argued that placing people outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply, makes these people to be seen as non-entities, and consequently harming them appears acceptable.

Morality seems to have a narrow relation with dehumanisation, at least for the explanation of these phenomena in conflict contexts. Over the last fifteen years the study of dehumanisation has moved from an approach based on extreme intergroup phenomena, and has been analysed outside the domains of violence and cruelty. Two main research programmes have been responsible for this paradigm shift: Leyens and colleagues with the formulation of the infrahumanisation theory (Leyens et al., 2003; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007) and Haslam and colleagues's dehumanisation model (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008). Both research programmes started at capturing what it means to be human, as a first step to analyse what is denied to others when we dehumanised them.

Morality has been pointed out as one humanness dimension (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006), but in what subtle dehumanisation concerns, it has been understudied. In this paper we intend to fill this gap by analysing the attribution and denial of humanness to groups within the moral domain.

Infrahumanisation and Dehumanisation

Leyens and colleagues were the first authors to overcome the dehumanisation link to violence and moral exclusion, arguing that this process may be subtle, in contrast with the blatant denials of humanness described by early dehumanisation theorists. They called this subtler form of perceiving others as less human as "infrahumanisation", to distinguish it from other forms of dehumanisation (Leyens et al., 2001). The infrahumanisation effect is the tendency to ascribe more human qualities to ingroup than outgroups. Humanness was defined by the authors as those characteristics that are unique to our species, exemplified by secondary emotions, which are reserved to one's groups and denied to outgroups, independently of characteristics' valence. This differential attribution of uniquely human characteristics implies that the ingroup is more human than the outgroup, leaving the outgroup to be seen as not fully human (Leyens et al., 2007). The infrahumanisation effect was

consistent in a large body of research (for reviews, see Leyens et al., 2007; Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012), and it appears in different intergroup contexts and in the absence of intergroup conflicts (Leyens et al., 2003; Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, 2009). The effect was demonstrated in judgment tasks, typically involving the attribution of emotions to groups, and also using implicit association methods (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Paladino et al., 2002). It can be shown in which cases humanness is represented through secondary versus primary emotions or through more directly human- and animal-related words (Viki, Winchester, Titshall, & Chisango, 2006), and has a variety of behavioural implications (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003).

Infrahumanisation theory provided a clear understanding of what humanness is, by contrasting humans with animals. It also provided methods to analyse subtle dehumanisation based on the primary-secondary emotion distinction, through which the differential attribution of humanness to ingroup and outgroups can be tested.

Haslam's dehumanisation model expanded the understanding of what is denied when we dehumanise, by developing a bi-dimensional approach to the representation of humanness. Considering that humanness can be represented by the comparison with or the description of the non-human (Kagan, 2004), the authors proposed a representation of the concept as Human Uniqueness, i.e., the human-animal distinction, and Human Nature, which consists in the opposition of humanness and inanimate objects, such as machines and automata. Ratings of the extent to which traits reflect Human Uniqueness and Human Nature are uncorrelated, and have different content. Whereas humans are distinguished from animals on the basis of attributes involving cognitive capacity, civility, and social refinement, we differ from inanimate objects on the basis of our emotionality, flexibility, and warmth (Haslam, 2006). A large body of research demonstrated that lay people recognise the two distinct forms of humanness (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005; Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008), that knowledge of them is highly convergent across cultures (Bain, Vaes, Haslam, Kashima, & Guan, 2012; Park, Haslam, & Kashima, 2012) and finally that they also appear to be denied to groups in different ways (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).

Given two senses of humanness, two forms of dehumanisation can be expected. Haslam (2006) proposed that whenever individuals are denied Human Uniqueness they are subtly or overtly linked to animals. According to Haslam this "animalistic" form of

dehumanisation captures phenomena ranging from the most blatant genocidal labelling of people as vermin to the subtlety of infrahumanisation. On the other hand, when a person or group is denied Human Nature they are linked to inanimate objects or automata, and seen as lacking the human essence.

The two approaches to the study of dehumanisation started by defining what it means to be human, and both identified morality as a feature that distinguishes humans from animals (Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006). Therefore, we can hypothesise that humanness is an important dimension when groups ascribe and deny moral traits. In this paper we will analyse the attribution of morality mapped onto humanness, following Leyens and colleagues' (2001) procedure. However, in the case of morality, and contrary to what happens with emotional dehumanisation, we believe that valence is also relevant for intergroup attributions. Morality is known to be an important social dimension within and between groups (Ellemers & van den Bos, 2012; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015) and furthermore it impacts on ingroup proud and ingroup positive evaluation (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).

The Importance of Morality in Groups

Morality plays a central role in social relations. Being moral and acting morally are part of one's essential self (Blasi, 1983), impacts on self-evaluations (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fisher, 2002), influences the process of forming impressions of other individuals or groups (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013), and gives inform about others intentions (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworszki, 1998).

Although traditionally analysed through an individual approach, the study of morality has been further extended to groups. Leach and colleagues (2007) examined the importance of morality on individual's positive evaluation of ingroups. In a series of studies, the authors compared the importance which individuals ascribe to morality, sociability, and competence, showing that participants considered morality traits (honest, sincere, trustworthy) as a primary source of ingroup virtue and pride, and contributing to a more positive social identity than traits indicating group's competence (competent, intelligent, skilled), or sociability (likable, warm, friendly). Moreover, in this study morality has also revealed to be determinant for ingroup identification, the more an experimentally created ingroup was considered to be moral, the greater was the identification reported by participants.

The authors also analysed how morality impacts on outgroup's evaluations. They manipulated group success and examined the attribution of positive traits to a relevant outgroup that was more or less successful than the ingroup. The attribution of morality was not the most important condition for an outgroup's positive evaluation, independently of relative group success. Indeed, competence was more important to positively evaluate the more successful outgroup, and sociability was more important to positively evaluate the less successful outgroup. More interesting were the ingroup´s attributions. Despite the context being largely irrelevant to morality, the authors found that morality was once again the characteristic that was most important to positively evaluate the ingroup, regardless of the ingroup's relative success. These results suggest that morality plays a central role in the evaluation of ingroups, but not in the outgroups evaluation, hence implying that morality is a dimension reserved to ingroups.

Brewer and Campbell's (1976) work corroborates the idea that morality is the one characteristic that ingroups consistently attribute more to themselves than to outgroups. The authors conducted a survey of intergroup perceptions in East Africa were they presented a lengthy list of character traits (both positive and negative) and asked respondents to indicate which groups were most likely to exhibit each trait. The authors found that the attributions of positive traits, such as peaceful, honest, and friendly, were almost universally reserved for ingroup, whereas the assignment of negative traits, such as dishonest and cruel, varied considerably across outgroups. But more interestingly, the results did not reveal a similar level of ingroup positivity bias on traits such as smart, wealthy, and progressive. Later on, Brewer (1986) found similar results in 20 different locations. In ethnographic interviews, she learned that some groups were willing to describe themselves as lacking competence, sociability, prestige, or strength, but not morality. Across this diverse set of ethnic groups, members of nearly every ingroup described themselves as highly moral.

These studies highlight the importance people attach to ingroup morality, revealing the ingroups motivation to not be seen as lacking morality. On the other hand, some studies can help us to understand what ingroup members do once confront with ingroup immoral actions. When faced with an ingroup's wrongdoing, ingroup members need to find strategies to cope with the threat posed by the immoral behaviour. This can be done by making flattering interpretations of the ingroup's wrongdoing and its consequences for others (e.g., Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), or by moral disengagement strategies (Bandura, 1999), such as dehumanising the victims of ingroup's wrongdoing (Castano & Giner-Sorolla,

2006). In intergroup conflicts, ingroups can also maintain their moral superiority over their adversary by endorsing narratives that legitimise ingroup violence, delegitimise the opponent, and emphasise the ingroup's victimisation (Bar-Tal, 1989). These studies reinforce the idea that it is unlikely that ingroup members would be willing to be associated with negative moral traits, quite on the contrary, they are motivated to be seen as highly moral. Therefore, we hypothesise that valence, along with humanness, has an important role in the attribution of morality.

In two studies we tested the hypothesis that in moral domain the dehumanisation effect will be verifiable only for positive traits. More specifically, we expect ingroup members to attribute more uniquely human traits to the ingroup than to outgroups, only when the moral traits are positive; when negative, we expect ingroup members to attribute less moral traits to the ingroup than to outgroups, independently of whether the trait is uniquely or non-uniquely human. In Study 1 we used a between design, in order to make a direct test to our hypothesis, namely by allowing participants to see only positive or negative uniquely and non-uniquely human moral traits. In Study 2 we used a within subject design, and made a robust test to the hypothesis by extending the results to two different outgroups, Gypsies (Study 2a) and Moroccans (Study 2b).

Study 1

Method

Participants.

Participants were 62 Portuguese citizens (47 of which female) with ages ranging from 18 to 54 (M = 31.79, SD = 8.99) in the positive trait condition, and 50 Portuguese citizens (35 of which female) with ages ranging from 19 to 43 (M = 27.38, SD = 5.13) in the negative trait condition.

Procedure and materials.

Participants took part in this study through an online platform. Before initiating the study, it was asked for the participants' informed consent. After agreeing on participating voluntarily, each participant was assigned to one of the two study conditions. In both conditions participants were asked to complete the moral dehumanisation measure, both for the ingroup and outgroup. Finally participants also responded to the ingroup identification scale, as a control measure.

Moral dehumanisation measure.

We used Leyens and colleagues' (2001) methodology, each participant saw a list of 6 moral traits, and then were asked to pick those traits which they thought to better describe ingroup members (Portuguese). Afterwards they were asked to do the same for outgroup members (Gypsies). The order of the group presentation was counterbalanced. Participants assigned in the positive trait condition only saw positive moral traits, whereas participants in the negative trait condition only saw negative moral traits.

A pre-test was conducted in order to identify the positive uniquely and non-uniquely human moral traits, as well as the negative uniquely and non-uniquely human moral traits. Thirty moral traits taken from Henriques, Gouveia-Pereira, and Miranda (2010) were pretested, of which 12 were selected for the final measure: 3 positive uniquely human (e.g. "justiça" [justice]; M_{uh} = 5.66, SD_{uh} = 1.12, M_{val} = 6.69, SD_{val} = 0.36), 3 positive non-uniquely human (e.g. "lealdade" [loyalty]; M_{uh} = 3.96, SD_{uh} = 1.45, M_{val} = 6.68, SD_{val} = 0.58), 3 negative uniquely human (e.g. "desonestidade" [dishonesty]; M_{uh} = 5.77, SD_{uh} = 1.59, M_{val} = 1.47, SD_{val} = 0.53) and 3 negative non-uniquely human (e.g. "crueldade" [cruelty]; M_{uh} = 3.94, SD_{uh} = 1.46, M_{val} = 1.67, SD_{val} = 0.63).

The analysis performed assured that the moral traits were orthogonal as to their level of uniquely humanness and valence. As such, uniquely human moral traits were judged as more uniquely human than non-uniquely human moral traits ($F(1, 29) = 53.628$, $p \leq .0001$, $\eta_p^2 = .649$), but did not differ in terms of valence ($F(1, 29) = .04$, $p = .842$). At the same time, the positive moral traits were evaluated as more positive than the negative moral traits ($F(1, 31) = 1244.134$, $p \leq .0001$, $\eta_p^2 = .976$) and this effect was not qualified by moral traits' human uniqueness ($F(1, 31) = 2.709$, $p = .110$).

Identification scale.

We used Leach and colleagues' (2008) identification scale. The scale comprises of 14 items and participants indicated their agreement with them on 7-point scales ($\alpha = .9$) ranging from 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree.

Results and Discussion

Ingroup identification.

Ingroup identification was calculated taking the mean of the fourteen identification items. In both conditions the mean ingroup identification was higher than the middle point of

the scale (M = 4.515, SD = 1.222; M = 4.666, SD = .934; for positive and negative conditions respectively), and since there was no variation between conditions (F(1, 109) = .513, p >.1), this variable will be left out in the remaining analyses.

Moral dehumanisation.

For each condition, two composite scores of the number of moral uniquely and non-uniquely human words attributed to the Portuguese group and the Gypsies group were computed for each participant by combining the selected words. This number could vary between 0 and 3.

A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to check for significant differences in the association of the ingroup versus outgroup with uniquely and non-uniquely human words. A significant interaction between humanness and target group was revealed by condition (F(1, 110) = 48.456, p < .001, η_p^2 = .306). As expected, in the positive trait condition participants selected more uniquely human moral traits to the ingroup (F(1, 61) = 4.773, p < .001, η_p^2 = .363), whereas the non-uniquely human moral traits were more selected for the outgroup (F(1, 61) = 9.254, p < .003, η_p^2 = .132) (see Table 1). We did not find a target main effect (F(1, 61) = 2.297, p = .135), indicating that participants differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup based on the humanness of the positive moral traits. Overall, when restricted to positive traits to choose, participants selected the uniquely human traits for their group, assuring the humanness of the ingroup.

In the negative trait condition a target main effect was found, indicating that these traits were more attributed to the outgroup (F(1, 49) = 33.62, p < .001, η_p^2 = .407), and the effect was qualified by the trait humanness. The negative uniquely human moral traits were more ascribed for the outgroup than ingroup (F(1, 49) = 41.263, p < .001, η_p^2 = .457), whereas the non-uniquely human negative moral traits were equally attributed to the outgroup and ingroup (F(1, 49) = 1.205, p = .278) (see Table 1). The outgroup was evaluated more negatively than the ingroup, though not any type of negativity, but rather uniquely humanness negativity.

Moral Traits	*Target*	*Positive Trait Condition*		*Negative Trait Condition*	
		Mean	*Std. Error*	*Mean*	*Std. Error*
Uniquely Human	Ingroup	1.145**	.105	.600*	.099
	Outgroup	.403*	.067	1.400*	.111
Non-Uniquely Human	Ingroup	.855**	.119	.680	.083
	Outgroup	1.306*	.099	.800*	.103

* p ≤. 05; ** p ≤ .01

Table 1: Means and standard errors of the attribution of uniquely and non-uniquely human moral traits to the ingroup and outgroup in positive and negative traits conditions.

Overall these results suggest a different intergroup differentiation pattern in each condition. In the positive trait condition our results follow those of Leyens and colleagues' (2001), since as expected participants attributed more uniquely human moral traits to the ingroup compared to the outgroup. The novelty concerns the negative trait condition, since in this case the uniquely human moral traits were more attributed to outgroup. This effect was not just a reflection of outgroup negativity, as the negative non-uniquely human moral traits were equally attributed to both groups. In Study 2 we aimed at replicating these results in a within subject design, and test whether these results could be generalised to other groups. In order to do so, we performed two identical studies, except for the group target.

Studies 2a and 2b

Method

Participants.

Participants in Study 2a consisted of 38 undergraduate Psychology students from a Portuguese university. Of these, 2 participants were excluded for not being native Portuguese speakers, leaving the sample with 31 female and a mean age of 21.67 years old (*SD* = 5.91).

In Study 2b participants consisted of 34 undergraduate Psychology students from the same university as Study 2a. Once again, 3 participants were left out of the final sample for not being native Portuguese speakers. In the end 27 were female and the sample's mean age was 20.97 years old (*SD* = 4.2).

Procedure and materials.

The materials and procedure of Study 2a and 2b were exactly the same, the only difference between the two studies being the outgroup target: in Study 2a we used the Gypsies group as the outgroup target, same as we did in Study 1, while in Study 2b the outgroup was the Moroccan. In both studies we used Portuguese as ingroup.

The studies were conducted in the university's laboratory, and participants took part in exchange for course credits. The procedure followed that of Study 1, where participants were first asked to complete the moral dehumanisation measure, but this time the measure comprised of both the positive and the negative traits used in each condition of Study 1. Participants saw the 12 traits at the same time and were asked to select those which they thought to better describe the members of the ingroup (Portuguese) and likewise the members of the outgroup (Gypsies or Moroccan). Once again the order of the group presentation was counterbalanced. After having completed the moral dehumanisation measure for each group, participants answered the ingroup identification scale. This measure was again used as a control variable.

In the end, all participants were thanked and debriefed.

Results and Discussion

Ingroup identification.

Similarly to Study 1, in Study 2a and 2b the mean ingroup identification was higher than the middle point of the scale (M = 4.651, SD = 1.044; M = 4.856, SD = .965; for each study respectively), and since there was no variation between studies (F(1, 65) = .694, p >.1), this variable was not further considered in the remaining analyses.

Moral dehumanisation.

Following the procedure of Study 1, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA to check for significant differences in the association of each group with uniquely and non-uniquely human words, this time with valence taken as a within factor.

In Study 2a (Portuguese and Gypsies) this analysis revealed a significant interaction between humanness and valence by group target (F(1, 35) = 10.977, p = .002, η_p^2 = .239). A main effect of target indicates that participants attributed more positive traits to the ingroup than outgroup (M_{ingroup} = 1.04, SD_{ingroup} = .682; M_{outgroup} = .618, SD_{outgroup} = .551; F(1, 35) = 16.716, p < .001, η_p^2 = .216), and this effect was qualified by humanness. Positive uniquely

human traits were more attributed to the ingroup than to the outgroup ($M_{ingroup}$ = 1.139, $SD_{ingroup}$ = .83; $M_{outgroup}$ = .306, $SD_{outgroup}$ = .577; $F(1, 35) = 35$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .5$), which was not the case of positive non-uniquely human traits, as these were equally attributed to both groups ($M_{ingroup}$ = .972, $SD_{ingroup}$ = .91; $M_{outgroup}$ = .917, $SD_{outgroup}$ = .77; $F(1, 35) = 19.163$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .354$). These results indicate that the ingroup was evaluated more positively than the outgroup, but only in the uniquely human traits, revealing a differentiation strategy based on humanness, as in the previous study. In the case of negative traits a main effect of group target indicates that these traits were more attributed to the outgroup ($M_{outgroup}$ = 1.013, $SD_{outgroup}$ = .486) compared to the ingroup ($M_{ingroup}$ = 54, $SD_{ingroup}$ = .512 ($F(1, 35) = 20.109$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .365$), as expected, but in this study this effect was not qualified by humanness ($F(1, 35) = 1.197$, $p < .281$, $\eta_p^2 = .033$). The results just described are illustrated on figure 1.



Figure 1: Mean number and error bars of positive and negative non-uniquely and uniquely human moral traits attributed to the ingroup and to the outgroup in Study 2a.

The results of Study 2a have some similarities and differences when compared with Study 1. Participants in Study 2a ascribed more positive uniquely human moral traits to the ingroup than to outgroup, and attributed more negative uniquely human traits to the outgroup than ingroup, replicating the results of Study 1 for the uniquely human moral traits. The difference relied on the attribution of non-uniquely human moral traits. Contrary to Study 1, participants in Study 2a selected more negative non-uniquely human traits to the Gypsies outgroup, but the same amount of positive non-uniquely human traits for both groups. Overall, the outgroup was evaluated more negatively, being these results not just a reflection of group derogation, as witnesses by the equal attribution of positive non-uniquely human traits to both groups.

In Study 2b (Portuguese and Moroccan) a 2 (humanness: UH vs non-UH) x 2 (valence: positive vs negative) x 2 (target: ingroup vs outgroup) repeated measures ANOVA reveals a significant interaction between humanness and valence by group target ($F(1, 30) = 8.786$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .227$). In the case of positive traits a main effect of target indicates that participants attributed these traits more to the ingroup than to the outgroup ($M_{ingroup} = 1.097$, $SD_{ingroup} = .611$; $M_{outgroup} = .581$, $SD_{outgroup} = .509$; $F(1, 30) = 14.369$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .324$). However, in this study no effect of humanness was found significant for positive traits ($F(1, 30) = .078$, $p = .782$).

In the case of negative traits an interaction between humanness and target ($F(1, 30) = 8.541$, $p = .007$, $\eta_p^2 = .222$) indicates that negative uniquely human traits were more attributed to the outgroup than to the ingroup ($M_{outgroup} = .742$, $SD_{outgroup} = .815$; $M_{ingroup} = .419$, $SD_{ingroup} = .502$; $F(1, 30) = 3.363$, $p = .077$, $\eta_p^2 = .101$), despite this interaction was only marginally significant. In this study the negative non-uniquely human traits were also more attributed to the ingroup than to the outgroup ($M_{ingroup} = .1.194$, $SD_{ingroup} = .749$; $M_{outgroup} = .774$, $SD_{outgroup} = .669$; $F(1, 30) = 7.59$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .202$). Study 2b results are illustrated on figure 2.



Figure 2: Mean number and error bars of positive and negative non-uniquely and uniquely human moral traits attributed to the ingroup and to the outgroup in Study 2b.

Once again, Study 2b had a similar results pattern regarding the uniquely human moral traits, with more positive traits attributed to the ingroup, and more negative traits attributed to the outgroup. And again, the results concerning the non-uniquely human moral traits were not consistent with previous studies' results. Contrary to what we found for the Gypsies outgroup,

participants in Study 2b selected more positive and negative non-uniquely human traits for the Portuguese group than the Moroccan outgroup. The fact that both positive traits, non-uniquely and uniquely human, were more selected for the ingroup could indicate a general positivity toward the ingroup. However, the negative non-uniquely human traits were also more attributed to the ingroup, suggesting that these findings are not just a mirror of an ingroup bias based on valence.

General Discussion

In this paper we aimed at analysing how groups differentiate within the moral domain. Across two studies we analysed the attribution and denial of morality traits mapped onto humanness and valence. In what morality concerns, and contrary to emotional dehumanisation, our results showed that humanness and valence are two important dimensions in intergroup differentiation.

In a between participants design we found that depending on the traits' valence, people used different strategies to preserve ingroup's positive differentiation. Faced with a choice that only provided positive traits, participants followed the emotional dehumanisation pattern, by choosing the uniquely human traits to their ingroup. However, when restricted their choice only to negative traits, participants had to go for another strategy. In this case, and contrary to emotional dehumanisation reasoning, participants attributed more negative uniquely human moral traits to the outgroup.

We replicated this tendency in a within subject design, with two different outgroups. In Study 2a and 2b the positive uniquely human traits were consistently more attributed to the ingroup, and the negative uniquely human traits were more ascribed to outgroup. In both studies we discarded the explanation of a classical ingroup bias and outgroup derogation based on valence by looking at the non-uniquely human traits. In Study 2a we rejected the hypothesis of outgroup derogation based on valence due to the fact that although participants chose more negative uniquely and non-uniquely human traits to the Gypsies outgroup, they attributed the same amount of positive non-uniquely human traits to both groups. In Study 2b participants attributed more positive moral traits in general to the ingroup, reflecting an ingroup bias, despite participants also having chosen more negative non-uniquely human traits to their ingroup.

The results pattern regarding the uniquely human moral traits was consistent throughout the two studies; overall, the positive uniquely human traits were more attributed to

the ingroup, and the negative uniquely human traits were more ascribed to outgroup. What seems to differ is the attribution of the non-uniquely human moral traits.

In the case of the Gypsies outgroup, the general negative evaluation exhibited in Study 2a is not entirely surprising. In Portuguese society there is still a negative attitude deeply rooted toward this minority group (Moscovici & Pérez, 1999), that became more evident in the within subjects study. This is not the case of the Moroccan outgroup, with whom Portuguese do not have much contact and information. In this case participants did not showed a general negative attitude toward Moroccan, ascribing more negative non-uniquely human traits to the ingroup, despite having ascribed more negative uniquely human traits to this outgroup. In fact, throughout the two studies the negative uniquely human moral traits were consistently attributed more to outgroups, which was not the case of negative non-uniquely human moral traits. There seems to be reluctance in attributing moral traits perceived as negative and uniquely human to the ingroup.

Brambilla and colleagues (2012; 2013) found out that while forming impressions of outgroups, participants are more affected by moral information. Furthermore, when the members of the outgroup were perceived as immoral, they were perceived as representing a threat. Morality was the only dimension that significantly affected participants' experiences of threat. However, depending on whether the target represented an ingroup or an outgroup member the impact of the target's morality was different. An ingroup target lacking morality was experienced as a threat to the ingroup image, whereas an immoral outgroup target was seen as representing a threat to the safety of one's group. In any case, group immorality is always a threat. These results can explain why ingroup members do not want to be associated with negative moral traits, although they do not explain the special reluctance in being associated with uniquely human immoral traits. There is something about negative uniquely human moral traits that makes them not ingroup suitable. We need more studies to better comprehend why groups repel uniquely human immorality, we can only conjecture that immorality can be seen in a different light as morality, and not just the opposite pole of the same dimension. Whereas morality is consistently pointed out as a uniquely human dimension, it is not known whether with immorality that is also the case.

The two studies presented in this paper support the hypothesis that moral traits are not attributed to ingroup regardless valence, but they depend on humanness too. We gave empirical support to the groups' tendency to reserve morality for their ingroup, along with humanness, and we help to raise the veil over the possibility that there might be more to say

about the relation between immorality and humanness than what is currently known in the field.

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The relation between Human Uniqueness and Morality: An index of behaviours

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Abstract

In humanness literature morality is consistently referred to as a capacity that makes us uniquely human. Social psychologists have been increasingly interested in studying the relationship between these two dimensions, specially in how negative morality impacts on humanness evaluations. In this paper we rank 27 criminal behaviours in Human Uniqueness and Morality dimensions, as well as severity. For assisting other researchers in the field, we provide all the data concerning rankings, raw scores, and z-scores for the dimensions under study. Furthermore, we also analyse the relation between negative Morality and Human Uniqueness in our data, finding that, similarly to other authors' findings, the two dimensions do not correlate with each other. Taken together this paper contributes to a better comprehension of the relation between negative Morality and Human Uniqueness, and provides researchers with a range of validated stimuli to address these topics.

Key-words

Morality, Human Uniqueness, Criminal Behaviour, Severity

Morality plays a key role in social interactions. For instance, our first evaluation of people relies more on moral information than on competence or sociability (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012; Wojciszke, 2005; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworsk, 1998). Morality gives individuals important cues about others intentions (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013), impacts on social identification and ingroup pride (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007) and helps regulating individual behaviours within groups and in social systems (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013, for a review see Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015).

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Moral concerns, despite being considered theoretically universal, depend on a large scale on the appreciation of others' humanness. When we perceive others as fully human, we see them as deserving a moral treatment and care about their welfare. But when we deny others humanness, subtly or overtly, these people are excluded from the moral circle, their suffering is less visible and we are less willing to help them (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Haslam, Loughan, & Holland, 2013; Opotow, 1990).

The link between morality and humanness has major consequences in various social domains, and social psychologists have been increasingly interested in this relation (Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; for a review see Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughan, 2012). In order to support the work of these researchers, there exist indices of specific behaviours evaluated in the moral (Chadwick, Bromgard, Bromgard, & Trafimow, 2006) as well as in the humanness domain (Wilson & Haslam, 2012), but none yet in both dimensions simultaneously. With this paper we aim at filling this gap, by putting forward an index of behaviours judged on the moral and humanness dimensions, to support the work of other researchers in the field.

Furthermore, we also intend to address the relation between negative morality and humanness. Quite recently, some researchers have been analysing how negative morality impacts on dehumanisation (Henriques & Gouveia-Pereira, 2016; Khamitov, Rotman, & Piazza, 2016; Pacilli, Roccato, Pagliaro, & Russo, 2016). We have therefore chosen to use criminal behaviours in this paper, as these are usually associated with immorality, in order to address this relation.

Summing up, in this paper we provide an index of behaviours judged on the moral and humanness dimensions taken together, and further analyse the relation between both dimensions.

Humanness and Morality

Haslam and colleagues proposed a model of dehumanisation based on two distinct forms of humanness: Human Nature and Human Uniqueness (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). The former refers to what is essentially human, the core aspects of humanness, which can be shared with other species. The latter is essentially what makes us unique, what distinguish us humans from animals. This domain of humanness is related to the one proposed by Leyens and colleagues, in their formulation of

infrahumanisation theory (Leyens et. al, 2001; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, Paladino, 2007). These authors used emotions to stress the boundaries between humans and animals. Laypeople distinguish between non-uniquely human emotions, those which humans share with animals, and uniquely human emotions, which are less visible to others, are acquired through socialisation rather than innate, are generated internally, are experienced over a long duration, and are morally informative (Demoulin et. al, 2004).

Recently Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007) formulated a framework about mind perception, based on laypeople's beliefs about mental capacities, which finds correspondence in humanness dimensions. The authors identify two dimensions of mind perception, namely *agency*, which involves the capacity for reason, self-control and morality, and *experience*, exemplified by consciousness, primary emotions and basic appetites. Agentic capacities highlight the boundary between humans and animals, and stand in parallel with Haslam's and Leyen's formulation of uniquely human traits and emotions.

When individuals or groups are denied Human Uniqueness, they are perceived as lacking civility, refinement and rationality, and hence are seen as coarse, unintelligent, immoral, or as in Haslam and colleagues' (2012) words, bestial. Since morality consistently appears as a uniquely human capacity, in this paper we will only focus on this dimension. As previously mentioned, we will also focus in the relation between humanness and negative morality.

The Importance of Negative Behaviours

Negative information is specially diagnostic and harder to disconfirm than positive information (e.g., Fiske, 1980; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Van der Pligt & Eiser, 1980). This is particularly true for moral information, when compared with the other dimensions of perception, competence and sociability (e.g., Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Marijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowrarski & Carlston, 1987; Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993). When evaluating moral character, immorality is what we look for (Brambilla & Leach, 2014). People do not want to interact with targets that lack moral qualities, because that kind of negativity can represent a threat, either to our ingroup image, when performed by an ingroup member, or even to our own safety, when it comes from an outgroup member (Brambilla et al., 2013).

The target of this paper is criminal behaviour, often perceived as immoral, since it involves harming another person. This immoral evaluation of the criminal behaviour is pointed out as impacting on the perception of the person who practices the behaviour as lacking humanness (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013; Vasiljevic & Viki, 2014). Therefore, in this paper we will use criminal behaviours as a proxy to address the relation between immorality and humanness.

This paper provides a ranking of behaviours belonging to the criminal domain, in terms of Morality and Human Uniqueness. This information can be useful not only in the field of Social Psychology, but also for criminal and legal psychologists as well, by informing on how people with these kinds of behaviours are evaluated by others. Penalties tend to be harsher when defendants are evaluated as less human and more morally blame (Bastian et al., 2013). Such an evaluation increases the endorsement of violence against the suspects and ultimately these are more likely to get convicted for capital crimes, and increases endorsement of violence against suspects (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008).

Method

Participants.

Participants were 219 Portuguese citizens (159 of which female female) with ages ranging from 19 to 75 (M = 31,8; DP = 10,9).

Materials.

In order to obtain a diverse set of behaviours, a sample of 20 undergraduate students (14 women, aged between 18 and 21) were asked to identify various criminal behaviours, as diverse as possible.

The material generated by the participants was subject to a selection procedure taking into account behaviour repetitions and redundancies. The final list of behaviours was composed of 27 crimes, which were randomly divided into three versions, to avoid participants' lack of interest when performing the task, which might have undermined the validity of the information.

The instructions given for the three versions were the same. Participants rated each one of the behaviours in 7 questions, 3 referring to the Morality domain, 3 referring to the Human Uniqueness (HU) dimension, and one referring to the Severity of the behaviour. All seven items were rated on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*noting*) to 7 (*very*).

Morality.

To access the morality of each one of the behaviours we used three items which are usually considered to be moral diagnostics in the literature: honesty, sincerity and trustworthy (Leach et al., 2007) (e.g., “To what extent a person performing this behaviour is honest?”)

Human Uniqueness.

We used Bastian and colleagues’ (2011; 2013) measure to access the perception of Human Uniqueness (HU). (“To what extent a person who practices this behaviour is refined and cultured/ is rational and logical/ has self-restraint?)

Severity.

Finally, we had one item to access crime severity ("To what extent practice this behaviour is serious?").

Procedure.

Participants took part in this study through an online platform. Before initiating the study, participants were asked for their informed consent. After agreeing on participating voluntarily, each participant was assign with one of the three survey versions.

All participants responded to one single version of the survey, as follows: 71 participants responded to version 1, 65 participants to version 2, and 83 participants to version 3.[5]

Each of the 9 behaviours that comprised each version was presented randomly. The pr[6]esentation order of the questions was also counterbalanced, by ensuring that half of the participants responded first to the questions related to the Morality dimension, and half responded first to the questions related to the HU dimension.

Participants took approximately 15 minutes to complete the survey.

Results

All analyses were conducted without taking into account neither the order nor the version of evaluation, since the usage of different versions was introduced only to control for material presentation order effects.

[5] Any change from the number of participants presented results from missing data

A factor analysis was performed for each one of the behaviours with the Morality and the HU items. The rotated solution accounted explained between 61.82 and 89.65 of the rating variance, and yielded two factors with eigenvalues over 1.0, one factor with Morality items, with Cronbach´s alpha between .69 and .96, and one factor with HU items, with Cronbach´s alpha between .57 and .92.

Two new variables were then computed, aggregating the Morality and the HU items, in order to have a measure of Morality and HU for each one of the behaviours.

To allow comparisons between the three dimensions, the correlations between the rating of each participant and the average ratings of all participants on the dimensions was calculated, following the practice of Rothbart and Park (1986) and Wilson and Haslam (2012). Participants whose judgments correlated negatively or near zero (less than .10) with the mean score on each dimension of evaluation were excluded. Thirteen judgments that correlated either negatively or near zero were identified and eliminated, with no more than ten from any given dimension.

Following Wilson and Haslam (2012), reliability was assessed by Cronbach's alpha and the intraclass correlation coefficient, reversing items and judges, so that what is under consideration here is the degree of agreement among the judges over the items (i.e., the 27 behaviours). The reliability coefficients for the original and the screened sample for unreliable judges are presented in Table 1. The data from the latter sample was used in forthcoming analyses.

		Original			*Final*	
		alpha	*Original*		*alpha*	*Final ICC*
Dimension	*Original N*	*value*	*ICC value*	*Final N*	*value*	*value*
Morality	54	.95	.95	50	.96	.96
Humanity	52	.91	.91	46	.92	.92
Severity	54	.96	.96	51	.97	.97

Table 1: Number of judges and reliability values before and after deletion of unreliable judges.

Correlations between dimensions

The data from the reliable judges was aggregated, and the mean value of the 27 behaviours was computed for each dimension, to be used in correlation analyses. The Morality and HU dimensions did not correlate with each other (r = .09, p = .65), indicating that the two dimensions are independent. Both dimensions were negatively associated with Severity (r = -.74, p < .01, r = -.51, p < .01, for Morality and Human Uniqueness, respectively).

Behaviours distribution across Morality and HU ratings

The non-standardised ratings of reliable participants were converted to z-scores, in order to emphasise the status of a given behaviour's Morality and HU scores within the distribution of the 27 behaviours. The rankings, raw scores and z-scores of the participants' Morality and HU ratings are provided in the appendix, as well as the participants' Severity ratings of the 27 behaviours.

A cluster analysis was also run on the 27 behaviours using their Morality and HU ratings, in order to examine whether the behaviours cluster together on the basis of the two dimensions. A hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward`s method produced four clusters, which were significantly different in the main (see Table 2). Cluster 1 was defined by behaviours that rated low on Morality (M = 1.98, SD = .11) and high on HU (M = 3.76, SD = .13). Cluster 2 was defined by behaviours that rated low on both dimensions (M =1.94, SD = .12; M = 2.46, SD = .13, for Morality and HU respectively), while Cluster 3 by behaviours that rated high on both dimensions (M =3.84, SD = .14; M = 3.21, SD = .2, for Morality and HU respectively). Finally, cluster 4 was defined by behaviours that rated high on Morality (M = 3.36, SD = .05) and low on HU (M = 2.51, SD = .18).

Although both Morality and HU ratings are relative measures, in the sense that all behaviours were rated below the middle point of the scale, the differences between clusters are statistically significant (F(3, 23) = 43.9, p < .001, F(3, 23) = 22.08, p < .001, for Morality and HU respectively). Regarding Morality, a contrast analysis revealed that the clusters that rated high on these dimensions (i.e. cluster 3 and 4) were significantly different from those rated low on this dimension (i.e. cluster 1 and 2) (t(23) = 10.97, p < .001). The clusters rated high on HU (i.e. cluster 1 and 3) were also significantly different from those rated low on this dimension (i.e. cluster 2 and 4) (t(23) = 7.21, p < .001).

We found significant differences in Severity between clusters as well ($F(3, 23) = 45.06$, $p < .001$). A contrast analysis revealed that the cluster high on both dimensions was evaluated as less severe than the others ($t(23) = 56.63$, $p < .001$), whereas the cluster low on both dimensions was evaluated as the most severe one ($t(23) = 81.27$, $p < .001$). There were no differences between clusters 1 and 4.

Cluster 1 *(Low Morality; High HU)*	***Cluster 2*** *(Low Morality; Low HU)*	***Cluster 3*** *(High Morality; High HU)*	***Cluster 4*** *(High Morality; Low HU)*
Terrorism	Domestic Violence	Online Piracy	Aggression
Identity Falsification	Torture	Prostitution	Racism
Tax evasion	Hit and Run	Insult to Authority	Drink Driving
Corruption	Murder	Illegal immigration	
Robbery	Rape		
Swindle	Child Abuse		
Extortion	Kidnapping		
Theft	Human Rights		
Defamation	Violation		
Fraud			
Plagiarism			
Traffic			

Table 2: Cluster analysis of 27 behaviours as defined by Morality and HU ratings.

Discussion

The first purpose of this paper was to provide researchers with an index of criminal behaviours in the Moral and Humanness domains taken together. With the material available in the appendix, we wish to endow researchers with a powerful tool which may help them in the elaboration of experimental studies, allowing the selection of behaviours in terms of their Moral and Human Uniqueness evaluation. Depending on the requirements of the research, researchers can either use the rankings, in case the data is ordinal; or the mean ratings, in case the equitable intensities of the items along their respective dimensional scales are requested; or even the standardized z-scores, in case the comparison between items on the basis of their positions and others items pertaining to the same trait is what they are looking for.

The second goal of this paper was to analyse the relation between Morality and Human Uniqueness. We found that the two dimensions did not correlate with each other. This result, although at first sight may seem unexpected, given the documented relation of these two dimensions in the literature, is not completely surprising. Indeed, in Wilson and Haslam's (2012) data the two dimensions did not correlate either. The authors explained this fact through the type of behaviours that exemplified HU in their data, which were dominated by non-social behaviours that reflected uniquely human capacities for language and reason. In our data however, we believe that the most likely explanation is due to the negative scope of the behaviours. Morality is a HU dimension, but evidences that immorality is so have not yet been found. This can also explain why behaviours were not rated as more uniquely human, but rather below the middle point of the scale. Our results can be interpreted as a reflection of immorality and humanness incompatibility. In fact when someone's behaviour is so morally wrong people tend to picture it in a bestial way, comparing such act as an animal behaviour (Bastian et al., 2013; Haslam et al., 2012).

Both dimensions were negatively associated with Severity. Unsurprisingly, the less moral or uniquely human a behaviour was, the more serious was consider to practice it. This association was also illustrated by the clusters analysis. The cluster high on Morality and HU dimensions was evaluated as less severe than the other three, whereas the cluster low on both dimensions was evaluated as the most severe one.

Summing up, the main contributions of this paper can be shortly described as follows. On the one hand, we have built an index of behavioural judgements on the moral and humanness dimensions taken together, which to the authors' knowledge, fills a missing gap in the literature. It may also serve as a basis for other researchers' work in the field. On the other hand, by analysing our data, we also put forward some further contributions towards a better understanding of the relation between Morality and Human Uniqueness.

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Table 3

Behaviours rank ordered according to standardized Morality rating (highest to lowest)

Behaviour	*Rank*	*M*	*DP*	z
Insult to Authority	1	4,15	0,98	2,15
Illegal immigration	2	3,89	1,14	1,82
Prostitution	3	3,82	1,46	1,74
Online Piracy	4	3,49	1,60	1,33
Aggression	5	3,46	1,21	1,30
Racism	6	3,33	1,23	1,14
Drink Driving	7	3,29	1,22	1,09
Tax evasion	8	2,63	1,37	0,29
Terrorism	9	2,43	1,46	0,04
Murder	10	2,37	1,33	-0,02
Plagiarism	11	2,31	1,11	-0,11
Torture	12	2,20	1,32	-0,23
Defamation	13	2,18	1,21	-0,26
Human Rights Violation	14	2,17	1,30	-0,27
Domestic Violence	15	2,13	1,11	-0,33
Traffic	16	2,04	1,34	-0,43
Identity Falsification	17	1,99	1,16	-0,49
Robbery	18	1,97	1,16	-0,51
Theft	19	1,92	0,85	-0,57
Hit and Run	20	1,88	0,92	-0,62
Rape	21	1,71	1,11	-0,83
Fraud	22	1,66	1,12	-0,89
Corruption	23	1,65	0,92	-0,90
Extortion	24	1,64	0,87	-0,92
Kidnapping	25	1,57	1,03	-1,00
Child Abuse	26	1,45	0,78	-1,15
Swindle	27	1,29	0,46	-1,35

Table 4

Behaviours rank ordered according to standardized HU rating (highest to lowest)

Behaviour	*Rank*	*M*	*DP*	z
Tax evasion	1	4,45	1,43	1,56
Corruption	2	4,23	1,50	1,27
Fraud	3	4,21	1,54	1,25
Swindle	4	4,21	1,41	1,25
Illegal immigration	5	4,20	0,87	1,23
Online Piracy	6	4,17	1,42	1,20
Identity Falsification	7	4,11	1,35	1,12
Prostitution	8	3,72	1,24	0,61
Terrorism	9	3,68	1,70	0,56
Extortion	10	3,66	1,22	0,53
Plagiarism	11	3,52	1,22	0,34
Traffic	12	3,44	1,57	0,25
Insult to Authority	13	3,34	1,32	0,12
Defamation	14	3,28	1,34	0,03
Robbery	15	3,22	1,24	-0,04
Theft	16	3,18	1,14	-0,09
Drink Driving	17	2,85	1,15	-0,52
Human Rights Violation	18	2,85	1,39	-0,52
Torture	19	2,81	1,47	-0,57
Kidnapping	20	2,78	1,42	-0,62
Murder	21	2,60	1,20	-0,85
Hit and Run	22	2,54	1,06	-0,92
Aggression	23	2,42	1,03	-1,09
Racism	24	2,27	0,99	-1,28
Domestic Violence	25	2,08	1,04	-1,53
Rape	26	2,02	0,99	-1,60
Child Abuse	27	1,96	1,02	-1,69

Table 5

Behaviours rank ordered according to standardized Severity rating (highest to lowest)

Behaviours	*Rank*	*M*	*DP*	z
Domestic Violence	1	6,93	0,25	1,10
Rape	2	6,82	0,78	0,96
Kidnapping	3	6,80	0,57	0,94
Child Abuse	4	6,71	1,15	0,82
Murder	5	6,70	1,10	0,81
Torture	6	6,68	1,00	0,79
Human Rights Violation	7	6,67	0,69	0,78
Terrorism	8	6,61	1,08	0,70
Hit and Run	9	6,59	1,00	0,68
Corruption	10	6,52	1,07	0,60
Extortion	11	6,43	0,91	0,49
Robbery	12	6,37	1,03	0,42
Swindle	13	6,36	1,03	0,40
Traffic	14	6,29	1,22	0,33
Racism	15	6,26	1,04	0,29
Fraud	16	6,22	1,06	0,24
Drink Driving	17	6,20	1,00	0,21
Identity Falsification	18	6,00	1,25	-0,03
Aggression	19	5,90	1,26	-0,14
Theft	20	5,82	1,48	-0,24
Tax evasion	21	5,67	1,42	-0,42
Defamation	22	5,43	1,24	-0,71
Plagiarism	23	5,20	1,30	-0,99
Insult to Authority	24	4,71	1,38	-1,57
Prostitution	25	4,34	1,65	-2,02
Online Piracy	26	4,22	1,65	-2,16
Illegal immigration	27	4,10	1,63	-2,31

Dealing With Inside Immorality and Human Uniqueness: The Role of Group Threat

Patrícia Henriques[7†], Mariana Miranda[8], Maria Gouveia-Pereira[9]

Abstract

In this paper we analysed how ingroup members deal with ingroup deviance. Specifically, we integrated the role of ingroup threat in analysing the humanness perception of a deviant ingroup member that behaves in an immoral way. In a first study we manipulate the threat that a deviant behaviour represented to ingroup image, and found that when the deviant behaviour was less threatening, ingroup members humanised equally the deviant and the ingroup. However, when the deviant behaviour represented a threat to ingroup image, the ingroup members did dehumanise the deviant member. In a second study we extended the analysis to include deviant behaviours, varying in terms of its perception of humanness and immorality and addressed intragroup strategies to deal with ingroup threat. Implications for dehumanisation and moral literature were discussed.

Key-words

Humanness, Dehumanisation, Morality, Ingroup Threat

Morality occupies a central position in social relations, as it is important for self-evaluations (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002), in forming impressions of other individuals or groups (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012), and for group norms (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). As such, morality impacts social identification (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007) and helps regulate individual behaviour both within groups and in social systems (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013, for a review see Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015).

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Alongside this framework, dehumanisation theory has focus on the fact that people are not seen as equally human, as we attribute more human characteristics to ourselves (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), and to the groups we belong (Leyens et al., 2001; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Haslam and colleagues distinguished between two basic conceptions of humanness: Human Nature and Human Uniqueness (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). According to the authors' framework, Human Nature refers to what is essentially human, including characteristics such as emotionality, vitality, warmth and openness, while Human Uniqueness refers to what makes us unique and distinct from animals, and includes characteristics like refinement, rationality, civility, and self-control. Previous research has provided evidence for the distinctiveness of each dimension, highlighting that people can be ascribed or denied humanness in two distinct ways (e.g., Haslam et al., 2005; 2008; Loughnan, Haslam, & Kashima, 2009).

Recently, Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, and Koval (2011) found that these humanness dimensions have different implications for judgments of moral status.

People are differently perceived in moral terms, we do not expect the same moral duties from a child or an adult (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). Specifically, one might be differently evaluated as to the degree to which one is responsible for immoral behaviour (moral blame), deserve praise for good deeds (moral praise), or is the recipient of morally relevant actions (moral patiency) (Gray & Wegner, 2012; Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2012). Most importantly to this paper's scope, Bastian and colleagues (2011) found that this moral status is directly linked to the perception of humanness, suggesting the independent role of each dimension in moral judgment. The authors manipulated the Human Uniqueness and Human Nature of four characters, finding that Human Uniqueness was associated with greater moral blame for immoral acts, but not with moral praise or moral patiency. On the contrary, Human Nature was associated with moral praise and moral patiency, but was unrelated to moral blame.

Bastian and colleagues established, therefore, the relation between the two dimensions of humanness and moral status at an interpersonal level. However, as stated before, one the one hand, people value humanness, not only for themselves, but for their groups too (Leyens et al., 2007). One the other hand, Morality is a central dimension within groups too (Leach et al., 2007), so when an ingroup member behaves immorally that is a problem for the other

group members. So what happens when an ingroup member shows a behaviour that is uniquely human, but also immoral?

Bastian, Denson, and Haslam (2013) developed a series of studies that can help to clarify this question. The authors analysed the impact of dehumanisation and moral outrage on retributive justice in response to criminal behaviour. Specifically, they isolated three types of criminal behaviour (white collar, violent behaviour and child molestation) and analysed the influence of moral outrage and dehumanisation on the severity of the punishment ascribed to the offender. The authors found that people felt morally outraged by harmful and violent crimes and dehumanise the perpetrators of these crimes. Furthermore, this subhuman perception was associated with harsher and longer punishment and a perception that the offender is unsuitable for rehabilitation. Bastian and colleagues (2013) also found that the more dehumanised was the agent of the criminal behaviour, more morally blamed he was considered to be. Although they used a unique measure for dehumanisation that comprises both Human Uniqueness and Human Nature, the relation between humanness and moral blame took a different direction from the one found in the previews studies developed by Bastian and colleagues (2011). In the first studies, the authors found that when an individual was evaluated as uniquely human, he was also considered more moral blame for his actions. However, in the latter studies, the authors found that when a perpetrator of a criminal behaviour was more blamed for his actions, we was also more dehumanised. As Bastian and colleagues (2013) pointed out, this difference might be explained by the nature of the behaviours: when dehumanisation appears in response to criminal behaviour, it can be combined with the moral character of the individual, leaving his responsibility unchanged.

In this paper we aim at further understanding the relation between Human Uniqueness immorality within groups. Specifically, we hypothesise that ingroup threat can dictate how uniquely human a deviant member might be perceived. Criminal behaviour should represent a threat to the image of the ingroup, as it poses a conflict for ingroup members. In one hand, the deviant is a member of the ingroup, and therefore should be seen as uniquely human. But in the other hand, he committed a behaviour that due to its immoral character can compromise the positive ingroup image, impelling ingroup members to dehumanise the deviant as a form of derogation and of self-protection.

Threat in Group Relations

Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) established the importance of belonging to positive valued groups for member's self-image, advancing that when this

positive image is jeopardized ingroup members will react. Threat to ingroup image can come from various sources, such as conflict in values, norms or believes between groups, i.e., a form of symbolic threat (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; 2000). Being moral is important for groups, so putting ingroup's morality at risk should be a problem for ingroup members. Pereira, Vala, and Leyens (2009) have already established a relation between threat and dehumanisation. The authors manipulated the humanness of an outgroup, finding that when the outgroup was less uniquely human, it was also more discriminated, and this relation between dehumanisation and derogation was mediated by symbolic threat.

But what happens if the source of the threat comes from an insider? Marques and colleagues developed a series of studies addressing this question (Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010), proposing a theoretical framework of reactions to group deviance. When an ingroup member engage in an undesirable behaviour, it affects the group as a whole, leaving the ingroup with the need to restore the group image. Ingroup members can choose to deal with this internal threat by derogating or punishing the ingroup deviant, even more than they would do if the threat would come from an outgroup member. Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1988) called this process as *black sheep effect*, i.e., when deviant ingroup members are evaluated more negatively than outgroup members for violating ingroup norms, in an attempt to restore ingroup positivity.

The studies conducted by Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, and Ellemers (2013) highlight the relation between threat and morality. The authors demonstrated that the morality of a target affects significantly the experience of threat, depending on whether the target represents an ingroup or an outgroup member. An ingroup target that lacks in morality is experienced as a threat to ingroup image, whereas an immoral outgroup target is seen as representing a threat to the safety of one's group. In any case, group immorality represented a threat.

Taking into consideration the threat that an immoral deviant behaviour represents for ingroup positivity, we developed a study in order to test if this variable will determine how ingroup members evaluate the humanness of a deviant ingroup member. We hypothesised that if the behaviour of the deviant ingroup member is not considered a threat to group's image, the ingroup members will evaluated the deviant as uniquely human as the ingroup. In the other hand, if the behaviour of the deviant ingroup member is considered a threat to group's image, ingroup members will evaluated the deviant as less uniquely human as the ingroup.

Furthermore, we expect that this effect will remain regardless of the moral status ascribed to the deviant member, that is, that his perceived moral blame.

In order to test these hypothesis we manipulated the threat that a deviant behaviour represents to the ingroup image. Furthermore, we only measured Human Uniqueness dimension, as it was this humanness dimension that was found to relate to moral blame (Bastian et al., 2011; 2013).

Study 1

Method

Participants.

Fifty four students (33 of which female) with ages ranging from 19 to 57 (M = 23.68; DP = 7.38) participated voluntarily in this study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two study conditions, low threat (n = 27), high threat (n = 27).

Procedure and materials.

Participants were asked to take part in a survey about an event that took place in their University. All participants were randomly assign to one of the two threat conditions. After reading the newspaper article all participants responded to the dehumanisation measure as to the ingroup and as to the deviant member, to the blame measure and to the perception of threat questions. At the end, all participants were thanked and fully debriefed.

Manipulation.

In order to manipulate ingroup threat, we had two different experiment conditions, low threat and high threat. The threat manipulation was the same in both conditions, except for one last paragraph. All participants read a newspaper article telling how a student of their University, Daniel Silva, had swindle several colleagues, by deluding them and selling them fake tickets for a party. Afterwards participants were informed that a new evaluation to the Portuguese Universities was being prepared, which would include an evaluation of each University's student community. In the low threat condition the newspaper article ended with the following paragraph:

"This new evaluation has raised some rumours, but some say that the case of Daniel Silva will have no impact on the evaluation of *University Name*, and its student community, since the values, customs and identity of the University and its students remain unchanged."

And in the high threat condition the newspaper article ended as followed:

"This new evaluation has raised some rumours, and there are those who say that the case of Daniel Silva will impact the evaluation of *University Name*, and its student community, since the values, customs and identity of the University and its students may have been changed."

We selected swindle as a behaviour because it has been considered immoral in a norms paper (Henriques & Gouveia-Pereira, 2016). Also, we assured the behaviour was not in itself non-uniquely human, so that it would not per se drive the dehumanisation of its perpetrator.

Dehumanisation measure.

We adapted the dehumanisation measure from Bastian and colleagues (2013), and used four items to measure the Human Uniqueness (HU) dimension (To what extent do you find the students from this University/Daniel Silva to be: "refined and cultured", "rational and logical", "has self-restraint", "sophisticated"). The measures reveal good internal consistency for both the ingroup ($\alpha = .84$) and the deviant member ($\alpha = .80$). All items were rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = Nothing to 7 = Very.

Moral Blame.

Two items assessed the perception of the deviant member's moral blame (e.g., "To what extent do you think Daniel Silva is responsible for his behaviour?") on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 = Nothing to 7 = Very ($\alpha = .89$).

Threat.

Three items assessed the perception of ingroup threat (e.g., "To what extent do you think Daniel Silva's behaviour will undermine the core values of the students of this University?") ($\alpha = .89$). We also assessed the deviant behaviour' impact on ingroup reputation in one item ("To what extent do you think Daniel Silva's behaviour will undermine the reputation of the students of this University?"). Finally, we added one item to assess the perception of the deviant behaviour's immorality ("To what extent do you think Daniel Silva is immoral?"). All five items were rated on 7-seven point scales, ranging from 1 = Nothing to 7 = Very.

Results and Discussion

Dehumanisation

We begin by analysing the dehumanisation of the ingroup and the deviant ingroup member. In order to do that, we run ANOVA with the evaluation of the uniquely humanness of both deviant member and ingroup as a repeated measure and the threat manipulation as a fixed condition. We found a main effect showing an overall higher humanisation of the ingroup (M = 3.98; SD = .95) compared to the deviant member (M = 3.22; SD = .1.26; F(1, 52) = 14.544, p < .001, η_p^2 = .219). The direct test of our hypothesis came from the analysis of the interaction effect, which also yield significant (F(1, 52) = 5.408, p = .024, η_p^2 = .094). A contrast analysis with Sidak adjustments showed that whereas in the low threat condition the ingroup (M = 3.64; SD = .91) and the deviant member (M = 3.34; SD = 1.19) were considered equally human (F(1, 52) = .528, p = .471), there were differences in the high threat condition (F(1, 52) = 7.753, p < .007, η_p^2 = .130). Specifically we observed a significant lower humanisation of the deviant member (M = 3.09; SD = 1.33) than of the ingroup (M = 4.31; SD = .87). All comparisons are illustrated in figure 1.



Figure 1: Mean values and error bars of Human Uniqueness of the deviant member and of the ingroup by threat condition.

We found support to our hypothesis that the level of ingroup threat determines the humanness perception of a deviant ingroup member.

Moral blame and deviant dehumanisation.

Next we analysed the perception of moral blame of the deviant ingrouper. We did not found significant differences between conditions ($F(1, 48) = .556$, $p = .460$), as the deviant ingroup member was considered equally blameworthy in the low threat condition ($M = 6.60$, $SD = .71$) and in the high threat condition ($M = 6.42$, $SD = .98$). These results may support Bastian and colleagues' (2013) claim that in response to criminal behaviour, dehumanisation and moral blame are independent, contrary to what was found in Bastian and colleagues' results (2011), when analysed the dimensional relation of humanness and moral status.

Perception of threat.

Finally, we analysed the perception of threat and the impact on ingroup reputation reported by participants. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences for ingroup threat between conditions. Contrary to our expectations, participants reported the same threat levels in the two conditions ($M_{Low} = 2.86$, $SD_{Low} = 1.70$; $M_{High} = 2.83$, $SD_{High} = 1.46$; $F(1, 52) = .005$, $p = .943$). The same occurred for the ingroup reputation: in both conditions participants reported that the deviant behaviour would undermine the reputation of ingroup members to the same extent ($M_{Low} = 3.26$, $SD_{Low} = 2.05$; $M_{High} = 3.30$, $SD_{High} = 1.81$; $F(1, 52) = .005$, $p = .944$). Moreover, in both conditions the deviant was considered equally immoral ($M_{Low} = 6.00$, $SD_{Low} = 1.33$; $M_{High} = 6.04$, $SD_{High} = 1.29$; $F(1, 52) = .011$, $p = .918$).

A post-hoc explanation of the fact that the checks of the threat manipulation did not function is of its order in relation to other measures. Specifically, we argue to be plausible that being able to punish the deviant member allowed them to restore their ingroup image.

To support this post-hoc interpretation we run a post-test assessing only the threat participants report after our two cover stories.

Post-test

In order to test if the cover story used to manipulate ingroup threat did, in fact, represent a threat to ingroup image, we asked 32 participants (28 of which female) to rate each cover story used to manipulate low and high threat. We used the exact same measures as in Study 1 to measure ingroup threat. We found significant differences in the perception of threat by threat condition ($F(1, 31) = 9.472$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .240$), as participants reported higher levels of perception of ingroup threat when read the cover story that induced high threat ($M = 3.51$; $SD = 1.15$), than in low threat ($M = 2.35$; $SD = .98$).

The results of these post-test taken together with the effect described in Study 1 make way for our hypothesis that when ingroup members first have the opportunity to derogate the ingroup deviant the perception of ingroup threat decreases.

Study 2

Because Bastian and colleagues (2013) found that the type of criminal behaviour has an impact of the perpetrator moral status, we introduced in a second study variations to the type of deviant behaviour presented. Specifically we compare the same behaviour used on Study1 (swindle) with another considered less uniquely human (aggression), and predict that the deviant member will be consider more blameworthy and more uniquely human when he practices a behaviour that is more immoral and uniquely human compared to one less immoral and uniquely human. Nonetheless this variations due to the different type of criminal, we expect that – likewise Study 1 – the tendency to dissociate their own group from the deviant ingroup member in what is uniquely human will remain unaltered.

In line with results from Study 1 and of the post-test as to the threat evaluation after an immoral behaviour by a ingroup member, in this second study we systematically tested our claim that there is a greater assessment of threat to the ingroup before participants have a chance to distance the deviant from their group. As such, in a one-shot threat condition we varied the order of presentation of study measures. We expect that when participants first respond to the threat perception questions, the level of threat reported should be higher than when they respond to the measures pertaining the uniquely humanness of the deviant and the ingroup first.

We have been arguing that, alike the black-sheep effect (Marques et al., 1988), the chance to derogate the deviant is in itself a strategy to maintain a positive evaluation of one's group and therefore of one self. Nonetheless, much can be added to the description of strategies ingroup members engage when facing ingroup defavourability. Here we wish to further extend our comprehension of group members reactions to the immorality perpetrated by an ingrouper opposing individual and group strategies. According to Social Identity Theory, people would prefer to engage in social mobility, specially when considering an at least relatively permeable ingroup context (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which could be argued to be the case of University membership. Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997) have found that ingroup identification is a strong predictor of the willingness to adopt a collective strategy rather than an individual one. As such, we measured the identification to the ingroup prior to the threat story been introduced and expect that the

higher the identification to the group the higher the tendency to distance the deviant from the ingroup and therefore dehumanise him. Finally we introduced the same measure of identification of the ingroup in the end of the experiment and used its relation to the initial identification as a measure of an individual mobility and explored its influence on the derogation of the deviant ingrouper.

Method

Participants and Design.

Ninety five undergraduate students (82 of which female) with ages ranging from 17 to 49 (M = 21.88, DP = 6.45) participated in this study in exchange for course credits. Participants were randomly assigned in a 2 (type of behaviour: swindle vs aggression) x 2 (order of measures: manipulation checks first vs HU measure first) between subjects design.

Procedure and Materials.

In this experiment participants started by completing an identification scale as to their ingroup. The following part was presented as a separate study, reason why we introduced next a distracter task (deductive reasoning task). Then all participants read a newspaper article telling a story about Daniel Silva, a student from their University, who had swindled several colleagues, or who had attacked a colleague during a class, according to the manipulation condition to which they were assigned. We wanted to test our hypotheses in a controlled setting of threat to the ingroup. As such, we presented the story only with an ingrouper performing an immoral behaviour, which has been shown to represent threat (Brambilla et al., 2013). Compared to Study 1, the last paragraph on the University's evaluation that induced a higher or lower level of threat was left out.

After reading the description of Daniel Silva's behaviour, participants responded to the dehumanisation measures, the blame measure and to the threat perception measures. The order of presentation of these measures were counterbalanced, so half of the participants in each manipulation condition responded first to the dehumanisation measures and blame measures, and half responded first to the threat perception measure. Finally, all participants responded to the identification scale again.

The experiment took about 20 minutes. In the end participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Identification Scale.

We used Leach and colleagues (2008) identification scale, which comprised 14 items and participants indicated their agreement with them on 7-point scales (α = .90) ranging from 1 = Totally disagree to 7 = Totally agree.

Criminal Behaviours.

In this study our manipulation had two different behaviours, swindle and aggression. Both behaviours differ significantly in terms of morality ($M_{\text{Aggression}}$ =3.35, $SD_{\text{Aggression}}$ = 1.145; M_{Swindle} = 1.317, SD_{Swindle} = .528; $t(39) = 10.549$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.28$) and Human Uniqueness ($M_{\text{Aggression}}$ = 2.333, $SD_{\text{Aggression}}$ = .1.032; M_{Swindle} = 4.205, SD_{Swindle} = 1.466; $t(38) = -8.295$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.48$)

Dehumanisation, Moral Blame and Threat Measures.

Materials in this study were the same as in Study 1. All showed good reliability ($\alpha_{DeviantUH}$ = .734; $\alpha_{IngroupUH}$ = .739; $\alpha_{Moral\ Blame}$ = .721; α_{Threat} = .913).

Results and Discussion

Perception of threat and of moral blame.

To test our first hypothesis that when first responding to the threat perception questions participants report a higher level of group threat we performed a MANOVA with the perception of threat, immorality and reputation as dependent variables, introducing the order of measures' presentation and the cover story manipulation as between-subject factors. We found an effect of presentation order of the measures in threat perception ($F(1, 87) = 8,9$, p = .004, η_p^2 = .093) and reputation ($F(1, 87) = 7,402$, p = .008, η_p^2 = .078). As we hypothesised, when first responded to the threat perception questions, participants reported that the deviant's behaviour threatened more the ingroup image (M = 4.04, SD = .27) and decreased ingroup reputation (M = 4.3, SD = .27), than they did when first responded to the dehumanisation measure (M_{Threat} = 2.93, SD_{Threat} = .26; $M_{\text{Reputation}}$ = 3.29, $SD_{\text{Reputation}}$ = .26). No other effects were found significant.

Therefore, these results help to clarify why we did not find differences in the threat conditions in Study 1. As we suggested, having the opportunity to dehumanise the deviant ingrouper in a first moment, the ingroup members felt that the image of the ingroup was not at risk anymore. However, when participants did not had the change to distance themselves from

the ingroup deviant, they felt that the deviant behaviour was, indeed, a threat to ingroup reputation.

The type of behaviour in the cover story affected the perception of immorality (F(1, 87) = 5.703, p = .019, η_p^2 = .062). Participants considered the deviant member more immoral for his behaviour in the swindle condition (M = 5.88, SD = .25) compared with the aggression condition (M = 5.06, SD = .24).

A 2 (type of behaviour) x 2 (order of measures) ANOVA on the perception of the deviant's blame showed a significant main effect of the type of behaviour (F(1, 87) = 6.064, p = .016, η_p^2 = .065), the deviant member was considered more blamed when he swindle his colleagues (M = 6.52, SD = .15), a more immoral behaviour, than when he attacked one of them (M = 5.99, SD = .15). The order of measure's presentation did not affect the deviant's blame (F(1, 87) = .577, p = .45).

Dehumanisation.

We run an ANOVA with the evaluation of deviant vs. ingroup humanness as a repeated measure and the type of behaviour manipulation and the order of measures presentation as between-subjects factors. We found a main effect of the target of the uniquely human (F(1, 91) = 113,125, p < .001, η_p^2 = .554). Alike Study 1, in a presence of a threat to the group image the deviant was considered less uniquely human (M_{Deviant} =3.06, SD_{Deviant} = .12) than the ingroup (M_{Ingroup} = 4.67, SD_{Ingroup} = .09), independently of order of measures (F < 1). We also found that the deviant member was considered more uniquely human in the swindle condition (M = 3.68, SD = .17), compared with the aggression condition (M = 2.43, SD = .17) (F(1, 91) = 18.363, p < .001, η_p^2 = .168). The type of behaviour did not affect the ingroup HU (F < 1). We did not find any significant effect of the order of measures presentation in the deviant and ingroup uniquely humanness (F(1, 91) = .876, p = .352).

We found empirical support for our claim that the deviant ingroup member would be considered more blameworthy and more uniquely human when he practiced a behaviour that was more immoral and more uniquely human, compared with when he practiced a behaviour that was less immoral and less uniquely human. Most importantly for our central hypothesis, this did not have an effect of the willingness to humanise the deviant to a lesser extent than the ingroup when in face of a threat to the ingroup, which remain unaltered.

Identification.

A repeated measure ANOVA for the ingroup identification measured in the beginning and in the end by the type of behaviour revealed a significant decrease of identification after the threat was introduced ($M_{Id\_beginning}$ = 4.85; $SD_{Id\_beginnig}$ = .92; M_{Id_end} = 4.71; SD_{Id_end} = .95; $F(1, 93) = 5.554$, $p = .021$, $\eta_p^2 = .056$). Also, this effect was not qualified by the type of behaviour ($F(1, 93) = .353$, $p = .554$).

A hierarchical multiple regression equation was computed to explore our goal of opposing mobility and collective strategies. The first block with the distance between ingroup and deviant uniquely humanness and initial identification was marginally significant (R^2 = .08, $F(1, 44) = 4{,}023$, $p = .51$). Here, the initial identification to the ingroup positively predicted the distance between the ingroup and the deviant member ($b = 0.189$, $SE = 0.094$, $p = .051$). The second model, in which the ingroup identification measured in the end was added, proved to explain a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .877$, $F(2, 43) = 153{,}775$, $p < .001$), but it also showed to be a significant improvement compared with the first one ($F_{change}(1, 43) = 278{,}184$, $p < .001$). Here, as one could predict both measures of ingroup identification, despite being different from each other, were significantly correlated ($b = 0.867$, $SE = 0.052$, $p < .001$). Most importantly, when introducing this covariation, the relation between the ingroup identification and of the distance between the ingroup and deviant member disappeared ($b = 0.024$, $SE = 0.036$, $p = .515$; see Table 1).

	Model 1			*Model 2*		
Variable	*B*	*SE*	*β*	*B*	*SE*	*β*
UH Distance ingroup - deviant	.189	.094	.289	.024	.036	.036
Final identification				.867	.052	.926
R^2		.084			.877	
F for change in R^2		.051			.000	

Table 1: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for initial identification, distance of the deviant from ingroup, and final identification

These results are interesting as they allow us to map the presence of both individual and group strategies participants engage when on face of ingroup threat. If on the one hand it seems that the relation between the initial identification and the decreased final identification

annulled a more group-level strategy of derogation of the ingroup, the fact is that this derogation is present regardless as a consistent main effect.

General Discussion

We wish to highlight some contributions to the field of dehumanisation, morality and intragroup relations provided by this paper. In this paper we wanted to address how ingroup members perceived the humanness of an ingroup member that behaves immorally, integrating the role of ingroup threat. In Study 1 we manipulated the threat that a deviant behaviour could represent for ingroup image to test if it determines how ingroup members perceived the humanness of the deviant member, compared to the ingroup humanness. We found that in low threat condition ingroup members do not need to dehumanise the deviant member, evaluating this ingroup member as uniquely human as the ingroup, whereas, in high threat condition we see a pattern of dehumanisation of the deviant in comparison to the ingroup.

In Study 1 we did not find any differences in the perceptions of threat reported by participants by experimental condition. However, due to a solid result in the post-test, and a consistent pattern of results of the threat measure in Study 2, we are confident that it was solely due to the order in which the threat manipulation check was presented.

The second contribution pertains an integration for Bastian and colleagues' (2011; 2013) different relation patterns between HU and moral blame. In our results we did not find any differences in the evaluation of moral blame by threat condition, but we did find for human uniqueness. Therefore, these results support Bastian and colleagues' (2013) claim that in response to criminal behaviour, dehumanisation and moral blame are independent. The fact that the deviant was always considered even more morally blamed in the Swindle condition in Study 2 and that this not affect the (de)humanisation of the deviant member, can indicate that when associated with a behaviour people can distinguish the two dimensions of morality and UH.

In Study 2 we also wanted to provide ingroup members the possibility to choose other strategies to re-establish group image. Specifically, we gave ingroup members the opportunity to reduce group identification level, which they did, but only for the behaviour that was uniquely human and immoral. Additional, the choice to disidentify enabled keeping the Uniquely Humanness of the ingroup intact. When faced with a deviant behaviour that was less uniquely human and less immoral, dehumanising the deviant was sufficient to maintain the group reputation, not being necessary to reduce the level of group identification.

A final contribution related to the exploration of strategies adopted by ingroup members, when the group positive image is compromised. Our studies contributes to highlight the different strategies that ingroup members choose when dealing with deviance. When faced with an immoral and HU behaviour, ingroup members do choose to reduce the identification to the ingroup. Cameira and Ribeiro (2014) found that disidentification served as a buffer for the negative effects of ingroup deviance, when derogation was not possible. However in Study 2 even when derogation was an option and an option that participants took, ingroup members reduced their identification level. This shows us that both strategies may co-occur in the presence of a threat posed by an immoral behaviour perpetrated by an ingroup member. It is true that we replicated the literature (Ellemers et al., 1990) that stated that the initial level of identification determines the individual vs group level of strategies. However we did not allow participants to desidentify as a strategy prior to the chance of derogating the deviant member. As such it is possible that both groups of people preferring solely each strategy co-existed. Future studies forcing the choice of one strategy over the other may continue to help us understand the effort for an uniquely human an moral identity within groups.

Also, further studies should allow a direct comparison in line with the black sheep effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988), allowing people to evaluate an outgroup member that behaves immorally, but in an uniquely human way.

Conclusion

Taken together we believe that the results presented in this paper made an important contribution to understand what means to be immoral and uniquely human in a society that values moral behaviour while at the same time blames to a higher extent individuals who are considered more uniquely human. Furthermore, we addressed the relation between Human Uniqueness and moral blame, providing an alternative variable that impacts this relation. By doing so, we also explored group strategies in dealing with ingroup deviants, opening the door for new lines of thinking when we talk about humanness and morality within groups.

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Section III

Geral Discussion

General Discussion

The thesis presented here focused on the relation between humanness and morality, two important social dimensions that groups strive for (Leach, et al., 2007; Leyens et al., 2007).

The first goal of this thesis aimed at analysing how groups attribute and deny humanness within the moral domain. In emotional dehumanisation the attribution of uniquely human emotions is consistently independent of trait valence (Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino & Vaes, 2009). However, based on the importance ascribed by groups to morality (Ellemers & van den Bos, 2012; Leach et al., 2015), we hypothesised that valence would also be relevant in intergroup attributions within the moral domain. Morality is a valued dimension to one's group, hence it is unlikely that ingroup members would be willing to associate their ingroup with negative moral traits, even if that allowed to differentiate it from outgroups in human terms.

In the first paper presented we found empirical support sustaining the hypothesis that in moral domain the dehumanisation effect is verifiable depending on trait valence. By means of two studies we found that positive uniquely human moral traits were more attributed to the ingroup, and negative uniquely human moral traits were more ascribed to outgroups. The results regarding the non-uniquely human moral traits did not follow this pattern, and contributed to discard the alternative explanation stating that our results were only driven by ingroup bias and outgroup derogation based on valence. The attributions of non-uniquely human moral traits were not consistent in between the two studies, as we discussed in the paper, but overall what seems to be consistent was that our results indicated that in what morality concerns humanness and valence are two important dimensions in intergroup differentiation.

As we have already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the nature of the dimensions of evaluation may be theoretically meaningful (Ellemers et al., 2013). Morality plays a crucial role in defining one's group identity (Leach et al., 2007), and constitutes a crucial domain for affirming intergroup distinctiveness (Ellemers et al., 2013), so perhaps more than wanting to be uniquely human, groups want to be moral.

Infrahumanisation represented an innovation as it extended the need for intergroup differentiation to a non-valence-based relevant dimension of comparison. In principle, even negatively valence group characteristics may fulfil the aim of establishing a distinct group

identity (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). Morality seems to be an exception, but what is truly surprising is the fact that this seems not to apply exclusively to the uniquely human part of negative morality.

In our studies negative uniquely human moral traits were consistently more attributed to outgroups, which was not the case for negative non-uniquely human moral traits. There seems to exist some reluctance in attributing negative moral traits to the ingroup, but only when these are uniquely human.

The fact that ingroup members perceive ingroup immorality as a threat to ingroup image (Brambilla et al., 2013) can explain why ingroup members do not want to be associated with negative moral traits, however it does not explain the special reluctance in being associated with uniquely human immoral traits.

In Haslam's (2006) model of dehumanisation, when people are portrayed as lacking uniquely human qualities, among other things, they are perceived as less moral too. However, as far as we know, there is no evidence that they are seen as immoral. Although we scaled morality in human uniqueness, when linked to groups or people immorality may not be seen as uniquely human.

In paper 2 we found some support sustaining the above idea. In this paper we focused mainly on the evaluation of criminal behaviours, and used this evaluation as a proxy to address the relation between immorality and humanness. The immorality of this type of behaviour had already been pointed out as impacting on the perception of the person who practices the behaviour as lacking humanness (Bastian et al., 2013). Therefore we tested the correlation between the two dimensions of evaluation upon criminal behaviour, and found that immorality and Human Uniqueness did not correlate with each other. This result was in line with other similar findings (Wilson & Haslam, 2012), giving more strength to the independency of the two dimensions' hypothesis.

Our results do not provide a definite answer to our question regarding the relation between the two dimensions, but are nevertheless one step forward in that direction. Despite a more direct test is still needed in order to clarify whether immorality, as with morality, is a uniquely human dimension, or an independent one that is not considered as uniquely human, our two papers point in this last direction.

In the last paper presented in this thesis we change our focus to the intragroup level. The recent results addressing the relation between the humanness dimensions and moral status

(Bastian et al., 2011; 2013) caught our attention, leading us to wonder how group members deal with immorality and humanness within the ingroup.

Specifically, we addressed the question of how ingroup members perceived the humanness of an ingroup member that behaved immorally, integrating the role of ingroup threat. We hypothesised that the fact that the deviant was a member of the ingroup, which is by definition uniquely human, and had behaved in an immoral way, which jeopardises the positive ingroup image, should represent a conflict that ingroup members needed to address.

Ingroup threat provided the answer: when ingroup members perceived the immoral behaviour as representing a threat to ingroup image, they dehumanised the deviant member, in an attempt to restore the ingroup image. However, when the deviant behaviour did not represent a threat, the humanness of the deviant member remained intact, not differing from the humanness evaluation of the ingroup.

Furthermore, in our studies we did not find any differences in the evaluation of moral blame by threat condition, despite having found it for human uniqueness. We interpreted these results as supporting Bastian and colleagues' (2013) reasoning that in response to criminal behaviour, dehumanisation and moral blame are independent. The fact that ingroup members always considered the deviant member as moral blame, reinforces the idea that when associated with a behaviour people can distinguish the humanness and immoral dimensions, holding the moral blame of a uniquely human target unchanged.

These results give us extra insights about the preeminent question underlying this thesis. The fact that we did not find a relation between Human Uniqueness and moral blame, adds, together with the results of the first two papers, another line into the discussion regarding the possibility that immorality is not perceived as a uniquely human dimension, when associated to persons or groups.

Vaes and colleagues (2012) caught the attention for the importance to address ingroup humanisation, in order to fully understand the process of differentiation of the ingroup from the outgroup in human terms. In previous formulations of infrahumanisation theory it was often claimed that it involved simultaneously the tendencies to favour the ingroup and derogate the outgroup (Leyens et al., 2007), however more recent empirical findings proposed that when identified with the ingroup, people first humanise one's own group (Gaunt, 2014; Vaes & Paladino, 2010).

To this date, few moderators of ingroup humanisation are known. Naturally, ingroup identification is a determinant variable to this effect, since people need to value their membership in order to be motivated to humanise their ingroup. Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, and Leyens (2004) gave empirical support to this effect, by showing that ingroup identification did not moderate the attribution of uniquely human emotions to outgroups, but only to the ingroup. Demoulin and colleagues (2009) also showed that varying the meaning of the intergroup categorisation criteria moderated the attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup. The authors found that only when belonging to a categorisation that had some meaning for the participants did they dehumanise the outgroup, but not when belonging to a random category. Furthermore, identification also varied in terms of the categorisation criteria, showing that only when the identification increased did the people's tendency to humanise the ingroup change.

The results found by Demoulin and colleagues (2009) are in line with the principles of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), since in the minimal group paradigm only when the group categorisation had some meaning, did people derogate the other group. Usually, it is possible to integrate the dehumanisation effect and the processes of ingroup bias and outgroup derogation based on valence, but in morality that does not seem to be the case. For positive morality we found a similar effect as ingroup humanisation, but for negative morality we did not find a dehumanisation effect. This social dimension, alongside with the meaning of the categorisation, can be a second way to disentangle the differentiation processes driven by dehumanisation and Social Identity Theory.

The papers presented in this thesis indicated that there is much more about immorality than just Human Uniqueness. People need to humanise the ingroup, but the motivation to not be seen as immoral overcomes that need.

Overall, our studies gave a contribution to understand the relation between humanness and morality and its implications for groups, but only lift the veil, leaving a lot of questions to be answer.

Future research

As we have already pointed out, we still need more tests to clarify whether immorality is a uniquely human dimension, as it is the case of morality. As a first future step researchers might address this question that this thesis does not fully answer.

The fact that only negative uniquely human moral traits were not ascribed to outgroups is still a puzzle, as we do not know why that turns out to be the case only for these specific characteristics. Ingroups do not want to be immoral, but more importantly they do not want to be immoral in a uniquely human way. This contradiction between the two motivations, to be uniquely human and moral, may be particularly difficult for groups to solve.

Koval, Laham, Haslam, Bastian and Whelan (2011) found that people humanise ingroup flaws by seeing them as part of human nature. When these flaws are of the immoral kind, group members probably cannot use the same strategy, hence turning immoral humanness into something that ingroup members will be highly motivated to repeal. Future research can help to clarify the reasons behind this repulsion.

Another future step that our research suggests is to address the question of whether morality is, in fact, a moderator of ingroup humanisation, and a dimension that enables to disentangle the dehumanisation effect and ingroup favouritism. We still need a more direct test to this hypothesis, maybe in line with what Desmoulin and colleagues (2009) did.

In another line of thinking, recent research has addressed the relationship between the infrahumanisation approach and the two-dimensional model of humanness. Martínez, Rodriguez-Bailona, Moya, and Vaes (2016) created three unknown groups (Humanised, Animalised, and Mechanised) that varied in Human Nature and Human Uniqueness, and measured the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to each group. The authors found that participants attributed more secondary emotions to the humanised when compared with the dehumanised groups, but more importantly, the authors found that both animalised and mechanised groups were attributed similar amounts of secondary emotions. Martinez and colleagues' research underlines the role of the attribution of secondary emotions in signalling both types of dehumanisation, a clearly innovation in dehumanisation literature.

These new results make us wonder if morality can impact on the two humanness dimensions too. Morality is a Uniquely Human dimension, but we still do not know whether immorality is also one. Furthermore, the descriptions picturing one's immoral actions as close to animals that sometimes appear in the press, or even in social interactions, indicate that immorality is probably diagnostic of animalistic dehumanisation, but does not exclude the possibility that it can be informative of mechanistic dehumanisation either. In our second paper, some of the criminal behaviours that we scaled in morality and humanness were white-collar type. This type of behaviour is normally associated with businesspeople, a category that

was demonstrated to be linked to Human Nature (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). But, we also found that white-collar type of behaviour is perceived as highly uniquely human. Therefore, this could be indicative that immorality may predict both animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation.

Another contribution of this thesis is that it highlighted the different strategies that ingroup members choose when dealing with deviance. In the second study of the third paper we analysed the strategies adopted by ingroup members in order to deal with ingroup threat. We gave ingroup members the opportunity to reduce group identification level, which they did when faced with a deviant behaviour that was uniquely human and immoral. But when faced with a deviant behaviour that was less uniquely human and less immoral, dehumanising the deviant was sufficient to maintain the group reputation, not being necessary to reduce the level of group identification. Our results indicated that both strategies may co-occur, even when derogation was an option, ingroup members reduced the identification level.

However, in our studies the action of the deviant fell on ingroup members, was committed by an ingroup member upon ingroup members. We suspect that if the receivers of the deviant actions were outgroup members, it would be more threatening for ingroup image, and will probably impact the strategies used by ingroup members to deal with deviance. As Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) found, when ingroup members are confronted with ingroup's wrongdoing, dehumanising others may serve to reduce the affective and moral consequences of one's actions.

Finally, as we had pointed out in the paper discussion, it would be also interesting to see how people evaluate an outgroup member that behaves immorally, but in an uniquely human way, allowing a comparison in line with the black sheep effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988).

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Section IV

Appendixes

Appendix A: Material and Measures of More human than others, but not immoral: On the attribution of humanness with moral characteristics

Dehumanisation measure

Moral traits used in Study 1and Studies 2a and 2b

Uniquely Human	Non-Uniquely Human
Humildade, Justiça, Sinceridade, Desonestidade, Indecência, Mentira	Lealdade, Fidelidade, Confiança, Agressividade, Egoísmo, Crueldade

Identification Measure

1 - Eu penso que os Portugueses têm muito de que se orgulhar.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

2 - É agradável ser Português.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

3 - Ser Português dá-me uma sensação agradável.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

4 - Eu penso muitas vezes no facto de que sou Português.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

5 - O facto de que sou Português é uma parte importante da minha identidade.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

6 - Ser Português é uma parte importante de como eu me vejo a mim mesmo.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

7 - Eu tenho muito em comum com o Português habitual.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

8 - Eu sou parecido com o Português habitual.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

9 – Os Portugueses têm muitos pontos em comum entre si.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

10 – Os Portugueses são muito parecidos.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

11 - Eu sinto uma ligação com os Portugueses.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

12 - Eu sinto solidariedade para com os Portugueses.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

13 - Eu sinto dedicação para com os Portugueses.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

14 - Eu estou contente por ser Português.

Discordo completamente	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Concordo completamente

Appendix B: Statistics of More human than others, but not immoral: On the attribution of humanness with moral characteristics

Study 1

Identification.

Descriptives

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Positivas	62	4,5150	1,22181	,15517	4,2047	4,8253	1,43	6,64
Negativas	49	4,6662	,93375	,13339	4,3980	4,9344	2,43	6,57
Total	111	4,5817	1,10181	,10458	4,3745	4,7890	1,43	6,64

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
3,804	1	109	,054

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	,626	1	,626	,513	,475
Within Groups	132,914	109	1,219		
Total	133,539	110			

Robust Tests of Equality of Means

	Statistic[a]	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	,546	1	108,895	,462

Dehumanisation.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Humaness	Sphericity Assumed	,060	1	,060	,137	,712	,001
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,060	1,000	,060	,137	,712	,001
	Huynh-Feldt	,060	1,000	,060	,137	,712	,001
	Lower-bound	,060	1,000	,060	,137	,712	,001
humaness * Condição	Sphericity Assumed	8,881	1	8,881	20,439	,000	,157

	Greenhouse-Geisser	8,881	1,000	8,881	20,439	,000	,157
	Huynh-Feldt	8,881	1,000	8,881	20,439	,000	,157
	Lower-bound	8,881	1,000	8,881	20,439	,000	,157
Error(humaness)	Sphericity Assumed	47,797	110	,435			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	47,797	110,000	,435			
	Huynh-Feldt	47,797	110,000	,435			
	Lower-bound	47,797	110,000	,435			
Group	Sphericity Assumed	2,744	1	2,744	6,022	,016	,052
	Greenhouse-Geisser	2,744	1,000	2,744	6,022	,016	,052
	Huynh-Feldt	2,744	1,000	2,744	6,022	,016	,052
	Lower-bound	2,744	1,000	2,744	6,022	,016	,052
group * Condição	Sphericity Assumed	10,136	1	10,136	22,250	,000	,168
	Greenhouse-Geisser	10,136	1,000	10,136	22,250	,000	,168
	Huynh-Feldt	10,136	1,000	10,136	22,250	,000	,168
	Lower-bound	10,136	1,000	10,136	22,250	,000	,168
Error(group)	Sphericity Assumed	50,114	110	,456			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	50,114	110,000	,456			
	Huynh-Feldt	50,114	110,000	,456			
	Lower-bound	50,114	110,000	,456			
humaness * group	Sphericity Assumed	1,825	1	1,825	3,641	,059	,032
	Greenhouse-Geisser	1,825	1,000	1,825	3,641	,059	,032
	Huynh-Feldt	1,825	1,000	1,825	3,641	,059	,032
	Lower-bound	1,825	1,000	1,825	3,641	,059	,032
humaness * group * Condição	Sphericity Assumed	24,289	1	24,289	48,456	,000	,306
	Greenhouse-Geisser	24,289	1,000	24,289	48,456	,000	,306
	Huynh-Feldt	24,289	1,000	24,289	48,456	,000	,306

Error(humaness*group)	Lower-bound	24,289	1,000	24,289	48,456	,000	,306
	Sphericity Assumed	55,139	110	,501			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	55,139	110,000	,501			
	Huynh-Feldt	55,139	110,000	,501			
	Lower-bound	55,139	110,000	,501			

Estimates

Condição	humaness	group	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Positivas	NUH	Ing	,855	,102	,653	1,056
		Outg	1,306	,096	1,116	1,497
	UH	Ing	1,145	,098	,951	1,340
		Outg	,403	,083	,239	,568
Negativas	NUH	Ing	,680	,113	,456	,904
		Outg	,800	,107	,588	1,012
	UH	Ing	,600	,109	,383	,817
		Outg	1,400	,092	1,217	1,583

Pairwise Comparisons

Condição	group	(I) humaness	(J) humaness	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Positivas	Ing	NUH	UH	-,290	,126	,023	-,540	-,040
		UH	NUH	,290	,126	,023	,040	,540
	Outg	NUH	UH	,903	,120	,000	,666	1,140
		UH	NUH	-,903	,120	,000	-1,140	-,666
Negativas	Ing	NUH	UH	,080	,140	,570	-,198	,358
		UH	NUH	-,080	,140	,570	-,358	,198
	Outg	NUH	UH	-,600	,133	,000	-,864	-,336
		UH	NUH	,600	,133	,000	,336	,864

Multivariate Tests

Condição	group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Positivas	Ing	Pillai's trace	,046	5,300	1,000	110,000	,023	,046
		Wilks' lambda	,954	5,300	1,000	110,000	,023	,046
		Hotelling's trace	,048	5,300	1,000	110,000	,023	,046
		Roy's largest root	,048	5,300	1,000	110,000	,023	,046
	Outg	Pillai's trace	,342	57,113	1,000	110,000	,000	,342
		Wilks' lambda	,658	57,113	1,000	110,000	,000	,342
		Hotelling's trace	,519	57,113	1,000	110,000	,000	,342
		Roy's largest root	,519	57,113	1,000	110,000	,000	,342
Negativas	Ing	Pillai's trace	,003	,325	1,000	110,000	,570	,003
		Wilks' lambda	,997	,325	1,000	110,000	,570	,003
		Hotelling's trace	,003	,325	1,000	110,000	,570	,003
		Roy's largest root	,003	,325	1,000	110,000	,570	,003
	Outg	Pillai's trace	,156	20,325	1,000	110,000	,000	,156
		Wilks' lambda	,844	20,325	1,000	110,000	,000	,156
		Hotelling's trace	,185	20,325	1,000	110,000	,000	,156
		Roy's largest root	,185	20,325	1,000	110,000	,000	,156

Pairwise Comparisons

Condição	humaness	(I) group	(J) group	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Positivas	NUH	Ing	Outg	-,452	,129	,001	-,706	-,197
		Outg	Ing	,452	,129	,001	,197	,706
	UH	Ing	Outg	,742	,120	,000	,505	,979
		Outg	Ing	-,742	,120	,000	-,979	-,505
Negativas	NUH	Ing	Outg	-,120	,143	,404	-,404	,164
		Outg	Ing	,120	,143	,404	-,164	,404
	UH	Ing	Outg	-,800	,133	,000	-1,064	-,536
		Outg	Ing	,800	,133	,000	,536	1,064

Multivariate Tests

Condição	humaness		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Positivas	NUH	Pillai's trace	,101	12,349	1,000	110,000	,001	,101
		Wilks' lambda	,899	12,349	1,000	110,000	,001	,101
		Hotelling's trace	,112	12,349	1,000	110,000	,001	,101
		Roy's largest root	,112	12,349	1,000	110,000	,001	,101
	UH	Pillai's trace	,259	38,359	1,000	110,000	,000	,259
		Wilks' lambda	,741	38,359	1,000	110,000	,000	,259
		Hotelling's trace	,349	38,359	1,000	110,000	,000	,259
		Roy's largest root	,349	38,359	1,000	110,000	,000	,259
Negativas	NUH	Pillai's trace	,006	,703	1,000	110,000	,404	,006
		Wilks' lambda	,994	,703	1,000	110,000	,404	,006
		Hotelling's trace	,006	,703	1,000	110,000	,404	,006
		Roy's largest root	,006	,703	1,000	110,000	,404	,006
	UH	Pillai's trace	,246	35,966	1,000	110,000	,000	,246
		Wilks' lambda	,754	35,966	1,000	110,000	,000	,246
		Hotelling's trace	,327	35,966	1,000	110,000	,000	,246
		Roy's largest root	,327	35,966	1,000	110,000	,000	,246

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	group	(I) Condição	(J) Condição	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	Positivas	Negativas	,175	,152	,253	-,127	,477
		Negativas	Positivas	-,175	,152	,253	-,477	,127
	Outg	Positivas	Negativas	,506	,144	,001	,221	,792
		Negativas	Positivas	-,506	,144	,001	-,792	-,221
UH	Ing	Positivas	Negativas	,545	,147	,000	,254	,836
		Negativas	Positivas	-,545	,147	,000	-,836	-,254
	Outg	Positivas	Negativas	-,997	,124	,000	-1,243	-,751
		Negativas	Positivas	,997	,124	,000	,751	1,243

Univariate Tests

humaness	group		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NHU	Ing	Contrast	,846	1	,846	1,319	,253	,012
		Error	70,574	110	,642			
	Outg	Contrast	7,099	1	7,099	12,361	,001	,101
		Error	63,177	110	,574			
UH	Ing	Contrast	8,226	1	8,226	13,774	,000	,111
		Error	65,694	110	,597			
	Outg	Contrast	27,500	1	27,500	64,473	,000	,370
		Error	46,919	110	,427			

Positive Traits.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Humanidade	Sphericity Assumed	5,823	1	5,823	14,690	,000	,194
	Greenhouse-Geisser	5,823	1,000	5,823	14,690	,000	,194
	Huynh-Feldt	5,823	1,000	5,823	14,690	,000	,194
	Lower-bound	5,823	1,000	5,823	14,690	,000	,194
Error(humanidade)	Sphericity Assumed	24,177	61	,396			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	24,177	61,000	,396			
	Huynh-Feldt	24,177	61,000	,396			
	Lower-bound	24,177	61,000	,396			
Grupo	Sphericity Assumed	1,306	1	1,306	2,297	,135	,036
	Greenhouse-Geisser	1,306	1,000	1,306	2,297	,135	,036
	Huynh-Feldt	1,306	1,000	1,306	2,297	,135	,036
	Lower-bound	1,306	1,000	1,306	2,297	,135	,036
Error(grupo)	Sphericity Assumed	34,694	61	,569			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	34,694	61,000	,569			
	Huynh-Feldt	34,694	61,000	,569			
	Lower-bound	34,694	61,000	,569			

humanidade * grupo	Sphericity Assumed	22,081	1	22,081	36,483	,000	,374
	Greenhouse-Geisser	22,081	1,000	22,081	36,483	,000	,374
	Huynh-Feldt	22,081	1,000	22,081	36,483	,000	,374
	Lower-bound	22,081	1,000	22,081	36,483	,000	,374
Error(humanidade*grupo)	Sphericity Assumed	36,919	61	,605			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	36,919	61,000	,605			
	Huynh-Feldt	36,919	61,000	,605			
	Lower-bound	36,919	61,000	,605			

Estimates

humanidade	grupo	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	,855	,119	,617	1,093
	Outg	1,306	,099	1,108	1,505
UH	Ing	1,145	,105	,935	1,355
	Outg	,403	,067	,269	,537

Pairwise Comparisons

grupo	(I) humanidade	(J) humanidade	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ing	NUH	UH	-,290	,137	,038	-,564	-,017
	UH	NUH	,290	,137	,038	,017	,564
Outg	NUH	UH	,903	,117	,000	,670	1,136
	UH	NUH	-,903	,117	,000	-1,136	-,670

Multivariate Tests

grupo		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Ing	Pillai's trace	,069	4,504[a]	1,000	61,000	,038	,069
	Wilks' lambda	,931	4,504[a]	1,000	61,000	,038	,069
	Hotelling's trace	,074	4,504[a]	1,000	61,000	,038	,069
	Roy's largest root	,074	4,504[a]	1,000	61,000	,038	,069
Outg	Pillai's trace	,496	60,005[a]	1,000	61,000	,000	,496
	Wilks' lambda	,504	60,005[a]	1,000	61,000	,000	,496
	Hotelling's trace	,984	60,005[a]	1,000	61,000	,000	,496
	Roy's largest root	,984	60,005[a]	1,000	61,000	,000	,496

Pairwise Comparisons

humanidade	(I) grupo	(J) grupo	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	Outg	-,452	,148	,003	-,748	-,155
	Outg	Ing	,452	,148	,003	,155	,748
UH	Ing	Outg	,742	,126	,000	,490	,994
	Outg	Ing	-,742	,126	,000	-,994	-,490

Multivariate Tests

humanidade		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Pillai's trace	,132	9,254[a]	1,000	61,000	,003	,132
	Wilks' lambda	,868	9,254[a]	1,000	61,000	,003	,132
	Hotelling's trace	,152	9,254[a]	1,000	61,000	,003	,132
	Roy's largest root	,152	9,254[a]	1,000	61,000	,003	,132
UH	Pillai's trace	,363	34,773[a]	1,000	61,000	,000	,363
	Wilks' lambda	,637	34,773[a]	1,000	61,000	,000	,363
	Hotelling's trace	,570	34,773[a]	1,000	61,000	,000	,363
	Roy's largest root	,570	34,773[a]	1,000	61,000	,000	,363

Negative Traits.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
humanidade	Sphericity Assumed	3,380	1	3,380	7,012	,011	,125
	Greenhouse-Geisser	3,380	1,000	3,380	7,012	,011	,125
	Huynh-Feldt	3,380	1,000	3,380	7,012	,011	,125
	Lower-bound	3,380	1,000	3,380	7,012	,011	,125
Error(humanidade)	Sphericity Assumed	23,620	49	,482			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	23,620	49,000	,482			
	Huynh-Feldt	23,620	49,000	,482			
	Lower-bound	23,620	49,000	,482			
grupo	Sphericity Assumed	10,580	1	10,580	33,620	,000	,407
	Greenhouse-Geisser	10,580	1,000	10,580	33,620	,000	,407

	Huynh-Feldt	10,580	1,000	10,580	33,620	,000	,407
	Lower-bound	10,580	1,000	10,580	33,620	,000	,407
Error(grupo)	Sphericity Assumed	15,420	49	,315			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	15,420	49,000	,315			
	Huynh-Feldt	15,420	49,000	,315			
	Lower-bound	15,420	49,000	,315			
humanidade * grupo	Sphericity Assumed	5,780	1	5,780	15,544	,000	,241
	Greenhouse-Geisser	5,780	1,000	5,780	15,544	,000	,241
	Huynh-Feldt	5,780	1,000	5,780	15,544	,000	,241
	Lower-bound	5,780	1,000	5,780	15,544	,000	,241
Error(humanidade*grupo)	Sphericity Assumed	18,220	49	,372			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	18,220	49,000	,372			
	Huynh-Feldt	18,220	49,000	,372			
	Lower-bound	18,220	49,000	,372			

Estimates

humanidade	grupo	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	,680	,083	,513	,847
	Outg	,800	,103	,593	1,007
UH	Ing	,600	,099	,401	,799
	Outg	1,400	,111	1,178	1,622

Pairwise Comparisons

grupo	(I) humanidade	(J) humanidade	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ing	NUH	UH	,080	,124	,522	-,169	,329
	UH	NUH	-,080	,124	,522	-,329	,169
Outg	NUH	UH	-,600*	,137	,000	-,875	-,325
	UH	NUH	,600*	,137	,000	,325	,875

Multivariate Tests

grupo		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Ing	Pillai's trace	,008	,416	1,000	49,000	,522	,008
	Wilks' lambda	,992	,416	1,000	49,000	,522	,008
	Hotelling's trace	,008	,416	1,000	49,000	,522	,008
	Roy's largest root	,008	,416	1,000	49,000	,522	,008
Outg	Pillai's trace	,281	19,174	1,000	49,000	,000	,281
	Wilks' lambda	,719	19,174	1,000	49,000	,000	,281
	Hotelling's trace	,391	19,174	1,000	49,000	,000	,281
	Roy's largest root	,391	19,174	1,000	49,000	,000	,281

Pairwise Comparisons

humanidade	(I) grupo	(J) grupo	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	Outg	-,120	,109	,278	-,340	,100
	Outg	Ing	,120	,109	,278	-,100	,340
UH	Ing	Outg	-,800	,125	,000	-1,050	-,550
	Outg	Ing	,800	,125	,000	,550	1,050

Multivariate Tests

humanidade		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Pillai's trace	,024	1,205	1,000	49,000	,278	,024
	Wilks' lambda	,976	1,205	1,000	49,000	,278	,024
	Hotelling's trace	,025	1,205	1,000	49,000	,278	,024
	Roy's largest root	,025	1,205	1,000	49,000	,278	,024
UH	Pillai's trace	,457	41,263	1,000	49,000	,000	,457
	Wilks' lambda	,543	41,263	1,000	49,000	,000	,457
	Hotelling's trace	,842	41,263	1,000	49,000	,000	,457
	Roy's largest root	,842	41,263	1,000	49,000	,000	,457

Study 2

Identification.

Descriptives

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
ciganos	36	4,6505	1,04367	,17394	4,2973	5,0036	2,00	6,32
marroquinos	31	4,8562	,96473	,17327	4,5023	5,2100	2,94	6,94
Total	67	4,7456	1,00566	,12286	4,5003	4,9909	2,00	6,94

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Identificação

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
,455	1	65	,502

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	,705	1	,705	,694	,408
Within Groups	66,045	65	1,016		
Total	66,750	66			

Robust Tests of Equality of Means

	Statistic[a]	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	,702	1	64,653	,405

Study 2a.

Dehumanisation.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
humaness	Sphericity Assumed	6,722	1	6,722	18,413	,000	,345
	Greenhouse-Geisser	6,722	1,000	6,722	18,413	,000	,345
	Huynh-Feldt	6,722	1,000	6,722	18,413	,000	,345
	Lower-bound	6,722	1,000	6,722	18,413	,000	,345
Error(humaness)	Sphericity Assumed	12,778	35	,365			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	12,778	35,000	,365			
	Huynh-Feldt	12,778	35,000	,365			
	Lower-bound	12,778	35,000	,365			
valence	Sphericity Assumed	,222	1	,222	,245	,624	,007
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,222	1,000	,222	,245	,624	,007
	Huynh-Feldt	,222	1,000	,222	,245	,624	,007
	Lower-bound	,222	1,000	,222	,245	,624	,007

Error(valence)	Sphericity Assumed	31,778	35	,908			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	31,778	35,000	,908			
	Huynh-Feldt	31,778	35,000	,908			
	Lower-bound	31,778	35,000	,908			
group	Sphericity Assumed	,014	1	,014	,075	,786	,002
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,014	1,000	,014	,075	,786	,002
	Huynh-Feldt	,014	1,000	,014	,075	,786	,002
	Lower-bound	,014	1,000	,014	,075	,786	,002
Error(group)	Sphericity Assumed	6,486	35	,185			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	6,486	35,000	,185			
	Huynh-Feldt	6,486	35,000	,185			
	Lower-bound	6,486	35,000	,185			
humaness * valence	Sphericity Assumed	,500	1	,500	,972	,331	,027
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,500	1,000	,500	,972	,331	,027
	Huynh-Feldt	,500	1,000	,500	,972	,331	,027
	Lower-bound	,500	1,000	,500	,972	,331	,027
Error(humaness*valence)	Sphericity Assumed	18,000	35	,514			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	18,000	35,000	,514			
	Huynh-Feldt	18,000	35,000	,514			
	Lower-bound	18,000	35,000	,514			
humaness * group	Sphericity Assumed	1,125	1	1,125	1,886	,178	,051
	Greenhouse-Geisser	1,125	1,000	1,125	1,886	,178	,051
	Huynh-Feldt	1,125	1,000	1,125	1,886	,178	,051
	Lower-bound	1,125	1,000	1,125	1,886	,178	,051
Error(humaness*group)	Sphericity Assumed	20,875	35	,596			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	20,875	35,000	,596			
	Huynh-Feldt	20,875	35,000	,596			
	Lower-bound	20,875	35,000	,596			

valence * group	Sphericity Assumed	15,125	1	15,125	23,659	,000	,403
	Greenhouse-Geisser	15,125	1,000	15,125	23,659	,000	,403
	Huynh-Feldt	15,125	1,000	15,125	23,659	,000	,403
	Lower-bound	15,125	1,000	15,125	23,659	,000	,403
Error(valence*group)	Sphericity Assumed	22,375	35	,639			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	22,375	35,000	,639			
	Huynh-Feldt	22,375	35,000	,639			
	Lower-bound	22,375	35,000	,639			
humaness * valence * group	Sphericity Assumed	5,014	1	5,014	10,977	,002	,239
	Greenhouse-Geisser	5,014	1,000	5,014	10,977	,002	,239
	Huynh-Feldt	5,014	1,000	5,014	10,977	,002	,239
	Lower-bound	5,014	1,000	5,014	10,977	,002	,239
Error(humaness*valence* group)	Sphericity Assumed	15,986	35	,457			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	15,986	35,000	,457			
	Huynh-Feldt	15,986	35,000	,457			
	Lower-bound	15,986	35,000	,457			

Estimates

humaness	valence	group	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Neg	Ing	,806	,137	,527	1,084
		Outg	1,139	,107	,923	1,355
	Pos	Ing	,972	,152	,664	1,280
		Outg	,917	,128	,656	1,177
UH	Neg	Ing	,278	,086	,104	,451
		Outg	,889	,137	,611	1,166
	Pos	Ing	1,139	,139	,857	1,421
		Outg	,306	,096	,110	,501

Pairwise Comparisons

valence	group	(I) humaness	(J) humaness	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Neg	Ing	NUH	UH	,528	,146	,001	,231	,825
		UH	NUH	-,528	,146	,001	-,825	-,231
	Outg	NUH	UH	,250	,180	,173	-,115	,615
		UH	NUH	-,250	,180	,173	-,615	,115
Pos	Ing	NUH	UH	-,167	,185	,373	-,542	,208
		UH	NUH	,167	,185	,373	-,208	,542
	Outg	NUH	UH	,611	,140	,000	,328	,895
		UH	NUH	-,611	,140	,000	-,895	-,328

Multivariate Tests

valence	group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Neg	Ing	Pillai's trace	,271	13,012	1,000	35,000	,001	,271
		Wilks' lambda	,729	13,012	1,000	35,000	,001	,271
		Hotelling's trace	,372	13,012	1,000	35,000	,001	,271
		Roy's largest root	,372	13,012	1,000	35,000	,001	,271
	Outg	Pillai's trace	,052	1,933	1,000	35,000	,173	,052
		Wilks' lambda	,948	1,933	1,000	35,000	,173	,052
		Hotelling's trace	,055	1,933	1,000	35,000	,173	,052
		Roy's largest root	,055	1,933	1,000	35,000	,173	,052
Pos	Ing	Pillai's trace	,023	,814	1,000	35,000	,373	,023
		Wilks' lambda	,977	,814	1,000	35,000	,373	,023
		Hotelling's trace	,023	,814	1,000	35,000	,373	,023
		Roy's largest root	,023	,814	1,000	35,000	,373	,023
	Outg	Pillai's trace	,354	19,163	1,000	35,000	,000	,354
		Wilks' lambda	,646	19,163	1,000	35,000	,000	,354
		Hotelling's trace	,548	19,163	1,000	35,000	,000	,354
		Roy's largest root	,548	19,163	1,000	35,000	,000	,354

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	group	(I) valence	(J) valence	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	Neg	Pos	-,167	,216	,446	-,606	,273
		Pos	Neg	,167	,216	,446	-,273	,606
	Outg	Neg	Pos	,222	,165	,186	-,112	,557
		Pos	Neg	-,222	,165	,186	-,557	,112
UH	Ing	Neg	Pos	-,861	,179	,000	-1,224	-,498
		Pos	Neg	,861	,179	,000	,498	1,224
	Outg	Neg	Pos	,583	,184	,003	,209	,957
		Pos	Neg	-,583	,184	,003	-,957	-,209

Multivariate Tests

humaness	group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Ing	Pillai's trace	,017	,593	1,000	35,000	,446	,017
		Wilks' lambda	,983	,593	1,000	35,000	,446	,017
		Hotelling's trace	,017	,593	1,000	35,000	,446	,017
		Roy's largest root	,017	,593	1,000	35,000	,446	,017
	Outg	Pillai's trace	,049	1,818	1,000	35,000	,186	,049
		Wilks' lambda	,951	1,818	1,000	35,000	,186	,049
		Hotelling's trace	,052	1,818	1,000	35,000	,186	,049
		Roy's largest root	,052	1,818	1,000	35,000	,186	,049

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	valence	(I) group	(J) group	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Neg	Ing	Outg	-,333	,169	,057	-,676	,010
		Outg	Ing	,333	,169	,057	-,010	,676
	Pos	Ing	Outg	,056	,173	,751	-,296	,408
		Outg	Ing	-,056	,173	,751	-,408	,296
UH	Neg	Ing	Outg	-,611	,161	,001	-,937	-,285
		Outg	Ing	,611	,161	,001	,285	,937
	Pos	Ing	Outg	,833	,141	,000	,547	1,119
		Outg	Ing	-,833	,141	,000	-1,119	-,547

Multivariate Tests

humaness	valence		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Neg	Pillai's trace	,100	3,889	1,000	35,000	,057	,100
		Wilks' lambda	,900	3,889	1,000	35,000	,057	,100
		Hotelling's trace	,111	3,889	1,000	35,000	,057	,100
		Roy's largest root	,111	3,889	1,000	35,000	,057	,100
	Pos	Pillai's trace	,003	,103	1,000	35,000	,751	,003
		Wilks' lambda	,997	,103	1,000	35,000	,751	,003
		Hotelling's trace	,003	,103	1,000	35,000	,751	,003
		Roy's largest root	,003	,103	1,000	35,000	,751	,003
UH	Neg	Pillai's trace	,292	14,454	1,000	35,000	,001	,292
		Wilks' lambda	,708	14,454	1,000	35,000	,001	,292
		Hotelling's trace	,413	14,454	1,000	35,000	,001	,292
		Roy's largest root	,413	14,454	1,000	35,000	,001	,292
	Pos	Pillai's trace	,500	35,000	1,000	35,000	,000	,500
		Wilks' lambda	,500	35,000	1,000	35,000	,000	,500
		Hotelling's trace	1,000	35,000	1,000	35,000	,000	,500
		Roy's largest root	1,000	35,000	1,000	35,000	,000	,500

Positive traits.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
humaness	Sphericity Assumed	1,778	1	1,778	3,613	,066	,094
	Greenhouse-Geisser	1,778	1,000	1,778	3,613	,066	,094
	Huynh-Feldt	1,778	1,000	1,778	3,613	,066	,094
	Lower-bound	1,778	1,000	1,778	3,613	,066	,094
Error(humaness)	Sphericity Assumed	17,222	35	,492			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	17,222	35,000	,492			

	Huynh-Feldt	17,222	35,000	,492			
	Lower-bound	17,222	35,000	,492			
group	Sphericity Assumed	7,111	1	7,111	16,716	,000	,323
	Greenhouse-Geisser	7,111	1,000	7,111	16,716	,000	,323
	Huynh-Feldt	7,111	1,000	7,111	16,716	,000	,323
	Lower-bound	7,111	1,000	7,111	16,716	,000	,323
Error(group)	Sphericity Assumed	14,889	35	,425			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	14,889	35,000	,425			
	Huynh-Feldt	14,889	35,000	,425			
	Lower-bound	14,889	35,000	,425			
humaness * group	Sphericity Assumed	5,444	1	5,444	11,510	,002	,247
	Greenhouse-Geisser	5,444	1,000	5,444	11,510	,002	,247
	Huynh-Feldt	5,444	1,000	5,444	11,510	,002	,247
	Lower-bound	5,444	1,000	5,444	11,510	,002	,247
Error(humaness*group)	Sphericity Assumed	16,556	35	,473			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	16,556	35,000	,473			
	Huynh-Feldt	16,556	35,000	,473			
	Lower-bound	16,556	35,000	,473			

Estimates

humaness	group	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	,972	,152	,664	1,280
	Outg	,917	,128	,656	1,177
UH	Ing	1,139	,139	,857	1,421
	Outg	,306	,096	,110	,501

Pairwise Comparisons

group	(I) humaness	(J) humaness	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ing	NUH	UH	-,167	,185	,373	-,542	,208
	UH	NUH	,167	,185	,373	-,208	,542
Outg	NUH	UH	,611	,140	,000	,328	,895
	UH	NUH	-,611	,140	,000	-,895	-,328

Multivariate Tests

group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Ing	Pillai's trace	,023	,814	1,000	35,000	,373	,023
	Wilks' lambda	,977	,814	1,000	35,000	,373	,023
	Hotelling's trace	,023	,814	1,000	35,000	,373	,023
	Roy's largest root	,023	,814	1,000	35,000	,373	,023
Outg	Pillai's trace	,354	19,163	1,000	35,000	,000	,354
	Wilks' lambda	,646	19,163	1,000	35,000	,000	,354
	Hotelling's trace	,548	19,163	1,000	35,000	,000	,354
	Roy's largest root	,548	19,163	1,000	35,000	,000	,354

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	(I) group	(J) group	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	Outg	,056	,173	,751	-,296	,408
	Outg	Ing	-,056	,173	,751	-,408	,296
UH	Ing	Outg	,833	,141	,000	,547	1,119
	Outg	Ing	-,833	,141	,000	-1,119	-,547

Multivariate Tests

humaness		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Pillai's trace	,003	,103	1,000	35,000	,751	,003
	Wilks' lambda	,997	,103	1,000	35,000	,751	,003
	Hotelling's trace	,003	,103	1,000	35,000	,751	,003
	Roy's largest root	,003	,103	1,000	35,000	,751	,003
UH	Pillai's trace	,500	35,000	1,000	35,000	,000	,500
	Wilks' lambda	,500	35,000	1,000	35,000	,000	,500
	Hotelling's trace	1,000	35,000	1,000	35,000	,000	,500
	Roy's largest root	1,000	35,000	1,000	35,000	,000	,500

Negative traits.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
humaness	Sphericity Assumed	5,444	1	5,444	14,057	,001	,287
	Greenhouse-Geisser	5,444	1,000	5,444	14,057	,001	,287
	Huynh-Feldt	5,444	1,000	5,444	14,057	,001	,287
	Lower-bound	5,444	1,000	5,444	14,057	,001	,287
Error(humaness)	Sphericity Assumed	13,556	35	,387			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	13,556	35,000	,387			
	Huynh-Feldt	13,556	35,000	,387			
	Lower-bound	13,556	35,000	,387			
group	Sphericity Assumed	8,028	1	8,028	20,109	,000	,365
	Greenhouse-Geisser	8,028	1,000	8,028	20,109	,000	,365
	Huynh-Feldt	8,028	1,000	8,028	20,109	,000	,365
	Lower-bound	8,028	1,000	8,028	20,109	,000	,365
Error(group)	Sphericity Assumed	13,972	35	,399			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	13,972	35,000	,399			
	Huynh-Feldt	13,972	35,000	,399			
	Lower-bound	13,972	35,000	,399			
humaness * group	Sphericity Assumed	,694	1	,694	1,197	,281	,033
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,694	1,000	,694	1,197	,281	,033
	Huynh-Feldt	,694	1,000	,694	1,197	,281	,033
	Lower-bound	,694	1,000	,694	1,197	,281	,033
Error(humaness*group)	Sphericity Assumed	20,306	35	,580			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	20,306	35,000	,580			
	Huynh-Feldt	20,306	35,000	,580			
	Lower-bound	20,306	35,000	,580			

Estimates

humaness	group	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	,806	,137	,527	1,084
	Outg	1,139	,107	,923	1,355
UH	Ing	,278	,086	,104	,451
	Outg	,889	,137	,611	1,166

Pairwise Comparisons

group	(I) humaness	(J) humaness	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ing	NUH	UH	,528	,146	,001	,231	,825
	UH	NUH	-,528	,146	,001	-,825	-,231
Outg	NUH	UH	,250	,180	,173	-,115	,615
	UH	NUH	-,250	,180	,173	-,615	,115

Multivariate Tests

group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Ing	Pillai's trace	,271	13,012	1,000	35,000	,001	,271
	Wilks' lambda	,729	13,012	1,000	35,000	,001	,271
	Hotelling's trace	,372	13,012	1,000	35,000	,001	,271
	Roy's largest root	,372	13,012	1,000	35,000	,001	,271
Outg	Pillai's trace	,052	1,933	1,000	35,000	,173	,052
	Wilks' lambda	,948	1,933	1,000	35,000	,173	,052
	Hotelling's trace	,055	1,933	1,000	35,000	,173	,052
	Roy's largest root	,055	1,933	1,000	35,000	,173	,052

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	(I) group	(J) group	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	Outg	-,333	,169	,057	-,676	,010
	Outg	Ing	,333	,169	,057	-,010	,676
UH	Ing	Outg	-,611*	,161	,001	-,937	-,285
	Outg	Ing	,611*	,161	,001	,285	,937

Multivariate Tests

humaness		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Pillai's trace	,100	3,889	1,000	35,000	,057	,100
	Wilks' lambda	,900	3,889	1,000	35,000	,057	,100
	Hotelling's trace	,111	3,889	1,000	35,000	,057	,100
	Roy's largest root	,111	3,889	1,000	35,000	,057	,100
UH	Pillai's trace	,292	14,454	1,000	35,000	,001	,292
	Wilks' lambda	,708	14,454	1,000	35,000	,001	,292
	Hotelling's trace	,413	14,454	1,000	35,000	,001	,292
	Roy's largest root	,413	14,454	1,000	35,000	,001	,292

Study 2b.

Dehumanisation.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
humaness	Sphericity Assumed	2,133	1	2,133	6,404	,017	,176
	Greenhouse-Geisser	2,133	1,000	2,133	6,404	,017	,176
	Huynh-Feldt	2,133	1,000	2,133	6,404	,017	,176
	Lower-bound	2,133	1,000	2,133	6,404	,017	,176
Error(humaness)	Sphericity Assumed	9,992	30	,333			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	9,992	30,000	,333			
	Huynh-Feldt	9,992	30,000	,333			
	Lower-bound	9,992	30,000	,333			
valence	Sphericity Assumed	,198	1	,198	,397	,533	,013
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,198	1,000	,198	,397	,533	,013
	Huynh-Feldt	,198	1,000	,198	,397	,533	,013
	Lower-bound	,198	1,000	,198	,397	,533	,013
Error(valence)	Sphericity Assumed	14,927	30	,498			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	14,927	30,000	,498			

	Huynh-Feldt	14,927	30,000	,498			
	Lower-bound	14,927	30,000	,498			
group	Sphericity Assumed	4,940	1	4,940	16,133	,000	,350
	Greenhouse-Geisser	4,940	1,000	4,940	16,133	,000	,350
	Huynh-Feldt	4,940	1,000	4,940	16,133	,000	,350
	Lower-bound	4,940	1,000	4,940	16,133	,000	,350
Error(group)	Sphericity Assumed	9,185	30	,306			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	9,185	30,000	,306			
	Huynh-Feldt	9,185	30,000	,306			
	Lower-bound	9,185	30,000	,306			
humaness * valence	Sphericity Assumed	2,940	1	2,940	4,719	,038	,136
	Greenhouse-Geisser	2,940	1,000	2,940	4,719	,038	,136
	Huynh-Feldt	2,940	1,000	2,940	4,719	,038	,136
	Lower-bound	2,940	1,000	2,940	4,719	,038	,136
Error(humaness*valence)	Sphericity Assumed	18,685	30	,623			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	18,685	30,000	,623			
	Huynh-Feldt	18,685	30,000	,623			
	Lower-bound	18,685	30,000	,623			
humaness * group	Sphericity Assumed	1,778	1	1,778	2,831	,103	,086
	Greenhouse-Geisser	1,778	1,000	1,778	2,831	,103	,086
	Huynh-Feldt	1,778	1,000	1,778	2,831	,103	,086
	Lower-bound	1,778	1,000	1,778	2,831	,103	,086
Error(humaness*group)	Sphericity Assumed	18,847	30	,628			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	18,847	30,000	,628			
	Huynh-Feldt	18,847	30,000	,628			
	Lower-bound	18,847	30,000	,628			
valence * group	Sphericity Assumed	3,391	1	3,391	5,579	,025	,157
	Greenhouse-Geisser	3,391	1,000	3,391	5,579	,025	,157
	Huynh-Feldt	3,391	1,000	3,391	5,579	,025	,157

	Lower-bound	3,391	1,000	3,391	5,579	,025	,157
Error(valence*group)	Sphericity Assumed	18,234	30	,608			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	18,234	30,000	,608			
	Huynh-Feldt	18,234	30,000	,608			
	Lower-bound	18,234	30,000	,608			
humaness * valence * group	Sphericity Assumed	2,520	1	2,520	8,786	,006	,227
	Greenhouse-Geisser	2,520	1,000	2,520	8,786	,006	,227
	Huynh-Feldt	2,520	1,000	2,520	8,786	,006	,227
	Lower-bound	2,520	1,000	2,520	8,786	,006	,227
Error(humaness*valence* group)	Sphericity Assumed	8,605	30	,287			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	8,605	30,000	,287			
	Huynh-Feldt	8,605	30,000	,287			
	Lower-bound	8,605	30,000	,287			

Estimates

humaness	valence	group	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Neg	Ing	1,194	,135	,919	1,468
		Outg	,774	,120	,529	1,020
	Pos	Ing	1,065	,153	,751	1,378
		Outg	,581	,121	,334	,827
UH	Neg	Ing	,419	,090	,235	,603
		Outg	,742	,146	,443	1,041
	Pos	Ing	1,129	,137	,849	1,409
		Outg	,581	,111	,353	,808

Pairwise Comparisons

valence	group	(I) humaness	(J) humaness	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Neg	Ing	NUH	UH	,774	,159	,000	,450	1,098
		UH	NUH	-,774	,159	,000	-1,098	-,450
	Outg	NUH	UH	,032	,210	,879	-,396	,461
		UH	NUH	-,032	,210	,879	-,461	,396
Pos	Ing	NUH	UH	-,065	,191	,738	-,454	,325
		UH	NUH	,065	,191	,738	-,325	,454
	Outg	NUH	UH	,000	,123	1,000	-,251	,251
		UH	NUH	,000	,123	1,000	-,251	,251

Multivariate Tests

valence	group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Neg	Ing	Pillai's trace	,442	23,80	1,000	30,000	,000	,442
		Wilks' lambda	,558	23,802	1,000	30,000	,000	,442
		Hotelling's trace	,793	23,802	1,000	30,000	,000	,442
		Roy's largest root	,793	23,802	1,000	30,000	,000	,442
	Outg	Pillai's trace	,001	,024	1,000	30,000	,879	,001
		Wilks' lambda	,999	,024	1,000	30,000	,879	,001
		Hotelling's trace	,001	,024	1,000	30,000	,879	,001
		Roy's largest root	,001	,024	1,000	30,000	,879	,001
Pos	Ing	Pillai's trace	,004	,114	1,000	30,000	,738	,004
		Wilks' lambda	,996	,114	1,000	30,000	,738	,004
		Hotelling's trace	,004	,114	1,000	30,000	,738	,004
		Roy's largest root	,004	,114	1,000	30,000	,738	,004
	Outg	Pillai's trace	,000	,000	1,000	30,000	1,000	,000
		Wilks' lambda	1,000	,000	1,000	30,000	1,000	,000
		Hotelling's trace	,000	,000	1,000	30,000	1,000	,000
		Roy's largest root	,000	,000	1,000	30,000	1,000	,000

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	group	(I) valence	(J) valence	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	Neg	Pos	,129	,184	,489	-,247	,505
		Pos	Neg	-,129	,184	,489	-,505	,247
	Outg	Neg	Pos	,194	,188	,311	-,190	,577
		Pos	Neg	-,194	,188	,311	-,577	,190
UH	Ing	Neg	Pos	-,71	,148	,000	-1,012	-,407
		Pos	Neg	,710	,148	,000	,407	1,012
	Outg	Neg	Pos	,161	,197	,420	-,242	,564
		Pos	Neg	-,161	,197	,420	-,564	,242

Multivariate Tests

humaness	group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Ing	Pillai's trace	,016	,492	1,000	30,000	,489	,016
		Wilks' lambda	,984	,492	1,000	30,000	,489	,016
		Hotelling's trace	,016	,492	1,000	30,000	,489	,016
		Roy's largest root	,016	,492	1,000	30,000	,489	,016
	Outg	Pillai's trace	,034	1,061	1,000	30,000	,311	,034
		Wilks' lambda	,966	1,061	1,000	30,000	,311	,034
		Hotelling's trace	,035	1,061	1,000	30,000	,311	,034
		Roy's largest root	,035	1,061	1,000	30,000	,311	,034

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	valence	(I) group	(J) group	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Neg	Ing	Outg	,419	,152	,010	,108	,730
		Outg	Ing	-,419	,152	,010	-,730	-,108
	Pos	Ing	Outg	,484	,190	,016	,095	,873
		Outg	Ing	-,484	,190	,016	-,873	-,095
UH	Neg	Ing	Outg	-,323	,176	,077	-,682	,037
		Outg	Ing	,323	,176	,077	-,037	,682
	Pos	Ing	Outg	,548	,166	,002	,209	,888
		Outg	Ing	-,548	,166	,002	-,888	-,209

Multivariate Tests

humaness	valence		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Neg	Pillai's trace	,202	7,590	1,000	30,000	,010	,202
		Wilks' lambda	,798	7,590	1,000	30,000	,010	,202
		Hotelling's trace	,253	7,590	1,000	30,000	,010	,202
		Roy's largest root	,253	7,590	1,000	30,000	,010	,202
	Pos	Pillai's trace	,177	6,453	1,000	30,000	,016	,177
		Wilks' lambda	,823	6,453	1,000	30,000	,016	,177
		Hotelling's trace	,215	6,453	1,000	30,000	,016	,177
		Roy's largest root	,215	6,453	1,000	30,000	,016	,177
UH	Neg	Pillai's trace	,101	3,363	1,000	30,000	,077	,101
		Wilks' lambda	,899	3,363	1,000	30,000	,077	,101
		Hotelling's trace	,112	3,363	1,000	30,000	,077	,101
		Roy's largest root	,112	3,363	1,000	30,000	,077	,101
	Pos	Pillai's trace	,266	10,892	1,000	30,000	,002	,266
		Wilks' lambda	,734	10,892	1,000	30,000	,002	,266
		Hotelling's trace	,363	10,892	1,000	30,000	,002	,266
		Roy's largest root	,363	10,892	1,000	30,000	,002	,266

Positive Traits.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
humaness	Sphericity Assumed	,032	1	,032	,084	,773	,003
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,032	1,000	,032	,084	,773	,003
	Huynh-Feldt	,032	1,000	,032	,084	,773	,003
	Lower-bound	,032	1,000	,032	,084	,773	,003
Error(humaness)	Sphericity Assumed	11,468	30	,382			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	11,468	30,000	,382			
	Huynh-Feldt	11,468	30,000	,382			

	Lower-bound	11,468	30,000	,382			
group	Sphericity Assumed	8,258	1	8,258	14,369	,001	,324
	Greenhouse-Geisser	8,258	1,000	8,258	14,369	,001	,324
	Huynh-Feldt	8,258	1,000	8,258	14,369	,001	,324
	Lower-bound	8,258	1,000	8,258	14,369	,001	,324
Error(group)	Sphericity Assumed	17,242	30	,575			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	17,242	30,000	,575			
	Huynh-Feldt	17,242	30,000	,575			
	Lower-bound	17,242	30,000	,575			
humaness * group	Sphericity Assumed	,032	1	,032	,078	,782	,003
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,032	1,000	,032	,078	,782	,003
	Huynh-Feldt	,032	1,000	,032	,078	,782	,003
	Lower-bound	,032	1,000	,032	,078	,782	,003
Error(humaness*group)	Sphericity Assumed	12,468	30	,416			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	12,468	30,000	,416			
	Huynh-Feldt	12,468	30,000	,416			
	Lower-bound	12,468	30,000	,416			

Estimates

humaness	group	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	1,065	,153	,751	1,378
	Outg	,581	,121	,334	,827
UH	Ing	1,129	,137	,849	1,409
	Outg	,581	,111	,353	,808

Pairwise Comparisons

group	(I) humaness	(J) humaness	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ing	NUH	UH	-,065	,191	,738	-,454	,325
	UH	NUH	,065	,191	,738	-,325	,454
Outg	NUH	UH	,000	,123	1,000	-,251	,251
	UH	NUH	,000	,123	1,000	-,251	,251

Multivariate Tests

group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Ing	Pillai's trace	,004	,114	1,000	30,000	,738	,004
	Wilks' lambda	,996	,114	1,000	30,000	,738	,004
	Hotelling's trace	,004	,114	1,000	30,000	,738	,004
	Roy's largest root	,004	,114	1,000	30,000	,738	,004
Outg	Pillai's trace	,000	,000	1,000	30,000	1,000	,000
	Wilks' lambda	1,000	,000	1,000	30,000	1,000	,000
	Hotelling's trace	,000	,000	1,000	30,000	1,000	,000
	Roy's largest root	,000	,000	1,000	30,000	1,000	,000

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	(I) group	(J) group	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	Outg	,484	,190	,016	,095	,873
	Outg	Ing	-,484	,190	,016	-,873	-,095
UH	Ing	Outg	,548	,166	,002	,209	,888
	Outg	Ing	-,548	,166	,002	-,888	-,209

Multivariate Tests

humaness		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Pillai's trace	,177	6,453	1,000	30,000	,016	,177
	Wilks' lambda	,823	6,453	1,000	30,000	,016	,177
	Hotelling's trace	,215	6,453	1,000	30,000	,016	,177
	Roy's largest root	,215	6,453	1,000	30,000	,016	,177
UH	Pillai's trace	,266	10,892	1,000	30,000	,002	,266
	Wilks' lambda	,734	10,892	1,000	30,000	,002	,266
	Hotelling's trace	,363	10,892	1,000	30,000	,002	,266
	Roy's largest root	,363	10,892	1,000	30,000	,002	,266

Negative Traits.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
humaness	Sphericity Assumed	5,040	1	5,040	8,786	,006	,227
	Greenhouse-Geisser	5,040	1,000	5,040	8,786	,006	,227
	Huynh-Feldt	5,040	1,000	5,040	8,786	,006	,227
	Lower-bound	5,040	1,000	5,040	8,786	,006	,227
Error(humaness)	Sphericity Assumed	17,210	30	,574			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	17,210	30,000	,574			
	Huynh-Feldt	17,210	30,000	,574			
	Lower-bound	17,210	30,000	,574			
group	Sphericity Assumed	,073	1	,073	,214	,647	,007
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,073	1,000	,073	,214	,647	,007
	Huynh-Feldt	,073	1,000	,073	,214	,647	,007
	Lower-bound	,073	1,000	,073	,214	,647	,007
Error(group)	Sphericity Assumed	10,177	30	,339			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	10,177	30,000	,339			
	Huynh-Feldt	10,177	30,000	,339			
	Lower-bound	10,177	30,000	,339			
humaness * group	Sphericity Assumed	4,266	1	4,266	8,541	,007	,222
	Greenhouse-Geisser	4,266	1,000	4,266	8,541	,007	,222
	Huynh-Feldt	4,266	1,000	4,266	8,541	,007	,222
	Lower-bound	4,266	1,000	4,266	8,541	,007	,222
Error(humaness*group)	Sphericity Assumed	14,984	30	,499			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	14,984	30,000	,499			
	Huynh-Feldt	14,984	30,000	,499			
	Lower-bound	14,984	30,000	,499			

Estimates

humaness	group	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	Ing	1,194	,135	,919	1,468
	Outg	,774	,120	,529	1,020
UH	Ing	,419	,090	,235	,603
	Outg	,742	,146	,443	1,041

Pairwise Comparisons

group	(I) humaness	(J) humaness	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ing	NUH	UH	,774	,159	,000	,450	1,098
	UH	NUH	-,774	,159	,000	-1,098	-,450
Outg	NUH	UH	,032	,210	,879	-,396	,461
	UH	NUH	-,032	,210	,879	-,461	,396

Multivariate Tests

group		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Ing	Pillai's trace	,442	23,802	1,000	30,000	,000	,442
	Wilks' lambda	,558	23,802	1,000	30,000	,000	,442
	Hotelling's trace	,793	23,802	1,000	30,000	,000	,442
	Roy's largest root	,793	23,802	1,000	30,000	,000	,442
Outg	Pillai's trace	,001	,024	1,000	30,000	,879	,001
	Wilks' lambda	,999	,024	1,000	30,000	,879	,001
	Hotelling's trace	,001	,024	1,000	30,000	,879	,001
	Roy's largest root	,001	,024	1,000	30,000	,879	,001

Pairwise Comparisons

humaness	(I) group	(J) group	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NUH	1	2	,419	,152	,010	,108	,730
	2	1	-,419	,152	,010	-,730	-,108
UH	1	2	-,323	,176	,077	-,682	,037
	2	1	,323	,176	,077	-,037	,682

Multivariate Tests

humaness		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
NUH	Pillai's trace	,202	7,590	1,000	30,000	,010	,202
	Wilks' lambda	,798	7,590	1,000	30,000	,010	,202
	Hotelling's trace	,253	7,590	1,000	30,000	,010	,202
	Roy's largest root	,253	7,590	1,000	30,000	,010	,202
UH	Pillai's trace	,101	3,363	1,000	30,000	,077	,101
	Wilks' lambda	,899	3,363	1,000	30,000	,077	,101
	Hotelling's trace	,112	3,363	1,000	30,000	,077	,101
	Roy's largest root	,112	3,363	1,000	30,000	,077	,101

Appendix C: Material and Measures of The relation between human uniqueness and immorality: An index of behaviours

Criminal behaviours used in paper 2

Criminal Behaviours
Agressão; Abuso Sexual de Menores; Assalto; Atropelamento e Fuga; Burla; Condução com Excesso de Álcool; Corrupção; Difamação; Extorsão de Bens; Falsificação de Identidade; Fraude; Fuga de Impostos; Furto; Homicídio; Imigração Ilegal; Insulto à Autoridade; Pirataria; Plágio; Prostituição; Racismo; Rapto; Terrorismo; Tortura; Tráfico; Violação dos Direitos Humanos; Violação Sexual; Violência Doméstica

Study Measures

Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é honesta?

Nada	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Muito

Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é sincera?

Nada	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Muito

Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é de confiança?

Nada	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Muito

Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é refinada e culta?

Nada	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Muito

Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento é racional e lógica?

Nada	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Muito

Em que medida considera que uma pessoa que pratique este comportamento tem auto-controlo?

Nada	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Muito

Em que medida considera que praticar este comportamento é grave?

Nada	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Muito

Appendix D: Statistics of The relation between human uniqueness and immorality: An index of behaviours

Correlation Analyses

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Moralidade_3itens	2,3936	,82042	27
Humanidade_3itens	3,2512	,76619	27
Gravidade	6,0209	,83341	27

Correlations

		Moralidade_3itens	Humanidade_3itens	Gravidade
Moralidade_3itens	Pearson Correlation	1	,092	-,739**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,647	,000
	N	27	27	27
Humanidade_3itens	Pearson Correlation	,092	1	-,511**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,647		,006
	N	27	27	27
Gravidade	Pearson Correlation	-,739**	-,511**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,006	
	N	27	27	27

Clusters Analyses

Final Cluster Centers

	Cluster			
	1	2	3	4
Moralidade_3itens	3,36	1,98	3,84	1,94
Humanidade_3itens	2,51	3,76	3,86	2,46

Distances between Final Cluster Centers

Cluster	1	2	3	4
1		1,864	1,426	1,423
2	1,864		1,864	1,310
3	1,426	1,864		2,362
4	1,423	1,310	2,362	

ANOVA

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
Moralidade_3itens	4,966	3	,113	23	43,898	,000
Humanidade_3itens	3,776	3	,171	23	22,079	,000

Number of Cases in each Cluster

Cluster	1	3,000
	2	12,000
	3	4,000
	4	8,000
Valid		27,000
Missing		,000

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Moralidade_3itens	1,302	3	23	,298
Humanidade_3itens	,971	3	23	,423

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Moralidade_3itens	Between Groups	14,898	3	4,966	43,898	,000
	Within Groups	2,602	23	,113		
	Total	17,500	26			
Humanidade_3itens	Between Groups	11,329	3	3,776	22,079	,000
	Within Groups	3,934	23	,171		
	Total	15,263	26			

Robust Tests of Equality of Means

		Statistic[a]	df1	df2	Sig.
Moralidade_3itens	Welch	73,737	3	9,679	,000
Humanidade_3itens	Welch	20,927	3	7,371	,001

Group Statistics

	Agrupamento_clusters_Moralidade	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Moralidade_3itens	Baixa Moralidade (1 e 2)	12	1,9758	,37889	,10938
	Alta Moralidade (3 e 4)	8	1,9365	,33369	,11798

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Moralidade_3itens	Equal variances assumed	,002	,968	,238	18	,815	,03931	,16522	-,30781	,38643
	Equal variances not assumed			,244	16,464	,810	,03931	,16088	-,30095	,37958

Group Statistics

	Agrupamento_clusters_Humanidade	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Humanidade_3itens	Alta Humanidade (1 e 3)	12	3,7643	,45249	,13062
	Baixa Humanidade (2 e 4)	8	2,4550	,37750	,13346

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Humanidade_3itens	Equal variances assumed	,805	,381	6,751	18	,000	1,30925	,19394	,90180	1,71671
	Equal variances not assumed			7,011	16,941	,000	1,30925	,18675	,91515	1,70336

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Moralidade_3itens	1	12	1,9758	,37889	,10938	1,7351	2,2165	1,29	2,63
	2	8	1,9365	,33369	,11798	1,6575	2,2155	1,45	2,37
	3	4	3,8377	,27479	,13740	3,4004	4,2750	3,49	4,15
	4	3	3,3580	,09168	,05293	3,1303	3,5857	3,29	3,46
	Total	27	2,3936	,82042	,15789	2,0690	2,7181	1,29	4,15
Humanidade_3itens	1	12	3,7643	,45249	,13062	3,4768	4,0518	3,18	4,45
	2	8	2,4550	,37750	,13346	2,1394	2,7706	1,96	2,85
	3	4	3,8573	,40822	,20411	3,2077	4,5068	3,34	4,20
	4	3	2,5142	,30352	,17524	1,7602	3,2682	2,27	2,85
	Total	27	3,2512	,76619	,14745	2,9481	3,5543	1,96	4,45

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Moralidade_3itens	1,302	3	23	,298
Humanidade_3itens	,971	3	23	,423

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Moralidade_3itens	Between Groups	14,898	3	4,966	43,898	,000
	Within Groups	2,602	23	,113		
	Total	17,500	26			
Humanidade_3itens	Between Groups	11,329	3	3,776	22,079	,000
	Within Groups	3,934	23	,171		
	Total	15,263	26			

Robust Tests of Equality of Means

		Statistic[a]	df1	df2	Sig.
Moralidade_3itens	Welch	73,737	3	9,679	,000
Humanidade_3itens	Welch	20,927	3	7,371	,001

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable	(I) Ward Method	(J) Ward Method	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Moralidade_3itens	1	2	,03931	,15352	,800	-,2783	,3569
		3	-1,86190*	,19419	,000	-2,2636	-1,4602
		4	-1,38220*	,21711	,000	-1,8313	-,9331
	2	1	-,03931	,15352	,800	-,3569	,2783
		3	-1,90121*	,20597	,000	-2,3273	-1,4751
		4	-1,42151*	,22771	,000	-1,8926	-,9505
	3	1	1,86190*	,19419	,000	1,4602	2,2636
		2	1,90121*	,20597	,000	1,4751	2,3273
		4	,47970	,25689	,075	-,0517	1,0111
	4	1	1,38220*	,21711	,000	,9331	1,8313
		2	1,42151*	,22771	,000	,9505	1,8926
		3	-,47970	,25689	,075	-1,0111	,0517
Humanidade_3itens	1	2	1,30925*	,18877	,000	,9188	1,6998
		3	-,09298	,23877	,701	-,5869	,4010
		4	1,25013*	,26696	,000	,6979	1,8024
	2	1	-1,30925*	,18877	,000	-1,6998	-,9188
		3	-1,40224*	,25326	,000	-1,9261	-,8783
		4	-,05913	,27999	,835	-,6383	,5201
	3	1	,09298	,23877	,701	-,4010	,5869
		2	1,40224*	,25326	,000	,8783	1,9261
		4	1,34311*	,31587	,000	,6897	1,9965
	4	1	-1,25013*	,26696	,000	-1,8024	-,6979
		2	,05913	,27999	,835	-,5201	,6383
		3	-1,34311*	,31587	,000	-1,9965	-,6897

Descriptives

Gravidade

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
1	12	6,0766	,45314	,13081	5,7886	6,3645	5,20	6,61
2	8	6,7386	,10822	,03826	6,6481	6,8291	6,59	6,93
3	4	4,3442	,26579	,13290	3,9213	4,7671	4,10	4,71
4	3	6,1201	,19141	,11051	5,6446	6,5956	5,90	6,26
Total	27	6,0209	,83341	,16039	5,6912	6,3506	4,10	6,93

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Gravidade

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
5,206	3	23	,007

ANOVA

Gravidade

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	15,433	3	5,144	45,058	,000
Within Groups	2,626	23	,114		
Total	18,059	26			

Robust Tests of Equality of Means

Gravidade

	Statistic[a]	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	89,239	3	6,333	,000

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Gravidade

(I) Ward Method	(J) Ward Method	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	2	-,66205	,15423	,000	-,9811	-,3430
	3	1,73236	,19508	,000	1,3288	2,1359
	4	-,0435	,21811	,843	-,4948	,4076
2	1	,66205	,15423	,000	,3430	,9811
	3	2,39441	,20691	,000	1,9664	2,8224
	4	,61848	,22875	,013	,1453	1,0917
3	1	-1,73236	,19508	,000	-2,1359	-1,3288
	2	-2,39441	,20691	,000	-2,8224	-1,9664
	4	-1,77593	,25807	,000	-2,3098	-1,2421
4	1	,0435	,21811	,843	-,4076	,4948
	2	-,61848	,22875	,013	-1,0917	-,1453
	3	1,77593	,25807	,000	1,2421	2,3098

Appendix E: Material and Measures of Human Uniqueness and Moral Blame: The Role of Group Threat

Study 1 Manipulation

Low Threat Condition.



Correio de

Janeiro, 2014

Burla no Ensino Superior

Há algum tempo atrás, um aluno do ISPA-IU foi acusado de ter burlado alguns colegas.

Daniel Silva, de 22 anos, aluno de Psicologia da referida Instituição, fez-se passar por um membro da Associação de Estudantes (AE), que estava, naquele momento, a organizar uma festa para os alunos, tendo vendido bilhetes falsos a vários colegas.

O esquema apenas foi descoberto no dia da festa. Vários alunos apresentaram os bilhetes comprados a Daniel Silva ao porteiro da festa, que os detectou imediatamente como sendo falsos por não apresentarem o código de emissão correcto.

Esta situação foi reportada à AE e à Reitoria do ISPA, sendo posteriormente apurado que tinha havido, de facto, uma burla por parte do aluno no valor de 250€.

Actualmente está a ser preparada uma avaliação ao Ensino Superior, que incide sobre vários aspetos das Universidades portuguesas. Pela primeira vez a comunidade estudantil de cada Universidade será também avaliada.

Esta nova avaliação tem suscitado alguns rumores, contudo há quem afirme que o caso do Daniel Silva não terá qualquer impacto na avaliação do ISPA, bem como na sua comunidade estudantil, uma vez que os valores, costumes e identidade da Instituição e dos seus alunos se mantêm inalterados.

High Threat Condition.



Correio de

Janeiro, 2014

Burla no Ensino Superior

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Daniel Silva, de 22 anos, aluno de Psicologia da referida Instituição, fez-se passar por um membro da Associação de Estudantes (AE), que estava, naquele momento, a organizar uma festa para os alunos, tendo vendido bilhetes falsos a vários colegas.

O esquema apenas foi descoberto no dia da festa. Vários alunos apresentaram os bilhetes comprados a Daniel Silva ao porteiro da festa, que os detectou imediatamente como sendo falsos por não apresentarem o código de emissão correcto.

Esta situação foi reportada à AE e à Reitoria do ISPA, sendo posteriormente apurado que tinha havido, de facto, uma burla por parte do aluno no valor de 250€.

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Esta nova avaliação tem suscitado alguns rumores, havendo quem afirme que o caso do Daniel Silva terá impacto na avaliação do ISPA, bem como na sua comunidade estudantil, uma vez que os valores, costumes e identidade da Instituição e dos seus alunos poderão ter ficado alterados.

Deviant and ingroup dehumanisation measure.

Em que medida considera que o Daniel Silva/ os alunos do ISPA:

	Nada						**Muito**
É/são refinado(s) e culto(s)	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
É/são racional(s) e lógico(s)	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Tem/têm auto-controlo	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
É/são sofisticado(s)	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

Blame and threat questions.

Em que medida considera:

	Nada						**Muito**
O Daniel Silva culpado pelo seu comportamento	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
O Daniel Silva responsável pelo seu comportamento	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Que o comportamento do Daniel Silva irá enfraquecer os valores centrais dos alunos do ISPA	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Que o comportamento do Daniel Silva irá enfraquecer os costumes dos alunos do ISPA	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Que o comportamento do Daniel Silva irá enfraquecer a identidade dos alunos do ISPA	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Que o comportamento do Daniel Silva irá diminuir a reputação dos alunos do ISPA	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
O Daniel Silva imoral pelo seu comportamento	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

Study 2

Agression Manipulation.



Correio de

Janeiro, 2014

Agressão no Ensino Superior

Há algum tempo atrás, um aluno do ISPA-IU foi acusado de ter agredido um colega.

Daniel Silva, de 22 anos, aluno de Psicologia da referida Universidade, estava a assistir a uma conferência que decorria no auditório do ISPA, quando de repente se levantou e se dirigiu a um colega que estava duas filas mais abaixo.

Sem que nada o fizesse prever, começou a agredir violentamente o colega, que, apanhado de surpresa, caiu imediatamente da cadeira e ficou no chão, enquanto Daniel Silva o pontapeava.

Foi necessária a intervenção do conferencista, um investigador externo à Universidade, e de dois professores, para imobilizar Daniel Silva e assim cessar as agressões ao colega.

A vítima foi medicamente assistida, perante o choque da audiência.

Swindle Manipulation.



Correio de

Janeiro, 2014

Burla no Ensino Superior

Há algum tempo atrás, um aluno do ISPA-IU foi acusado de ter burlado alguns colegas.

Daniel Silva, de 22 anos, aluno de Psicologia da referida Instituição, fez-se passar por um membro da Associação de Estudantes (AE), que estava, naquele momento, a organizar uma festa para os alunos, tendo vendido bilhetes falsos a vários colegas.

O esquema apenas foi descoberto no dia da festa. Vários alunos apresentaram os bilhetes comprados a Daniel Silva ao porteiro da festa, que os detectou imediatamente como sendo falsos por não apresentarem o código de emissão correcto.

Esta situação foi reportada à AE e à Reitoria do ISPA, sendo posteriormente apurado que tinha havido, de facto, uma burla por parte do aluno no valor de 250€.

Identification measure.

	Discordo fortemente						**Concordo fortemente**
Eu penso que os/as alunos/as do ISPA têm muito de que se orgulhar.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
É agradável ser aluno/a do ISPA.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Ser aluno/a do ISPA dá-me uma sensação agradável.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Eu penso muitas vezes no facto de que sou aluno/a do ISPA.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
O facto de ser aluno/a do ISPA é uma parte importante da minha identidade.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Ser aluno/a do ISPA é uma parte importante de como eu me vejo a mim mesmo/a.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Eu tenho muito em comum com o/a aluno/a habitual do ISPA.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Eu sou parecido/a com o/a aluno/a habitual do ISPA.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Os/as alunos/as do ISPA têm muitos pontos em comum entre si.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Os/as alunos/as do ISPA são muito parecidos/as.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Eu sinto uma ligação com os/as alunos/as do ISPA.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Eu sinto solidariedade para com os/as alunos/as do ISPA.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Eu sinto dedicação para com os/as alunos/as do ISPA.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Eu estou contente por ser aluno/a do ISPA.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

Appendix F: Statistics of Human Uniqueness and Moral Blame: The Role of Group Threat

Study 1

Measures Reliability.

Deviant Dehumanisation.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,800	4

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
UH1_alvo	3,1296	1,46720	54
UH2_alvo	3,5185	1,74551	54
UH3_alvo	3,2037	1,67534	54
UH4_alvo	3,0185	1,46004	54

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
UH1_alvo	9,7407	15,894	,625	,746
UH2_alvo	9,3519	13,402	,697	,706
UH3_alvo	9,6667	15,245	,559	,779
UH4_alvo	9,8519	16,317	,586	,764

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
12,8704	25,360	5,03589	4

Ingroup Dehumanisation.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,846	4

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
UH1_alunos	3,7963	1,08818	54
UH2_alunos	4,1296	1,11670	54
UH3_alunos	4,3519	1,19996	54
UH4_alunos	3,6296	1,17033	54

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
UH1_alunos	12,1111	8,176	,802	,756
UH2_alunos	11,7778	8,591	,689	,803
UH3_alunos	11,5556	8,403	,648	,821
UH4_alunos	12,2778	8,770	,607	,838

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
15,9074	14,350	3,78811	4

Moral Blame.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,899	2

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
MoralB1	6,4600	,88548	50
MoralB2	6,5600	,90711	50

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
MoralB1	6,5600	,823	,816	.
MoralB2	6,4600	,784	,816	.

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
13,0200	2,918	1,70820	2

Threat Perception.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,898	3

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Threat1	3,2453	1,88012	53
Threat2	2,4906	1,44944	53
Threat3	2,5849	1,58641	53

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Threat1	5,0755	8,379	,770	,898
Threat2	5,8302	10,259	,855	,820
Threat3	5,7358	9,813	,802	,851

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
8,3208	20,299	4,50544	3

Deviant and Ingroup Dehumanisation.

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
UH	Sphericity Assumed	15,565	1	15,565	14,544	,000	,219
	Greenhouse-Geisser	15,565	1,000	15,565	14,544	,000	,219
	Huynh-Feldt	15,565	1,000	15,565	14,544	,000	,219
	Lower-bound	15,565	1,000	15,565	14,544	,000	,219
UH * Ameaça	Sphericity Assumed	5,787	1	5,787	5,408	,024	,094
	Greenhouse-Geisser	5,787	1,000	5,787	5,408	,024	,094
	Huynh-Feldt	5,787	1,000	5,787	5,408	,024	,094
	Lower-bound	5,787	1,000	5,787	5,408	,024	,094
Error(UH)	Sphericity Assumed	55,648	52	1,070			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	55,648	52,000	1,070			
	Huynh-Feldt	55,648	52,000	1,070			
	Lower-bound	55,648	52,000	1,070			

Estimates

Ameaça	UH	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Baixa Ameaça	Deviant	3,343	,243	2,854	3,831
	Ingroup	3,639	,172	3,294	3,983
Alta Ameaça	Deviant	3,093	,243	2,604	3,581
	Ingroup	4,315	,172	3,970	4,659

Pairwise Comparisons

UH	(I) Ameaça	(J) Ameaça	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Deviant	Baixa Ameaça	Alta Ameaça	,250	,344	,471	-,441	,941
	Alta Ameaça	Baixa Ameaça	-,250	,344	,471	-,941	,441
Ingroup	Baixa Ameaça	Alta Ameaça	-,676	,243	,007	-1,163	-,189
	Alta Ameaça	Baixa Ameaça	,676	,243	,007	,189	1,163

Univariate Tests

UH		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Deviant	Contrast	,844	1	,844	,528	,471	,010
	Error	83,162	52	1,599			
Ingroup	Contrast	6,168	1	6,168	7,753	,007	,130
	Error	41,366	52	,795			

Estimates

Ameaça	UH	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Baixa Ameaça	Deviant	3,343	,243	2,854	3,831
	Ingroup	3,639	,172	3,294	3,983
Alta Ameaça	Deviant	3,093	,243	2,604	3,581
	Ingroup	4,315	,172	3,970	4,659

Pairwise Comparisons

Ameaça	(I) UH	(J) UH	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Baixa Ameaça	Dev	Ing	-,296	,282	,297	-,861	,269
	Ing	Dev	,296	,282	,297	-,269	,861
Alta Ameaça	Dev	Ing	-1,222	,282	,000	-1,787	-,657
	Ing	Dev	1,222	,282	,000	,657	1,787

Multivariate Tests

Ameaça		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Baixa Ameaça	Pillai's trace	,021	1,107	1,000	52,000	,297	,021
	Wilks' lambda	,979	1,107	1,000	52,000	,297	,021
	Hotelling's trace	,021	1,107	1,000	52,000	,297	,021
	Roy's largest root	,021	1,107	1,000	52,000	,297	,021
Alta Ameaça	Pillai's trace	,266	18,845	1,000	52,000	,000	,266
	Wilks' lambda	,734	18,845	1,000	52,000	,000	,266
	Hotelling's trace	,362	18,845	1,000	52,000	,000	,266
	Roy's largest root	,362	18,845	1,000	52,000	,000	,266

Moral Blame.

Descriptives

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Baixa Ameaça	24	6,6042	,70679	,14427	6,3057	6,9026	4,00	7,00
Alta Ameaça	26	6,4231	,97665	,19154	6,0286	6,8176	4,00	7,00
Total	50	6,5100	,85410	,12079	6,2673	6,7527	4,00	7,00

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
2,546	1	48	,117

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	,409	1	,409	,556	,460
Within Groups	35,336	48	,736		
Total	35,745	49			

Perception of Threat.

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
ThreatQ	Baixa Ameaça	27	2,8580	1,70137	,32743	2,1850	3,5311	1,00	6,67
	Alta Ameaça	27	2,8272	1,46285	,28152	2,2485	3,4058	1,00	5,00
	Total	54	2,8426	1,57164	,21387	2,4136	3,2716	1,00	6,67
Reputation	Baixa Ameaça	27	3,2593	2,04925	,39438	2,4486	4,0699	1,00	7,00
	Alta Ameaça	27	3,2963	1,81479	,34926	2,5784	4,0142	1,00	6,00
	Total	54	3,2778	1,91732	,26091	2,7545	3,8011	1,00	7,00
Imoral	Baixa Ameaça	27	6,0000	1,33012	,25598	5,4738	6,5262	2,00	7,00
	Alta Ameaça	27	6,0370	1,28547	,24739	5,5285	6,5456	3,00	7,00
	Total	54	6,0185	1,29572	,17633	5,6649	6,3722	2,00	7,00

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
ThreatQ	,115	1	52	,736
Reputation	,404	1	52	,528
Imoral	,026	1	52	,872

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
ThreatQ	Between Groups	,013	1	,013	,005	,943
	Within Groups	130,899	52	2,517		
	Total	130,912	53			
Reputation	Between Groups	,019	1	,019	,005	,944
	Within Groups	194,815	52	3,746		
	Total	194,833	53			
Imoral	Between Groups	,019	1	,019	,011	,918
	Within Groups	88,963	52	1,711		
	Total	88,981	53			

Post-test

Descriptive Statistics

manipulacao_ameaça	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
baixa ameaça	2,3529	,98228	17
alta ameaça	3,5111	1,14688	15
Total	2,8958	1,19868	32

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	10,689[a]	1	10,689	9,472	,004	,240
Intercept	274,022	1	274,022	242,836	,000	,890
manipulacao_ameaça	10,689	1	10,689	9,472	,004	,240
Error	33,853	30	1,128			
Total	312,889	32				
Corrected Total	44,542	31				

manipulacao_ameaça

manipulacao_ameaça	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
baixa ameaça	2,353	,258	1,827	2,879
alta ameaça	3,511	,274	2,951	4,071

Study 2

Measures Reliability.

Deviant Dehumanisation

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,734	,741	4

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
HU1_deviant	3,4316	1,48505	95
HU2_deviant	3,2000	2,10673	95
HU3_deviant	2,5158	1,81520	95
HU4_deviant	3,0211	1,72577	95

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
HU1_deviant	8,7368	20,153	,480	,427	,703
HU2_deviant	8,9684	15,371	,542	,319	,673
HU3_deviant	9,6526	18,846	,420	,221	,734
HU4_deviant	9,1474	16,063	,702	,564	,572

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
12,1684	28,759	5,36270	4

Ingroup Dehumanisation.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,739	,740	4

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
HU1_ingroup	4,7579	1,05906	95
HU2_ingroup	4,7474	1,10095	95
HU3_ingroup	4,5684	1,11711	95
HU4_ingroup	4,6000	1,26659	95

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
HU1_ingroup	13,9158	7,333	,553	,331	,669
HU2_ingroup	13,9263	7,133	,558	,320	,664
HU3_ingroup	14,1053	7,542	,462	,224	,717
HU4_ingroup	14,0737	6,431	,559	,322	,665

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
18,6737	11,626	3,40975	4

Moral Blame.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,721	,723	2

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Check_guilt	6,0947	1,42227	95
Check_responsability	6,0526	1,56673	95

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Check_guilt	6,0526	2,455	,566	,320	.
Check_responsability	6,0947	2,023	,566	,320	.

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
12,1474	6,999	2,64562	2

Threat Perception.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,913	,913	3

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Check_threat1	3,4947	2,08783	95
Check_threat2	3,0842	1,96059	95
Check_threat3	3,5789	1,92729	95

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Check_threat1	6,6632	12,907	,879	,775	,829
Check_threat2	7,0737	14,452	,816	,698	,883
Check_threat3	6,5789	15,012	,785	,636	,907

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
10,1579	30,454	5,51847	3

Perception of Threat.

Descriptive Statistics

	Manipulation	Order	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
		1ºThQ	4,1333	1,77507	20
	Swindle	1ºVD	3,1515	1,79572	22
		Total	3,6190	1,83251	42
		1ºThQ	3,9467	2,10748	25
ThreatQ	Agression	1ºVD	2,7083	1,28278	24
		Total	3,3401	1,84402	49
		1ºThQ	4,0296	1,94731	45
	Total	1ºVD	2,9203	1,54789	46
		Total	3,4689	1,83382	91
		1ºThQ	5,9500	1,09904	20
	Swindle	1ºVD	5,8182	1,36753	22
		Total	5,8810	1,23372	42
		1ºThQ	5,2400	1,78606	25
Imoral	Agression	1ºVD	4,8750	2,04966	24
		Total	5,0612	1,90840	49
		1ºThQ	5,5556	1,54560	45
	Total	1ºVD	5,3261	1,80190	46
		Total	5,4396	1,67471	91
		1ºThQ	4,4000	1,66702	20
	Swindle	1ºVD	3,4545	2,10955	22
		Total	3,9048	1,94823	42
		1ºThQ	4,2000	1,68325	25
Reputation	Agression	1ºVD	3,1250	1,56906	24
		Total	3,6735	1,70034	49
		1ºThQ	4,2889	1,65999	45
	Total	1ºVD	3,2826	1,83379	46
		Total	3,7802	1,81232	91

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances

	F	df1	df2	Sig.
ThreatQ	3,338	3	87	,023
Imoral	3,997	3	87	,010
Reputation	2,375	3	87	,076

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	ThreatQ	30,635[a]	3	10,212	3,266	,025	,101
	Imoral	17,010[b]	3	5,670	2,095	,107	,067
	Reputation	24,725[c]	3	8,242	2,647	,054	,084
Intercept	ThreatQ	1097,098	1	1097,098	350,876	,000	,801
	Imoral	2703,649	1	2703,649	999,192	,000	,920
	Reputation	1300,909	1	1300,909	417,821	,000	,828
Manipulation	ThreatQ	2,240	1	2,240	,716	,400	,008
	Imoral	15,430	1	15,430	5,703	,019	,062
	Reputation	1,583	1	1,583	,508	,478	,006
Order	ThreatQ	27,829	1	27,829	8,900	,004	,093
	Imoral	1,394	1	1,394	,515	,475	,006
	Reputation	23,048	1	23,048	7,402	,008	,078
Manipulation Order	ThreatQ	,371	1	,371	,119	,731	,001
	Imoral	,307	1	,307	,113	,737	,001
	Reputation	,095	1	,095	,030	,862	,000
Error	ThreatQ	272,027	87	3,127			
	Imoral	235,408	87	2,706			
	Reputation	270,880	87	3,114			
Total	ThreatQ	1397,667	91				
	Imoral	2945,000	91				
	Reputation	1596,000	91				
Corrected Total	ThreatQ	302,662	90				
	I Imoral	252,418	90				
	Reputation	295,604	90				

Comparisons between manipulation.

Estimates

Dependent Variable	Manipulation	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
ThreatQ	Swindle	3,642	,273	3,099	4,185
	Agression	3,328	,253	2,825	3,830
Imoral	Swindle	5,884	,254	5,379	6,389
	Agression	5,058	,235	4,590	5,525
Reputation	Swindle	3,927	,273	3,385	4,469
	Agression	3,663	,252	3,161	4,164

Pairwise Comparisons

Dependent Variable	(I) Manipulation	(J) Manipulation	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
ThreatQ	Swindle	Agression	,315	,372	,400	-,425	1,054
	Agression	Swindle	-,315	,372	,400	-1,054	,425
Imoral	Swindle	Agression	,827	,346	,019	,139	1,515
	Agression	Swindle	-,827	,346	,019	-1,515	-,139
Reputation	Swindle	Agression	,265	,371	,478	-,473	1,003
	Agression	Swindle	-,265	,371	,478	-1,003	,473

Multivariate Tests

	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Pillai's trace	,066	2,001[a]	3,000	85,000	,120	,066
Wilks' lambda	,934	2,001[a]	3,000	85,000	,120	,066
Hotelling's trace	,071	2,001[a]	3,000	85,000	,120	,066
Roy's largest root	,071	2,001[a]	3,000	85,000	,120	,066

Univariate Tests

Dependent Variable		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
ThreatQ	Contrast	2,240	1	2,240	,716	,400	,008
	Error	272,027	87	3,127			
Imoral	Contrast	15,430	1	15,430	5,703	,019	,062
	Error	235,408	87	2,706			
Reputation	Contrast	1,583	1	1,583	,508	,478	,006
	Error	270,880	87	3,114			

Comparisons by order.

Estimates

Dependent Variable	Order	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
ThreatQ	1ºThQ	4,040	,265	3,513	4,567
	1ºVD	2,930	,261	2,411	3,449
Imoral	1ºThQ	5,595	,247	5,105	6,085
	1ºVD	5,347	,243	4,864	5,829
Reputation	1ºThQ	4,300	,265	3,774	4,826
	1ºVD	3,290	,260	2,772	3,807

Pairwise Comparisons

Dependent Variable	(I) Order	(J) Order	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
ThreatQ	1ºThQ	1ºVD	1,110	,372	,004	,371	1,850
	1ºVD	1ºThQ	-1,110	,372	,004	-1,850	-,371
Imoral	1ºThQ	1ºVD	,248	,346	,475	-,440	,936
	1ºVD	1ºThQ	-,248	,346	,475	-,936	,440
Reputation	1ºThQ	1ºVD	1,010	,371	,008	,272	1,748
	1ºVD	1ºThQ	-1,010	,371	,008	-1,748	-,272

Multivariate Tests

	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Pillai's trace	,100	3,156	3,000	85,000	,029	,100
Wilks' lambda	,900	3,156	3,000	85,000	,029	,100
Hotelling's trace	,111	3,156	3,000	85,000	,029	,100
Roy's largest root	,111	3,156	3,000	85,000	,029	,100

Univariate Tests

Dependent Variable		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
ThreatQ	Contrast	27,829	1	27,829	8,900	,004	,093
	Error	272,027	87	3,127			
Imoral	Contrast	1,394	1	1,394	,515	,475	,006
	Error	235,408	87	2,706			
Reputation	Contrast	23,048	1	23,048	7,402	,008	,078
	Error	270,880	87	3,114			

Moral Blame.

Descriptive Statistics

Manipulation	Order	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
	1ºThQ	6,4773	,80884	22
Swindle	1ºVD	6,5682	,89036	22
	Total	6,5227	,84189	44
	1ºThQ	5,8800	1,30926	25
Agression	1ºVD	6,1136	,93773	22
	Total	5,9894	1,14441	47
	1ºThQ	6,1596	1,13303	47
Total	1ºVD	6,3409	,93244	44
	Total	6,2473	1,03916	91

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances

F	df1	df2	Sig.
2,059	3	87	,112

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	7,195[a]	3	2,398	2,318	,081	,074
Intercept	3554,906	1	3554,906	3436,704	,000	,975
Manipulation	6,273	1	6,273	6,064	,016	,065
Order	,597	1	,597	,577	,449	,007
Manipulation Order	,116	1	,116	,112	,739	,001
Error	89,992	87	1,034			
Total	3648,750	91				
Corrected Total	97,187	90				

Comparisons by manipulation.

Estimates

Manipulation	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Swindle	6,523	,153	6,218	6,827
Agression	5,997	,149	5,701	6,292

Pairwise Comparisons

(I) Manipulation	(J) Manipulation	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Swindle	Agression	,526	,214	,016	,101	,950
Agression	Swindle	-,526	,214	,016	-,950	-,101

Deviant and ingroup dehumanisation.

Descriptive Statistics

	Manipulation	Order	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
HU_Deviant	Swindle	1ºThQ	3,4886	1,41732	22
		1ºVD	3,8750	1,40070	24
		Total	3,6902	1,40652	46
	Agression	1ºThQ	2,4800	,98668	25
		1ºVD	2,3854	,90883	24
		Total	2,4337	,94066	49
	Total	1ºThQ	2,9521	1,29761	47
		1ºVD	3,1302	1,38954	48
		Total	3,0421	1,34068	95
HU_Ingroup	Swindle	1ºThQ	4,6932	,67670	22
		1ºVD	4,5938	,77604	24
		Total	4,6413	,72390	46
	Agression	1ºThQ	4,7800	1,09049	25
		1ºVD	4,6042	,82724	24
		Total	4,6939	,96456	49
	Total	1ºThQ	4,7394	,91181	47
		1ºVD	4,5990	,79349	48
		Total	4,6684	,85244	95

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices

Box's M	14,673
F	1,565
df1	9
df2	91414,925
Sig.	,119

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
target	Sphericity Assumed	122,935	1	122,935	113,125	,000	,554
	Greenhouse-Geisser	122,935	1,000	122,935	113,125	,000	,554
	Huynh-Feldt	122,935	1,000	122,935	113,125	,000	,554
	Lower-bound	122,935	1,000	122,935	113,125	,000	,554
target Manipulation	Sphericity Assumed	19,955	1	19,955	18,363	,000	,168
	Greenhouse-Geisser	19,955	1,000	19,955	18,363	,000	,168
	Huynh-Feldt	19,955	1,000	19,955	18,363	,000	,168
	Lower-bound	19,955	1,000	19,955	18,363	,000	,168
target Order	Sphericity Assumed	,952	1	,952	,876	,352	,010
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,952	1,000	,952	,876	,352	,010
	Huynh-Feldt	,952	1,000	,952	,876	,352	,010
	Lower-bound	,952	1,000	,952	,876	,352	,010
target Manipulation Order	Sphericity Assumed	,485	1	,485	,446	,506	,005
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,485	1,000	,485	,446	,506	,005
	Huynh-Feldt	,485	1,000	,485	,446	,506	,005
	Lower-bound	,485	1,000	,485	,446	,506	,005
Error(target)	Sphericity Assumed	98,891	91	1,087			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	98,891	91,000	1,087			
	Huynh-Feldt	98,891	91,000	1,087			
	Lower-bound	98,891	91,000	1,087			

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances

	F	df1	df2	Sig.
HU_Deviant	2,859	3	91	,041
HU_Ingroup	,783	3	91	,506

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	2828,460	1	2828,460	2612,343	,000	,966
Manipulation	17,077	1	17,077	15,772	,000	,148
Order	,001	1	,001	,001	,978	,000
Manipulation Order	,920	1	,920	,850	,359	,009
Error	98,528	91	1,083			

Estimates

target	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	3,057	,123	2,814	3,301
2	4,668	,089	4,492	4,844

Pairwise Comparisons

(I) target	(J) target	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	2	-1,611	,151	,000	-1,911	-1,310
2	1	1,611	,151	,000	1,310	1,911

Multivariate Tests

	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Pillai's trace	,554	113,125[a]	1,000	91,000	,000	,554
Wilks' lambda	,446	113,125[a]	1,000	91,000	,000	,554
Hotelling's trace	1,243	113,125[a]	1,000	91,000	,000	,554
Roy's largest root	1,243	113,125[a]	1,000	91,000	,000	,554

Estimates

Manipulation	target	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Swindle	1	3,682	,176	3,332	4,032
	2	4,643	,127	4,391	4,896
Agression	1	2,433	,171	2,094	2,772
	2	4,692	,123	4,447	4,937

Pairwise Comparisons

target	(I) Manipulation	(J) Manipulation	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	Swindle	Agression	1,249	,245	,000	,762	1,736
	Agression	Swindle	-1,249	,245	,000	-1,736	-,762
2	Swindle	Agression	-,049	,177	,784	-,401	,303
	Agression	Swindle	,049	,177	,784	-,303	,401

Univariate Tests

target		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
1	Contrast	36,976	1	36,976	25,949	,000	,222
	Error	129,672	91	1,425			
2	Contrast	,056	1	,056	,075	,784	,001
	Error	67,748	91	,744			

Pairwise Comparisons

Manipulation	(I) target	(J) target	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Swindle	1	2	-,962	,218	,000	-1,394	-,529
	2	1	,962	,218	,000	,529	1,394
Agression	1	2	-2,259	,211	,000	-2,678	-1,841
	2	1	2,259	,211	,000	1,841	2,678

Multivariate Tests

Manipulation		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Swindle	Pillai's trace	,177	19,535	1,000	91,000	,000	,177
	Wilks' lambda	,823	19,535	1,000	91,000	,000	,177
	Hotelling's trace	,215	19,535	1,000	91,000	,000	,177
	Roy's largest root	,215	19,535	1,000	91,000	,000	,177
Agression	Pillai's trace	,558	115,039	1,000	91,000	,000	,558
	Wilks' lambda	,442	115,039	1,000	91,000	,000	,558
	Hotelling's trace	1,264	115,039	1,000	91,000	,000	,558
	Roy's largest root	1,264	115,039	1,000	91,000	,000	,558

Identification.

Descriptive Statistics

	Manipulation	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Identification_Beginning	Swindle	4,8618	1,05220	46
	Agression	4,8309	,78038	49
	Total	4,8459	,91718	95
Identification_End	Swindle	4,6910	1,12335	46
	Agression	4,7289	,76167	49
	Total	4,7105	,94906	95

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
identification	Sphericity Assumed	,883	1	,883	5,554	,021	,056
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,883	1,000	,883	5,554	,021	,056
	Huynh-Feldt	,883	1,000	,883	5,554	,021	,056
	Lower-bound	,883	1,000	,883	5,554	,021	,056
identification * Manipulation	Sphericity Assumed	,056	1	,056	,353	,554	,004
	Greenhouse-Geisser	,056	1,000	,056	,353	,554	,004
	Huynh-Feldt	,056	1,000	,056	,353	,554	,004
	Lower-bound	,056	1,000	,056	,353	,554	,004
Error(identification)	Sphericity Assumed	14,788	93	,159			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	14,788	93,000	,159			
	Huynh-Feldt	14,788	93,000	,159			
	Lower-bound	14,788	93,000	,159			

Regression.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Identification_Beginning	4,8618	1,05220	46
difIngDev	,9511	1,60867	46
Identification_End	4,6910	1,12335	46

Correlations

		Identification_Beginning	difIngDev	Identification_End
Pearson Correlation	Identification_Beginning	1,000	,289	,936
	difIngDev	,289	1,000	,273
	Identification_End	,936	,273	1,000
Sig. (1-tailed)	Identification_Beginning	.	,026	,000
	difIngDev	,026	.	,033
	Identification_End	,000	,033	.
N	Identification_Beginning	46	46	46
	difIngDev	46	46	46
	Identification_End	46	46	46

Variables Entered/Removed

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	difIngDev[b]		. Enter
2	Identification_End[b]		. Enter

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	,289[a]	,084	,063	1,01854	,084	4,023	1	44	,051
2	,937[b]	,877	,872	,37699	,794	278,184	1	43	,000

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	4,174	1	4,174	4,023	,051
	Residual	45,647	44	1,037		
	Total	49,820	45			
2	Regression	43,709	2	21,855	153,775	,000
	Residual	6,111	43	,142		
	Total	49,820	45			

Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	4,682	,175		26,759	,000
	difIngDev	,189	,094	,289	2,006	,051
2	(Constant)	,770	,243		3,166	,003
	difIngDev	,024	,036	,036	,657	,515
	Identification_End	,867	,052	,926	16,679	,000

Excluded Variables

Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics
						Tolerance
1	Identification_End	,926[b]	16,679	,000	,931	,925