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We are human, they are not: Driving forces behind outgroup dehumanisation and the humanisation of the ingroup

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Mostly invigorated by infrahumanisation theory, our knowledge on processes of dehumanisation in intergroup relations has grown considerably in the last decade. Building on these earlier endeavours, the present chapter reviews some recent empirical extensions that highlight the importance of differentiating between ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation because they are often moderated by specific variables. The role of these separate processes is discussed as a function of the main structural elements that define intergroup behaviour; that is, the defining boundaries of the groups, the relation between the groups at hand, and the ideologies of its members. Finally, the role of the different senses of humanness is discussed, suggesting that the folk conception of humanness differs between cultures.

Keywords: Outgroup dehumanisation; Ingroup humanisation; Intergroup boundaries; Intergroup relations; Ideologies.

Dehumanisation involves viewing others as less than human. History is filled with events that exemplify the scaling of others on the human dimension. In Ancient Greece, Barbarians were strangers not able to speak Greek but they were considered (almost) equals. It was with mounting slavery and the expanding Roman Empire that Barbarians came to be seen as stupid, dangerous, and living like animals. Explorers (see, e.g., Jahoda, 1999; Todorov, 1989), scientists (e.g., de Buffon 1833–34), anthropologists (e.g.,
Lévi-Strauss, 1952/1987; Sumner, 1906) have always noted that people glorify their groups while vilifying the strangers. Jahoda (1999), for example, reports early descriptions of navigators around the African coasts—habitants were portrayed as animals full of lust and evilness.

While history has provided many examples of dehumanisation, social psychology has only recently started to unravel the reasons why it is so difficult to grant equal humanness to all human beings. Indeed, an ever-increasing amount of research has shown that people tend to differentiate others on the very fact that they are fully human. These research efforts have emphasised that dehumanisation is a pervasive phenomenon in interpersonal and intergroup contexts that occurs in a large variety of social domains. The common reported finding is that humanness is reserved to describe one’s own group (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Leyens et al., 2000) or the self (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), denying full humanness to others.

In the present review we will focus on the role of dehumanisation in intergroup relations. Broadly speaking, intergroup relations are determined by three structural elements: the defining boundaries of the groups at hand, the socio-structural relations between the groups, and the ideologies of their group members. We will use this framework to discuss dehumanisation as an intergroup phenomenon that affords crucial importance to boundaries, that is nourished by ideology, and that affects relations more than it mirrors them. The way each of these three structural elements moderates the humanness that is conferred to the ingroup and that is denied to the outgroup will be discussed separately. Most research efforts have focused on the dehumanisation of the outgroup or concentrated on understanding the relative difference between the ingroup and the outgroup in human terms. Only recently has ingroup humanisation been studied as a separate phenomenon that is determined by specific variables. Therefore ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation will be reviewed separately as a function of the three structural elements that determine intergroup relations in general. Finally we will highlight some of the recent developments in our understanding of humanness, the quality that is denied when people dehumanise. More specifically we will review cross-cultural research suggesting the existence of intercultural differences in people’s folk conception of humanness. Before introducing an integrative framework of dehumanisation in intergroup relations, however, we will briefly review the main approaches that have been proposed in the literature up to now.

DIFFERENT APPROACHES IN DEHUMANISATION

In the last decade several theories have studied the phenomenon of dehumanisation, extending its original conception. Dehumanisation has
mostly been related to extreme reactions of aggression and hatred (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975) and seen as a destructive process in violent conflict situations (Bar-Tal, 1989; Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1990). These more recent approaches have emphasised that processes of dehumanisation can be common and apply outside the domains of violence and cruelty. The two main approaches will be briefly introduced: the infrahumanisation theory of Leyens and colleagues (2000) and Haslam’s (2006) two-dimensional model of humanness that differentiates between animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. Finally, another way of operationalising nonhuman perceptions will be discussed, analysing the study of dehumanising metaphors.

Infrahumanisation theory

Leyens and his colleagues (2000; for a recent review see Leyens et al., 2007) were the first to launch the idea that humanness is not a given but a dynamic dimension of social judgement on which people are differentiated. Specifically, ingroups were expected to have a more human social identity than (some) outgroups. This original hypothesis emphasised the relative nature of the difference in humanness between groups and distinguished it from the absolute denial of humanity that the term dehumanisation would imply. Therefore Leyens and colleagues called the phenomenon infrahumanisation and insisted on its subtle expression. Leyens and colleagues (2000) also provided a tool to measure humanness. In their research they differentiated between primary or non-uniquely human emotions that are believed to be shared with other animals (e.g., surprise, anger, joy, and fear) and secondary or uniquely human emotions that are only expressed by human beings (e.g., hope, regret, enthusiasm, and remorse). Focusing on these emotions they found that people commonly attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups but do not differentially attribute the primary emotions (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001). Given that secondary emotions are an “essential” aspect of what constitutes a human being (Demoulin, Leyens, et al., 2004), this bias reflects people’s tendency to reserve full humanness to describe their own group, attributing a somewhat lesser humanity to the outgroup.

The main hypotheses of infrahumanisation have been tested using different paradigms and stimuli to establish its validity and generalisability (for complete reviews see Demoulin, Rodriguez-Torres, et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2003, 2007). Our first attempt examined whether there was a preferential association between the ingroup and uniquely human emotions. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) was run with several ingroups and outgroups occupying different status, and the emotions, primary and secondary, were either positive or negative (Paladino et al., 2002). In four
experiments people reacted more rapidly when the ingroup was associated with secondary emotions and the outgroup with primary emotions than when the reverse was the case. The classic IAT does not allow the researcher to identify the precise association that causes this effect. Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, and Leyens (2007) elucidated this ambiguity, confirming the initial premise of infrahumanisation theory. In a series of priming experiments they found that people were particularly quick in associating the ingroup with secondary emotions compared to the outgroup, while no differences were found for primary emotions.

We also tested for a preferential attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup. Among a list of primary emotions, secondary emotions, and filler items participants are asked to select about 10–12 characteristics that are most prototypical of the ingroup or the outgroup. The comparison between ingroup and outgroup can be made between (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001) or within (e.g., Cortes et al., 2005) participants. The recurrent finding is that more positive and negative secondary emotions are attributed to the ingroup than to the outgroup. This pattern of data was found with different groups (Demoulin et al., 2009), in a large variety of contexts (Rodriguez-Pérez, Delgado-Rodriguez, Betancor-Rodriguez, Leyens, & Vaes, 2011), and even with children of 6/7 years old (Martin, Bennett, & Murray, 2008).

Importantly, alternative explanations of the infrahumanisation effect have been discarded. Secondary emotions are not intense and not very visible; therefore it could be that only familiar people could attribute them to each other, explaining the preferential attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup in terms of familiarity. This familiarity hypothesis was examined by Cortes et al. (2005), who collected data for different outgroups that varied in terms of familiarity with the ingroup. Familiarity was measured by asking participants to indicate the number of people they knew of each outgroup and how much contact they had with them. Differences in familiarity did not predict infrahumanisation, and thus cannot account for the infrahumanisation effects we have observed.

Even though infrahumanisation is a common and pervasive phenomenon that occurs outside the domains of violence and conflict, it has clear negative behavioural consequences. Vaes and colleagues investigated people’s reactions when an outgroup member expressed secondary emotions, examining a range of different situations involving perspective taking (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2004), political credibility (Vaes, Paladino, & Magagnotti, 2011), imitation, avoidance reactions (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003), and helping behaviour (Vaes et al., 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002). In all these contexts a similar pattern of results was reported that is best demonstrated with an example. Carella and Vaes (2006), adapting the lost e-mail (Stern & Faber, 1997) and lost letter (Milgram, 1977) paradigms, sent a lost SMS to naive participants.
This paradigm, like its predecessors, consists in sending a large amount of manipulated messages that are all wrongly addressed. Each participant receives only one message and can decide to respond to it with a new message conveying the participant’s stance towards the original sender. In this study the message was ostensibly written by an Italian ingroup or a German outgroup member. In the message the male sender expressed his rage (primary emotion) or resentment (secondary emotion) at being thrown out of his apartment. Table 1 summarises the results of the content analyses of participants’ responses. Replicating the pattern of results that was reported in previous work, participants used more words and gave more positive responses when they replied to an ingroup member compared to an outgroup member who expressed secondary emotions. No such differences occurred when primary emotions were expressed.

This recurrent finding was explained in a subsequent set of studies (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006) that showed that ingroup and outgroup members who express secondary emotions activate humanness to a different extent. While an ingroup member expressing secondary emotions was implicitly seen as more human, the humanity of an outgroup member who expressed the same emotion was not recognised, making human concepts less accessible. Parallel findings have been obtained recently in work on intergroup forgiveness. Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett (2012) looked at the role of intergroup apologies for historical transgressions in intergroup forgiveness and reported that these attempts were impaired when outgroup transgressors expressed their apologies in terms of secondary compared to primary emotions. It is indeed hard to see such an apology as genuine if one denies others the capacity to experience uniquely human emotions.

All in all, these studies verify the postulated interpretation given to the previous “association” experiments (Boccato et al., 2007; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002): People preferentially associate their group with secondary emotions because such a link shows their humanity. When

| TABLE 1 |
| Content of SMS responses as a function of sender’s group membership and expressed emotion |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary emotion</th>
<th>Secondary emotion</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of words</td>
<td>6.82&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10.71&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positivity of the message</td>
<td>3.60&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken from Carella and Vaes (2006). Means with different superscripts significantly differ from each other $p < .05$. Published with permission.
outgroup members try to do the same, expressing uniquely human emotions, they provoke negative behavioural reactions.

**Differentiating animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation**

Meanwhile other perspectives emerged proposing that an adequate understanding of humanness—the quality that is denied to others when they are dehumanised—is necessary in order to get a full grasp of what it means to dehumanise others (Haslam, 2006). When people are asked what makes them human, they mention a great variety of characteristics that can be defined either as core or essential features or as uniquely human attributes that differentiate us from other species. Indeed, as with all things, humans can be defined by listing all their central and core attributes or by comparing them with other beings and emphasising their unique aspects. Haslam (2006; see also Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008) systematically looked at the human concept from these perspectives and in this way distinguished between two senses of humanness. The first includes a set of core or central human attributes that involve emotionality, warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and depth, and is referred to as *human nature*. The second type of humanness sets us apart from animals, is denoted as *human uniqueness*, and results in a list of uniquely human characteristics that involve, civility, refinement, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity. According to these authors two forms of dehumanisation result from the denial of these senses of humanness. One involves the perception of others as more machine-like, denying human nature attributes, and has been called *mechanistic dehumanisation*, while the other occurs when we have an animalised view of others, denying them uniquely human traits, and has been referred to as *animalistic dehumanisation*. This double view of dehumanisation is illustrated in a study by Loughnan and Haslam (2007). Using a go–no-go task the authors showed that artists, a social category pretested to be high in human nature, was indeed associated more with human nature traits, while business people were more easily associated with uniquely human traits. Moreover, social categories that lacked one form of humanness were associated with the corresponding type of nonhuman. Artists’ lack of uniquely human traits led them to be associated with animals. Business people were instead seen as short on human nature traits and were associated more easily with automata.

Haslam and his colleagues (2005) first demonstrated the importance of differentiating between the senses of humanness when studying the phenomenon of “self-humanisation”. In an impressive set of studies Haslam and colleagues (see Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008, for a review) found that people believed they were particularly good (better) examples of their species, perhaps because they do not wish to seem deviant. More precisely,
these authors consistently noted that people attributed more human nature personality traits (or emotions and values) to themselves, especially undesirable ones, than to other members of the ingroup. Nothing happened for uniquely human traits, a finding that initially did not cause much of a surprise given that the attribution of this dimension was only shown to differ between groups. Indeed, infrahumanisation is an intergroup, and not an interpersonal phenomenon (Cortes et al., 2005; Leyens et al., 2003).

When assigning human nature to groups, valence seemed to play a crucial role, even more so than in an interpersonal setting. In a recent set of studies Koval, Laham, Haslam, Bastian, and Whelan (2012) showed that only negative personality traits are judged higher in human nature when they are assigned to the ingroup compared to the outgroup, a finding they did not observe for positive traits. According to these authors, people humanise the flaws of their ingroup because mitigating the flaws of one’s own group as “only human” may serve a group protective function. Importantly, they only found these effects on human nature judgements; indeed both positive and negative ingroup traits were judged higher in human uniqueness than when the same traits were attributed to the outgroup (see also Paladino & Vaes, 2009). Compared to uniquely human attributes, human nature traits are essentialised (i.e., seen as deep, inherent, and immutable) and more universal. As such, judging ingroup flaws high on human nature implies that these negative characteristics are inborn, uncontrollable, and shared by a large number of people, thus reducing people’s fear of being seen as a deviant.

Dehumanising metaphors

Loughnan, Haslam, and Kashima (2009) differentiated between research on dehumanisation that focuses on the denial of human characteristics to others and that which focuses on the association of others to nonhuman entities. These two different approaches have been called attribute-based and metaphor-based dehumanisation. The so-called attribute-based approaches first define and select human characteristics and then verify if they are attributed differently to social targets. Both the previously mentioned theories can be seen as examples of this approach. Leyens and his colleagues (2000) mostly focused on the attribution of secondary emotions, and the work of Haslam and his collaborators (Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008) selected different personality traits that best represented the high and low poles of the two senses of humanness to measure dehumanisation. Metaphor-based approaches instead directly study the possibility that outgroups are likened to a nonhuman entity, such as animals or robots. Enemy descriptions in intergroup conflict situations, for example, often contain direct references to animal images. The Nazis called the Jews “rats”
before and during the Second World War; and the Hutu-led Radio Rwanda used the terms “cockroach” and Tutsis interchangeably before and during the Rwandan genocide (Kellow & Steeves, 1998). Metaphors are often strong images that can stick to the targets to which they were originally attributed, even when the conflict or the period of oppression is long gone. Examples of such images are central in Jahoda’s (1999) historical thesis in which he analyses examples and testimonies of early travellers describing unknown tribes in newly discovered continents. Interestingly he connects the ancient “images of savages” with the endurance of modern prejudice today, stating that “the key image in this connection, and the one that has survived most stubbornly, is that of ‘animality’,” (Jahoda, 1999, pp. 243–244). One such surviving metaphor that recently received renewed attention is the association between Blacks and apes. Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson (2008) showed that White Americans tended to associate Blacks more with ape images than with other wild animals, while none of these associations was observed for White targets. Moreover, making an association between Blacks and apes salient had clear negative consequences for the treatment of Black targets. In an archival study (Goff et al., 2008) apelike images were shown to be more frequently used when describing Black compared to White criminals convicted for capital crimes, and the use of these images was positively linked with the convict’s chances of actually being executed. Importantly, and in line with the other forms of dehumanisation introduced above, the Black/ape association appeared independently of participants’ explicit knowledge regarding this association and was not reducible or related to prejudice towards Blacks.

A more systematic investigation of the animal metaphors and dehumanisation stems from Haslam, Loughnan, and Sun (2011). These authors analysed the factors that make animal metaphors offensive and proposed a content-by-context approach. Testing a large variety of animal metaphors they found that the most offensive ones were those that involve disliked animals (e.g., snakes, rats, and leeches) and those that are perceived to dehumanise the target (e.g., dog and ape). In the former case the targets are not literally seen as a rat or a leech. Instead, these metaphors convey the idea of depravity and moral disgust, and are judged as offensive for this reason. The latter highly offensive metaphors express more than a disgusting meaning, a degrading meaning. These were the types of metaphors expressing the belief that the target is less than human, and were more likely judged as implying that the target literally equates to a specific animal. Interestingly, calling people animals is not invariably dehumanising and depends highly on the context of use. Especially when animal metaphors were applied to ingroup members or expressed in a jocular manner, they were not seen as denying the target’s humanity. As such, these studies
showed for the first time that animal metaphors are offensive to the extent that they imply a view of the target as less than human.

**Summary**

The attribute-based and metaphor-based approaches that are summarised above have dominated research on dehumanisation in the past 10 years. Broadly speaking they can be differentiated on the operationalisation of the characteristic that is denied to others when they are dehumanised. Infrahumanisation theory has focused on the denial of secondary emotions; Haslam and colleagues focused on uniquely human and human nature traits to define humanness and their respective forms of dehumanisation; and mainly animal metaphors have been used in yet another line of research to study processes of dehumanisation. These approaches to dehumanisation all have their specificities and can lead to different social consequences (see, for example, Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011), but perhaps they have more in common than has been acknowledged until now. Recent research (Loughnan et al., 2009) has shown that attribute-based dehumanisation is highly related to the attribution of corresponding dehumanising metaphors. Specifically, these authors gave a description of a fictitious group that lacked one type of humanness or was associated with a nonhuman metaphor (animal or machine). Results confirmed that participants dehumanised the fictitious target and inferred the corresponding type of attribute- or metaphor-based perception (e.g., perceived a group as animal-like after learning that it lacked uniquely human attributes, and vice versa). As such, attribute-based dehumanisation led to metaphor-based dehumanisation and vice versa.

In the present review we want to propose yet another type of dehumanisation that we will call *target-based dehumanisation*. In this approach the specific characteristic that is denied to others is less important; instead the target to which humanness gets attributed or denied becomes the central variable of analysis. To reinforce this focus we will use the term dehumanisation to refer to any process that involves the differential attribution of humanness more to an ingroup than an outgroup, independently of the specific definition or operationalisation of humanness that is used. Even though in the first experiments the denial of secondary emotions was seen as the sole indicator of infrahumanisation, the same term has also been used when uniquely human traits were denied to others (see, for example, Vaes & Paladino, 2010) or when animal words were mostly associated with the outgroup (see, for example, Viki, Winchester, Titshall, & Chisango, 2006). These more recent findings suggest that the differences between the various approaches to dehumanisation and the operationalisations and paradigms they use are blurring. Therefore we choose to use the
term dehumanisation to name any process that involves the differential attribution of humanness to an ingroup and an outgroup, while the term infrahumanisation will only be used when referring to the original formulation of the theory.

**TARGETS OF DEHUMANISATION AND THEIR MODERATORS**

We will now introduce the term target-based dehumanisation and evidence will be provided showing that differentiating between outgroup dehumanisation and ingroup humanisation is important as they seem to be moderated by different variables. Second, the known moderators of both outgroup dehumanisation and ingroup humanisation will be discussed in an integrative framework that builds on the three structural elements that define intergroup relations in general. In this exercise we will verify whether people’s tendency to humanise the ingroup and dehumanise the outgroup varies as a function of the defining boundaries of the group, the socio-structural relations between groups, and the ideologies of its group members.

**Target-based dehumanisation: To whom humanity is attributed**

Paladino and Vaes (2009) proposed that the “human meaning” of characteristics depends at least in part on the category to which they are attributed. What these authors proposed is the reversal of the causal link usually implied in dehumanisation research: not only are characteristics that are human attributed more to ingroups, but characteristics that are attributed to ingroups are also judged to be more human than when the same characteristics are attributed to outgroups. In sum, the humanness of a trait is not a given, but it depends, at least in part, on the target to which it is attributed, and is therefore called target-based dehumanisation.

While the underlying rationale for this hypothesis is consistent with the general tenets of infrahumanisation theory, analogies can be found in the ingroup projection model. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003), for example, state that people tend to project, and consequentially perceive the ingroup and its characteristics as more prototypical of the superordinate category than the outgroup and its characteristics. Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, and Boettcher (2004) have shown that when primary school and high school teachers are confronted, both sets of teachers rate the traits of their own group (vs. those of the outgroup) as being more typical of the superordinate category teachers. Similar findings have been found for other groups (e.g., bikers, university students, etc.). Assuming that “humanity” (as opposed to
animals) is a relevant superordinate category, the ingroup projection model, in line with our predictions, would predict that ingroup, but not outgroup, characteristics would be projected onto the human category and therefore rated as more uniquely human.

Paladino and Vaes (2009) tested this hypothesis by giving participants bogus information about the typical characteristics of their ingroup (i.e., Italians) and different outgroups (Slavs, Albanians, and Belgians). Half of the participants were informed that certain traits and emotions were the typical characteristics shown by Italians when facing a new situation, whereas the outgroup was said to respond to the same situation by manifesting a different set of traits and emotions. For the rest of the participants the emotions and the personality traits assigned to the ingroup and the outgroup were reversed. Subsequently a second, ostensibly unrelated, questionnaire was given in which participants were asked to judge a list of traits and emotions, including the characteristics that were previously associated with the ingroup and the outgroup. As expected, the characteristics were rated more human when said to characterise the ingroup than when they were said to characterise the outgroup (see Table 2). These results occurred independently of the valence of the characteristics and of the specific trait or emotion that was used to differentiate between the ingroup or the outgroup. As such, these findings demonstrate that humanness is not only expressed through certain attributes (i.e., secondary emotions), but is an intrinsic part of our category membership that gets generalised to all things that are associated to our ingroup.

Stereotypes characterise groups, by definition also including one’s own group. Based on the conclusion of the studies of Paladino and Vaes (2009), stereotypes become likely candidates to convey humanness, an idea that was recently tested by Vaes and Paladino (2010). Recent theories in intergroup relations have shown that the socio-structural relations between groups determine the content of the stereotypes that are attributed to these groups.

### TABLE 2

Mean centred humanity ratings and standard deviations (in parentheses) for ingroup and outgroup characteristics, Studies 1–3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italians versus Slavs</td>
<td>Italians versus Albanese</td>
<td>Italians versus Belgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>.134 (.89)</td>
<td>.104 (.93)</td>
<td>.109 (.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>−.132 (.93)</td>
<td>−.105 (.91)</td>
<td>−.108 (.89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Specifically, the stereotype content model of Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2007) states that two dimensions, status and competition, shape whether a social group will be seen as competent and/or warm. While status dictates the extent to which a group is perceived as competent, competition will inversely predict whether a group is seen as warm and likable. The combination of warmth and competence judgements can result in uniformly positive judgements and behaviour for those who have both, whereas those who lack both are derogated and seen in a negative light. People or groups that are high on only one dimension elicit affectively ambivalent judgements and behaviours.

Starting from the warmth and competence divide, Vaes and Paladino (2010) looked at the uniquely human content of stereotypes in a large set of intergroup contexts. In a pretest different outgroups were selected that were good representatives of one of the three outgroup quadrants of the stereotype content model, excluding the high competence – high warmth quadrant in which people mostly locate their ingroup (but see Cuddy et al., 2009). A total of nine intergroup situations were put to the test. Three outgroups were pretested as low on both warmth and competence dimensions (Gypsies, Albanians, and Moroccans). The remaining six outgroups were ambivalent: three had low competence, but were seen as warm (Southern Italians, Brazilians, and Cubans), three others were instead judged high on competence, but low in warmth (Americans, Japanese, and Germans). Given that the study was conducted in the north of Italy, Northern Italians constituted the ingroup in all cases. Each participant judged only one ingroup and one outgroup. Participants were asked to judge a set of traits indicating the extent to which each trait was typical of the ingroup and typical of the outgroup. Subsequently participants had to report the extent to which each trait represented a uniquely human characteristic and the desirability of possessing each trait. These judgements were analysed using hierarchical linear modelling that allows us to consider the relations between the trait ratings on the four variables (humanity, valence, ingroup and outgroup typicality, i.e., level-1 model) controlling for the fact that these judgements were provided by different individuals (i.e., level-2 model). Taking the between-participants variation into account, humanity and desirability judgements were entered at the same time as predictors of the typicality ratings. This model was performed for each intergroup situation, predicting the ingroup and the outgroup typicality ratings separately. The resulting beta coefficients expressing the extent to which humanity judgements predict ingroup and outgroup typicality ratings controlling for valence are depicted in Figure 1. These coefficients are positive the more the typical traits are seen as uniquely human, but negative the more the typical traits are seen as more animal-like. Focusing on the
ingroup, results indicated that the typical ingroup traits were also judged as uniquely human. All the bars that refer to the ingroup were positive and significantly different from zero, indicating that overall ingroup stereotypes are seen as uniquely human, independent of their valence and of the specific outgroup with which the ingroup was confronted. There was only one exception, when Italians were judged together with Germans. Possibly the German–Italian intergroup situation activated the larger European context, merging both groups in a single super-ordinate category and reducing the need to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup in terms of humanness (cf., Gaunt, 2009).

When looking at the results for the outgroup, more variability was observed. Even though the relation between humanity and typicality judgements tended to be negative, it was not always significant. In particular, outgroups with ambivalent stereotypes (either low competence, and high warmth or high competence, and low warmth) did not always show a negative relation. Among these outgroups only the Cubans and the Japanese were significantly denied full humanness. In contrast, the traits of the low–low outgroups always showed a significant negative humanity

![Figure 1. Beta values expressing the link between typicality and uniquely human judgements for the ingroup and the outgroup in nine different intergroup situations (taken from J. Vaes & M. P. Paladino, The uniquely human content of stereotypes, *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010, with permission of Sage Publications. Copyright Sage Publications (2010). Note: *Humanity coefficients significantly different from zero, indicating that people either significantly humanised the group (when positive) or dehumanised the group (when negative).*]
index. This pattern indicates that the stereotypes of these groups tended to be more animal-like, showing the active denial of humanity to these groups.

Overall, the data of the latter study of Vaes and Paladino (2010) concur with a target-based approach to dehumanisation (Paladino & Vaes, 2009) indicating that it matters to whom a trait is attributed. Ingroup stereotypes were judged more uniquely human than outgroup stereotypes, and this was shown to be a pervasive phenomenon. Independently of the specific intergroup comparison situation, the more a trait was attributed to the ingroup, the more it was judged to be uniquely human. This result could imply that the ingroup was seen as uniquely human independently of the warmth or competence with which it was associated. Indeed, a post-test that analysed the level of warmth and competence of the most stereotypical ingroup and outgroup traits showed that the ingroup stereotypes also differed in terms of competence and warmth as a function of the intergroup situation. Figure 2 shows that the Italian ingroup was characterised with more competent than warm traits when it was compared with a warm, but incompetent outgroup, while it was especially seen as warm but less competent when it was confronted with a competent, less warm outgroup (see also Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Demoulin, & Judd, 2008). Even though similar variations in warmth and competence influenced the perception of the

![Figure 2](image-url)

**Figure 2.** Mean competence (comp) and warmth judgements of the 10 most stereotypical traits of the ingroup and the outgroup as a function of group typology (post-test, taken from J. Vaes & M. P. Paladino, The uniquely human content of stereotypes, *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010, with permission of Sage Publications. Copyright Sage Publications (2010)). Trait judgements were made on 7-point Likert-type scales that ranged from –3 (totally expresses incompetence [coldness]) to 3 (totally expresses competence [warmth]).
outgroup in human terms, the ingroup stereotypes remained invariably human. This result can be linked with recent research that showed that competence and warmth are not the most important dimensions to positively distinguish the ingroup from an outgroup (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Focusing on the characteristics most important to a positive ingroup evaluation, Leach and colleagues found that morality is more important than, and largely independent from, competence and warmth characteristics. Morality is a uniquely human characteristic, and together these results suggest that people have a profound need to describe their own group with deep-seated and uniquely human characteristics.

In earlier reviews of infrahumanisation theory (e.g., Leyens et al., 2000, 2003) it has always been taken for granted that infrahumanisation comprised at the same time ingroup favouritism (humanisation) and outgroup derogation (dehumanisation). Many researchers (e.g., Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Viki et al., 2006) took the measure including positive and negative secondary emotions as evidence that the concept went beyond ingroup humanisation, and included the dehumanisation of the outgroup. These two biases often work together, but they do not have to (Brewer, 1999). The present results support this latter case, and highlight the distinction between the role of the ingroup and the outgroup in differentiating both groups in human terms. In a number of intergroup contexts (see Figure 1) this difference was mainly created through the humanisation of the ingroup (i.e., when comparing the ingroup with Southern Italians, Brazilians, and Americans); in other contexts a combination of ingroup humanisation and the denial of humanity to the outgroup caused the effect (i.e., when comparing the ingroup with Gypsies, Albanians, Moroccans, Cubans, and Japanese). This variation suggests that the processes that guide people’s attribution of humanity to the ingroup or the outgroup could be different. Even though the ingroup was described differently in terms of competence and warmth in the various intergroup settings, as was shown in Figure 2, it was invariably seen as uniquely human. The humanity that was attributed to the outgroup, on the other hand, shows more variability than could be predicted on the basis of variables that are known to determine judgements of warmth and competence. In the following paragraphs we will discuss this possibility in more detail, providing evidence that ingroup and outgroup humanisation are determined by different moderating variables.

Moderators of outgroup dehumanisation

An avalanche of theories have been proposed that explain and aim to improve intergroup relations in general. These theories have studied many moderating variables that play a pivotal role in intergroup relations. A
broad look at these variables allows us to categorise them and suggests that intergroup relations hinge on three structural elements: boundaries, relations, and ideologies. Many theories have studied intergroup relations focusing on what defines a group; that is, its boundaries. Groups are social constructions with boundaries that allow us to differentiate between us and them, and tend to lead to the discrimination of those outside the ingroup boundaries. Other theories deal with the most obvious moderating element; that is, the relations between groups including status and power differences. The third class of theories has tried to understand intergroup relations as a function of the societal beliefs or ideologies of the group members, which accentuate or play down disparities. We will use this framework to discuss the different moderators of outgroup dehumanisation and ingroup humanisation. These different moderators and their respective categories are summarised in Table 3. We will first introduce the moderators of

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<td>Outgroup dehumanisation</td>
<td>• Identification with a superordinate category (Gaunt, 2009)</td>
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outgroup dehumanisation, dividing them into variables that pertain to boundaries, relations, and ideologies.

**Boundaries moderating outgroup dehumanisation**

The centrality of categorisation processes and thus group boundaries in understanding intergroup relations in social psychology can hardly be underestimated (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Changing group boundaries is central in improving the coexistence between groups (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Wilder, 1981), their definition makes ingroup members essentially the same to one another, and different from outgroup others (e.g., Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), and provides meaning and security to its constituents (Castano & Dechesne, 2005).

*Identification with a superordinate category.* Research in the realm of infrahumanisation theory has always emphasised the intergroup nature of the phenomenon (Cortes et al., 2005). Given that groups are unthinkable without boundaries, attributing humanness to outgroups will likely depend on psychological shifts in these boundaries. Gaunt (2009) gave an interesting demonstration of this idea applying the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to the attribution of outgroup dehumanisation. In two correlational studies Israeli Jews (Study 1) and Israeli Arabs (Study 2) served as participants and their identification with the Israeli superordinate category was measured. Results revealed that the more participants perceived the ingroup and the outgroup as sharing a common superordinate category, the more they attributed secondary emotions to the outgroup, reducing the difference in humanness between the ingroup and the outgroup. Importantly, these shifts in social categorisation did not influence the attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup, but only increased the humanness that was attributed to the outgroup.

*Ingroup glorification and nationalism.* While boundaries create distinct entities, people place themselves within or outside these boundaries, differentiating between ingroups and outgroups and developing different kinds of attachments with these groups. Even with the ingroup different types of identification can be distinguished. Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006), for example, proposed a bidimensional view of identification differentiating between attachment and glorification. When attached to one’s national identity, attachment is linked with patriotism and includes a subjective positive identification with the essence and common fate of the ingroup. Glorification instead starts from a comparative judgement and implies that one believes that one’s ingroup is superior to outgroups on a variety of dimensions. Measuring this difference in ingroup identification,
Leidner, Castano, Zaiser and Giner-Sorolla (2010) showed that only ingroup glorification, but not ingroup attachment, was linked to outgroup dehumanisation. Specifically, these authors showed that high levels of ingroup glorification made people resist justice for the victims of their ingroup’s mistreatment. Dehumanisation of the victim’s outgroup and minimisation of the victim’s emotional suffering mediated this relationship. For the present purpose it is important that feelings of ingroup superiority increased the explicit dehumanisation of an outgroup, while ingroup identification did not.

A similar finding was reported by Viki and Calitri (2008), who showed that only the endorsement of nationalism was linked with increased dehumanisation, while patriotism even showed a significant inverse tendency, decreasing the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup and the outgroup. Importantly, the effect of nationalism on the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions was mostly due to variations in the attribution of these emotions to the outgroup (Viki, T., personal communication 16 December 2010).

**Relations moderating outgroup dehumanisation**

Many different relational variables have been studied that moderate people’s attitudes towards outgroup members (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). Cooperation within groups and competition between them were the central elements in the realistic conflict theory of Sherif and his colleagues’ initial attempt to understand prejudice (Sherif, Harvey, White, Wood, & Sherif, 1961). Competition was retrieved by Fiske and colleagues (2007) and linked with people’s judgements of warmth, one of the fundamental dimensions in social judgement. The other universal dimension is competence and is dictated by status differences between groups. Power is a most valued resource and inequality of power directly changes the way people treat each other (Guinote, 2007). Finally, threat perceptions are a recurrent reality when dealing with different groups and have been amply studied in the realm of intergroup relations (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 2000). These relational variables have shown their importance in understanding intergroup behaviour and are likely candidates to moderate people’s tendency to dehumanise the outgroup.

**Status and competence.** The initial empirical evidence in favour of infrahumanisation theory showed that both low- and high-status groups dehumanise the outgroup. Leyens and colleagues (2001), for example, found that Canarians (i.e., inhabitants of the Canary islands, and seen as a low-status group) attributed fewer secondary emotions to mainland Spanish people (high-status group) to the same extent as the mainland Spanish
people did to them. Similar results were obtained in several independent studies using a variety of methods (e.g., Demoulin et al., 2005; Paladino et al., 2002; Paladino & Vaes, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2011; but see Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, 2009). These results led researchers to conclude that status differences between groups were not a necessary variable for subtle forms of dehumanisation to occur, nor was the dehumanisation of the other group a one-way bias in which only the dominant derogated the dominated. It is true that the reasoning became that the status of the outgroup did not play a role in the dehumanisation process (e.g., Leyens, 2009).

For many years this reasoning obscured the importance of status differences, until their role was tested through their link with competence (Fiske et al., 2007). In a study reported in Haslam, Loughnan, et al. (2008) evidence was found for a direct link between the senses of humanness (human uniqueness and human nature) and the universal dimensions of social judgement (warmth and competence). Their results indicated that these dimensions were related, but at the same time meaningfully distinct. While human nature ratings tended to be positively related with both warmth and competence, groups that were judged high on human uniqueness tended to be seen as competent, but not warm. On the basis of this link it can be expected that low-status outgroups should be seen as less uniquely human compared to high-status outgroups. Given that we compared a large set of outgroups, Vaes and Paladino (2010) could verify this hypothesis in the above-mentioned study. A contrast analysis (for details see Vaes & Paladino, 2010) that compared the humanity coefficients of the competent outgroups to the other outgroups revealed that overall the competent, high-status outgroups were seen as more human than the low-status, less competent outgroups (see Figure 1). The same was not found for the humanisation of the ingroup that did not vary in terms of competence or status; also the warm outgroups were not seen as differentially more or less human compared to the other types of outgroups.

This result was recently replicated experimentally using an adapted minimal group paradigm and measuring the attribution of secondary emotions (Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira, & Vaes, 2010b). In this study participants were led to believe, following a bogus personality test, that they belonged to a group that had either high or low competence and high or low warmth (excluding the low-warmth and low-competence ingroup; apparently no social group allocates itself in this quadrant; see Cuddy et al., 2009). At the same time participants were also confronted with a different group of people that represented another quadrant of the stereotype content model. All different combinations that paired the different ingroups and outgroups were presented to participants in separate conditions, except for the ones in which the ingroup and the outgroup would be the same. As such,
a total of 9 conditions (i.e., 3 types of ingroups × 4 types of outgroups minus 3 situations in which the ingroup and the outgroup would get the same feedback) were created. Results indicated that differences in competence between the groups moderated participants’ tendency to dehumanise the outgroup. Only when the ingroup had more competence than the outgroup did participants attribute more secondary emotions to the ingroup compared to the outgroup. Instead, when the intergroup situations in which the ingroup and the outgroup differed in warmth were compared, no moderation was found.

Other evidence that shows that status can play a role in the dehumanisation of the outgroup comes from research that has focused on the “lowest of the low”; those outgroups that not only have low status, but are often marginalised in society and are marked by overt prejudice. That these groups are especially dehumanised has been shown most dramatically by Harris and Fiske (2006, 2009). These authors compared groups from the four quadrants of the stereotype content model and tested the prediction that only outgroups that are both hostile (not warm) and incompetent would be dehumanised. Measuring neural responses using an fMRI and focusing on the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the region of the brain that is recruited for social judgements, these authors found mPFC activation for all social groups except for the extreme outgroups (i.e., drug addicts and homeless people). These outgroups were also marked by greater activation in both the amygdala and the insula consistent with disgust reactions, the emotion that, according to the stereotype content model, is mainly associated with these groups. This neural evidence was interpreted in terms of dehumanisation, since these specific outgroups did not induce brain activation that was different from that evoked by (disgusting) objects. Other research on moral dilemmas, where the death of one person could save the life of five other people, shows that it is judged most acceptable morally to sacrifice the life of a member of a low–low outgroup to save five ingroup members, and it is least acceptable to save the low–low outgroup members when an ingroup member has to die. Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, and Fiske (2010) found special neural correlates for these evaluations.

Similar results can be found in the study by Vaes and Paladino (2010). Figure 1 shows that it is particularly outgroups that are perceived to lack both warmth and competence that are denied full humanness. Other evidence stems from research that measured the dehumanisation of so-called primitive people. Saminaden, Loughnan, and Haslam (2010) compared the human associations with people that were portrayed in either a traditional, primitive fashion or a more modern and contemporary way. These authors created two different sets of pictures that were matched on multiple parameters (i.e., age, gender, frontal pose, gaze direction, attractiveness, facial expression, and skin tone) depicting members of traditional societies

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or industrialised modern societies. Confirming the belief that primitive people are trapped in an earlier evolutionary stage and therefore are lesser beings, these people were more easily associated with animal-like traits and images compared to modern people. Importantly, these findings emerged on both implicit and more explicit measures.

Together these data confirm the idea that low-status outgroups that are disliked and marginalised are the most likely victims of dehumanisation and are confronted with harsher forms of human denial than other outgroups. Given their special status, would these outgroups that are clearly dominated dare to dehumanise their oppressor? Previously the role of status was tested by comparing groups that had relative status differences, in which the low-status group was not literally dominated by the high-status outgroup. As such, Italians or Belgians were the low-status group when compared with Americans, or Canarians were the low-status group when compared with mainland Spanish people. In none of these situations did low status imply being truly dominated and marginalised as immigrant groups often are in their host country, or Gypsies are across Europe. Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira and Vaes (2010a) tried to answer this question by using Portuguese Gypsies and Blacks as participants who judged the high-status White Portuguese outgroup. First participants were asked to generate the characteristics that they considered to be human. Each attribute on the resulting list of characteristics then had to be allocated to the ingroup and the outgroup. Both Gypsies and Blacks attributed equal amounts of human characteristics to their ingroup and to the White Portuguese outgroup. Using the same method, however, the White Portuguese outgroup dehumanised both low-status outgroups. These results suggest that truly low-status groups do not dehumanise the dominant outgroup so easily. Of course we cannot be sure that status is the key variable, as these groups are also marked by other unique factors, one of which is the lack of power.

Power. Strangely, power has hardly been studied in relation to dehumanisation. Given that dehumanisation is the derogating response *par excellence* that identifies people with a lower level of being, it is especially hard to imagine that power would not be an important variable in moderating this phenomenon.

To test the importance of power, however, it could be interesting to look at the dehumanising tendencies of the powerless. Could it be, for instance, that the low-status and marginalized outgroups we talked about previously do not dehumanise the dominant outgroup because they see themselves as lacking power? We tested this hypothesis in a study that confronted psychology and medical students of the University of Padova (Miranda, Vaes, & Gouveia-Pereira, 2010). These groups were chosen because psychology students are seen as having lower status than medical students.
Participants, who were all psychology students, thought that they were volunteering in an opinion poll organised by the university on some highly relevant topics. Once they had given their opinion, they were informed in the low power condition that the university had decided that the opinion of psychology students would only count for 20% and that of the medical students for 80%, while the reverse distribution was used in the high power condition. This information was justified in both cases by the differences in the numbers of students between the two faculties and was given some kind of legitimacy in this way. Immediately afterwards the same participants were asked to participate in an unrelated study that was interested in the perception of psychology and medical students. Results confirmed the expectations and showed that the ingroup was only seen as more human than the high-status outgroup when psychology students were given the illusion of power. Of course, more research is needed to ascertain the combined role of power and status. For now, these results seem to suggest that a minimal sense of power is necessary for subtle dehumanisation to occur among low-status groups, at least when confronted with a high-status outgroup. As such, power could resolve some of the contradictory findings that were found previously, and explain why certain low-status groups do, and others do not, dehumanise a high-status outgroup.

**Outgroup threat.** Blatant forms of dehumanisation have often been reported in intractable conflicts marked by cruelty and violence. Suzanne Goldenberg (*The Guardian Weekly*, 12 August 2002) reported some striking examples from Israeli and Palestinian civilians at the start of the second Intifada:

Israeli: “One thing that is hard to explain is this tremendous rage at the Palestinians in which you dehumanise them, in which you can just do anything to them with utter disregard to them as human beings.”

Palestinian: “There are no civilians in Israel. All the Israelis are military. No woman, no children, no ordinary people struggling to survive. Only massed ranks of soldiers, not quite human.”

In its original formulations dehumanisation was seen as an extreme response that was fuelled by hatred and could only occur in severe conflict situations. Even though the more recent accounts of dehumanisation have shown it to be a broader phenomenon that plays a role in almost all human encounters, the current research on dehumanisation has never completely abandoned its origins. These recent accounts have therefore tested the role of dehumanisation in understanding conflict and processes of reconciliation. One line of research has shown that the dehumanisation of threatening others decreases the likelihood that people want to restore relations with previously
conflictual outgroups. For example, Tam and colleagues’ (2007) correlational study in Northern Ireland showed that both Protestants and Catholics were less likely to forgive the outgroup for past atrocities the more they dehumanised them. Cehajic, Brown, and Gonzalez (2009) conducted studies focusing on the aftermath of the Bosnian war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on reminders of the atrocities committed against the Mapuche (indigenous group) in Chile. In both contexts dehumanisation of the outgroup was negatively related with the extent to which participants empathised with the victims of these conflicts. Similarly, Cuddy, Rock, and Norton (2007) found that, after the Katrina hurricane in the US, White and Black American participants dehumanised members of the other ethnicity, and the more they did so, the less help they were ready to provide to the ethnic outgroup. Finally, Zebel, Zimmerman, Viki, and Doosje (2008) reminded their Dutch participants of the inability of the Dutch UN soldiers to prevent the massacre of more than 7000 Muslims in Srebrenica, and found that the more these participants dehumanised the Bosnian Muslims, the less they were willing to support reparation policies.

All these studies show that the dehumanisation of a (once) threatening outgroup may enable people to morally disengage (Bandura, 1999) from the ingroup’s responsibility for harming the outgroup in the first place. Through this process they can refrain from getting involved with the outgroup’s suffering and do not feel the moral obligation to reconcile their differences. This process was clearly demonstrated by Castano and Giner-Sorola (2006) who showed that victims of past wrongdoings were seen as less human when ingroup members were explicitly reminded that their group had been responsible for these atrocities. According to these authors, denying humanity to others serves to morally disengage from self-sanctions by justifying the harm one’s group has caused to another (Bandura, 1999).

While these studies have shown that dehumanisation can help to justify negative treatment (or the absence of a positive treatment) of a threatening outgroup, a recent study has shown another dynamic relation between threat and outgroup dehumanisation. Manipulating the humanity of a disliked outgroup, Pereira, Vala, and Leyens (2009) showed that people were more willing to discriminate against a less human outgroup. Moreover, perceptions of symbolic threat were shown to mediate this relationship in such a way that symbolic threat justified the discrimination of the outgroup. A less human outgroup is seen as a greater symbolic threat to the ingroup’s values and norms and justifies a discriminatory reaction.

Still, the threat need not necessarily come from the outgroup. Delgado, Rodriguez, Vaes, Leyens, and Betancor (2009) tested a violence-triggers-threat hypothesis investigating whether participants’ exposure to generic violence can induce outgroup dehumanisation, even when neither the ingroup nor the outgroup was directly involved in the depicted violence or
its victims. These authors primed participants with human violence compared to animal violence in Study 1, and with human violent or human suffering pictures in Study 2, and showed in both studies that only a human violence prime made people dehumanise the outgroup. These results confirm the idea that generic violent contexts are able to trigger less than human perceptions of the outgroup.

Ideologies moderating outgroup dehumanisation

Ideologies are societal beliefs held by individuals that often colour their intergroup perceptions. For years ideologies have been a neglected research topic that has regained its full importance only recently (Jost, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Several studies that have been published in recent years have looked at the influence of people’s ideologies on the dehumanisation of the outgroup. The two ideologies that were measured and related to dehumanisation on different occasions are Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 2006). High-SDO individuals believe that the existence of social hierarchies and intergroup inequality is justified and a natural product of a competitive society. For these individuals, ingroup superiority is a given and discriminating against others is a way to attain or maintain group dominance. Therefore it should not come as a surprise that research has mostly found that outgroup dehumanisation is exacerbated among high-SDO individuals (see, for example, Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Leidner et al., 2010).

Right-wing authoritarians generally subscribe to traditional values, are submissive to authorities, and are aggressive against individuals who threaten their norms and social stability. Here results have been mixed. While Hodson and Costello (2007) have found no direct effect of RWA on outgroup dehumanisation, Leidner and colleagues (2010) reported a weak put positive effect showing that high-RWA individuals tend to dehumanise the outgroup more. A possible explanation for these discordant findings is that high-RWA individuals would be especially motivated to dehumanise those that are threatening to their ingroup and the values and norms they represent. They are definitely more sensitive to the animal–human distinction as Motyl, Hart, and Pyszczynski (2010) recently showed. Indeed, depicting violence as instinctual or animal-like reduced the hostility of people prone to aggression evidenced by a high RWA, especially when mortality was made salient. The authors explained this effect through a need of high-RWA individuals to see themselves as distinct from animals. Therefore these individuals can be expected to denigrate threatening others on the human dimension. Another possible explanation focuses on RWA as an extreme ideology that is less easily endorsed than some of its correlates.
Conservatism is one such a related ideology and has been associated with negative attitudes towards various outgroups (for a review see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Looking at conservatism and its potential moderating role in the dehumanisation of others, DeLuca-McLean and Castano (2009) investigated whether Caucasian conservatives and liberals differed in the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to ingroup and outgroup victims of a natural disaster. While the ethnic background of the target did not matter for liberals, conservatives attributed fewer uniquely human emotions to the victim when their name was Hispanic, as compared to when it was Caucasian. Importantly, no differences emerged for the attribution of primary emotions or the humanisation of the ingroup as a function of the political ideology of participants. These results provide evidence for the link between conservatism and the perception of a minority as less than human.

Moderators of ingroup humanisation

When thinking about dehumanisation we normally think of the denial of humanity to an outgroup, disregarding the possibility that people create differences between groups on the human dimension because of a general need to humanise the ingroup. Mullen, Calogero, and Leader (2007) showed that ingroup names or ethnonyms often directly refer to their humanness. For example, the word “Rom” is used to denominate Gypsies and means in their language “men”. The word “Ainu” in the language of the Ainu (indigenous people mostly living in the Nord of Japan) means “men” or “persons”. In African Bantu tribes the word for the people or humans is “bantu”. While most researchers have begun to uncover the motivational impetus of dehumanisation, focusing on the denial of humanness to the outgroup, there has been less effort to demonstrate the underlying motivation for the humanisation of the ingroup. In the present review we will discuss some of the moderating variables that were proposed in recent research, analysing them in light of the structural elements of intergroup relations.

Boundaries moderating ingroup humanisation

Ingroup identification. The first variable is rather self-evident and does not need much explanation. Before people will be motivated to humanise their ingroup, they need to value their membership and identify with it. Two independent studies demonstrated this effect empirically. Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, and Leyens (2004) showed that ingroup identification moderated the attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup, but did not
moderate the denial of these emotions to the outgroup. More recently, Demoulin and colleagues (2009) showed that varying the meaningfulness of the intergroup categorisation criteria moderated the attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup. In this experiment participants were allocated randomly to one of two groups, or selected on the basis of their favourite colour, or were divided following their preferred professional career choice. Results revealed that participants only dehumanised the outgroup when they belonged to the latter two more meaningful categories, but not to the random category. Interestingly, identification also varied as a function of this manipulation and mediated the increase in dehumanisation. Even though specific analyses were not reported in this paper, the tables clearly show that only the attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup varied as a function of the manipulation, suggesting that the increase in identification only changed people’s tendency to humanise the ingroup (but see Gaunt, 2009, Expt. 2).

Existential concerns. Until recently no clear answer was formulated to the question of why the human category is so important in shaping one’s social identity. Terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997) has been proposed as a framework that could provide an answer to this question (Goldenberg, Heflick, Vaes, Motyl, & Greenberg, 2009; Vaes, Heflick, & Goldenberg, 2010). TMT is based on the work of the anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973), who states that the combination of the animal instinct to survive and the humans’ awareness of the inevitability of death gives rise to an existential terror. Becker (1973) argued that individual members of our species would be paralysed with terror unless they developed some means of managing this problem. Building on this idea, Greenberg et al. (1997) found that the immersion in a cultural worldview and the belief that one is living up to the system’s values serves an anxiety-buffering function. Cultures provide a shared conception of reality that gives structure and meaning to the lives of their members. This gives people a subjective feeling of safety and death transcendence that protects them from deeply rooted existential fears surrounding their vulnerability and mortality.

Two recent extensions to TMT have made this theory an interesting framework for understanding ingroup humanisation. One was articulated and empirically tested by Castano and colleagues (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; for a review see Castano & Dechesne, 2005), who suggested that because one’s social identity is a more symbolic, and less finite, way to represent the self than one’s personal identity, the ingroup acts as a buffer from mortality concerns in its own right. The second extension stems from Goldenberg and colleagues (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000) who extended TMT to explain the
ambivalence people often have when dealing with the more physical and animalistic aspects of their existence. Our bodies get tired, stink, excrete, and in doing so emphasise our animal nature and our physical limitations. Therefore our bodies become a problem for humans because they make apparent our vulnerability to death. In an abundant amount of research Goldenberg et al. (2000; for a recent review see Goldenberg, 2005) have shown that in order to minimise this existential threat, people not only deny their similarity to animals but also engage in strategies that allow them to emphasise the uniquely human aspects of the self. Taken together, the view espoused by Castano et al. (2002), that the ingroup has a critical function for terror management, and the work of Goldenberg and colleagues (2000) that highlights people’s tendency to emphasise the uniquely human aspects of their existence when they think of themselves as mortal beings, make apparent the importance of preserving the human category for one’s own group. In sum, to defend ourselves against the existential threat that is associated with the inevitability of death, we have to endow our ingroup with uniquely human characteristics and acknowledge it as the one and only reality that can elevate us above the natural world.

This hypothesis was tested and confirmed by Vaes and colleagues (2010) who showed that people humanise their ingroup as an existential defence against death reminders. In three studies, when people were asked to think about their own death (i.e., mortality salience condition) they endowed their ingroup with more uniquely human characteristics compared to an equally aversive, but death-unrelated control condition (see Figure 3).

In another study these authors demonstrated the buffering function of ingroup humanisation to contrast death concerns. In this study participants were not only asked to judge the ingroup or the outgroup under mortality salience, they also had to complete a task that measured the extent to which they still had death thoughts activated at the end of the whole procedure. Results again revealed that when participants’ mortality was made salient they attributed more uniquely human characteristics to their ingroup. Importantly, the more they humanised their ingroup under mortality salience, the more they showed a lowered accessibility of death thoughts at the end of the study, showing that ingroup humanisation was effective in reducing their existential concern. It is important to note that none of these studies found that making death thoughts salient increased dehumanisation of the outgroup.

Relations moderating ingroup humanisation

Very little research has looked at the moderating role of relational variables on ingroup humanisation. If anything the few studies that have measured
ingroup humanisation seem to suggest that people do not humanise the ingroup differently as a function of status (Vaes & Paladino, 2010) and power (Miranda et al., 2010). A recent exception was reported in a series of studies that focused on the role of occupational status in dehumanisation (Iatridis, in press).

**Occupational status.** Status differences vary in the extent to which they are consensually acknowledged and shared, and seen as a legitimate outcome of intergroup comparisons. Most of the previously cited work on dehumanisation that looked at the moderating role of status differences has studied status in the context of national, ethnic, or regional groups. In these contexts status differences are not always acknowledged and consensually legitimated; instead they are often confounded with social competition. In contrast, occupational status differences are more likely seen as consensually shared and legitimate. When asked to rank various professions according to their social status in terms of pay, for example, research has shown that there is a large consensus even across different countries (Kelley & Evans, 1993). Iatridis (in press) started from this reasoning and adopted the emotion attribution paradigm of Leyens et al. (2001) to test the role of stable and legitimate occupational status differences in the (de)humanisation of the ingroup and the outgroup. In a set of three studies results confirmed that members of high-status occupational groups (e.g., white-collar workers,
lawyers, and secondary school teachers compared to primary school teachers) dehumanised the low-status outgroup (e.g., blue-collar workers, shop keepers, secondary school teachers compared to university teachers) while the reverse did not happen. Interestingly, in two of these experiments members of a low-status occupational group attributed fewer secondary emotions to their ingroup compared to the members of a high-status occupational group. Taken together, these studies show that occupational status not only moderates outgroup dehumanisation, but can also change the way we humanise our ingroup.

**Neurobiologically induced cooperation.** Little is known on the subject, but the way we interact with people is at least partly regulated by neurobiological mechanisms. Ethnocentrism, the tendency to view one’s group as centrally important and superior to other groups, has recently been proposed to depend on brain oxytocin levels (De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, & Handgraaf, 2011). Oxytocin is a neuropeptide that promotes trust, empathy, and cooperation, but according to De Dreu et al. (2011) only among individuals belonging to one’s ingroup. These authors reasoned that such neurobiological mechanisms evolved to sustain and facilitate ingroup coordination and cooperation. In a series of experiments participants self-administered oxytocin or placebo and performed tasks assessing different manifestations of ingroup favouritism as well as outgroup derogation. Interestingly for our purpose, one of these experiments measured the attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup and the outgroup. Results showed that oxytocin strengthened the association between uniquely human emotion words and ingroup, but not outgroup targets. As such, these data suggest that a neurobiologically induced sense of cooperation and trust increases people’s tendency to humanise the ingroup without necessarily increasing the dehumanisation of the outgroup.

**Ideologies moderating ingroup humanisation**

As far as we know no published research has looked at the specific impact of ideological variables on ingroup humanisation. This gap in the literature reflects the prevailing focus on outgroup dehumanisation rather than any explicit theorising that these variables should not have any influence on the attribution of humanness to the ingroup. Some recent results that were gathered in our own laboratories could be indicative.

**Assimilative beliefs.** Among acculturation strategies (Berry, 1980), colour-blind ideology (Maquil, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2009; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010) comprises assimilation and implies that minority groups adopt the position of the dominant outgroup. While assimilation is mostly
preferred by the dominant host society (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2008), immigrants often try to accommodate. Russian Jews of modest origin immigrated to the United States after the wealthy Polish and German Jews. The first wave of immigrants was so ashamed of their less refined and educated members that they even tried to surpass US citizens to make the gap with the Russian Jews as huge as possible (Berkowitz, 1978, personal communication). In these cases the true ingroup is the one of immigrants, but the ideal ingroup is the host one. Initial evidence in this direction stems from two studies reported by Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira, and Vaes (2011), one conducted on recent Brazilian immigrants in Portugal, and another using Albanian and Romanian immigrants in Italy. In both studies immigrant participants’ acculturation strategies moderated their tendency to humanise the ingroup compared to the outgroup. Specifically, the more participants expressed a desire to assimilate with the host society, the more they humanised the dominant outgroup compared to their national ingroup.

It goes without saying that people’s beliefs about acculturation and integration do not constitute a pure ideological variable. Different models on the subject have emphasised different aspects of the acculturation concept: this includes relational aspects pertaining to the willingness to have contact with the host society (Berry, 1980), more boundary-related properties that have to do with the degree to which immigrants define themselves within the bounds of both the original group and the host society (Hutnik, 1986), but also ideological beliefs that shift between cultural maintenance and cultural adoption (Bourhis, Moïse, Perrault, & Sénécal, 1997; Maquil et al., 2009). The above-mentioned studies do not allow us to identify what aspect of people’s assimilationist beliefs is driving the lack of ingroup humanisation. However, these studies do open up the possibility that people’s ideologies can moderate their tendency to humanise the ingroup, and propose it as a domain where innovative research could be developed.

**Summary**

In this section we have focused on the targets of dehumanisation and introduced a target-based approach to dehumanisation. This approach starts from the idea that what is human not only depends on inherent qualities of certain characteristics, but is also a function of the target to which these characteristics are attributed. This target-based approach to dehumanisation paves the way to broaden the research on dehumanisation in different ways. First of all, it demonstrates that people’s need to humanise the ingroup can be as important as their motivation to dehumanise the outgroup in order to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup in human
terms. While most research on dehumanisation has tried to understand the phenomenon by focusing on the psycho-social forces that make people deny human qualities to the outgroup, this perspective highlights different motivations that mainly involve the ingroup and that could clarify the process of dehumanisation. Previous accounts in the realm of infrahumanisation theory often claimed that the infrahumanisation effect always involved simultaneous tendencies to favour the ingroup and derogate the outgroup (Leyens et al., 2007). The present analysis and the recent empirical extensions on which it is based (e.g., Vaes & Paladino, 2010) propose that people first of all humanise a salient ingroup with which they identify. Whether they also dehumanise the outgroup depends on specific socio-psychological variables that can play at any of the structural levels that characterise intergroup relations.

Second, differentiating between ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation allowed us to reconcile past findings with more recently observed results, most notably concerning the moderation of status differences. While earlier work did not report any differences in the dehumanisation of high- and low-status groups, recent results showed that high-status outgroups are dehumanised to a lesser extent than those with a low status. The earlier focus on relative differences between the ingroup and the outgroup probably contributed to hide the specific humanness of each of the groups. New emphasis on the fate of both groups highlighted their peculiarities.

Finally, treating the ingroup and the outgroup as separate targets that can be attributed or denied human characteristics allows us to test the possibility that they are driven and moderated by different variables. Intergroup relations and behaviour roughly hinge on different moderating variables that play at the level of group boundaries, the specific relations between the groups, and group members’ ideologies. Using this framework the research on dehumanisation was reviewed, showing with surprising ease that ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation were mostly moderated by specific variables. It is important to note that the attribution of humanness to both targets was not always measured, but enough studies have been conducted to confirm that the attribution of humanness to both ingroups and outgroups is often determined by specific factors. Processes of re-categorisation (Gaunt, 2009), status differences based on national or regional divides (Vaes & Paladino, 2010), power over the outgroup’s outcomes (Miranda et al., 2010), a nationalistic attachment to one’s ingroup (Viki & Calitri, 2008), and a conservative ideology (DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009) only showed moderation of outgroup dehumanisation. Instead, ingroup identification (Demoulin et al., 2009; Paladino et al., 2004), mortality concerns (Goldenberg et al., 2009; Vaes et al., 2010) and neurobiologically induced cooperation (De Dreu et al., 2011) uniquely
determined the attribution of humanness to the ingroup. These unique moderators suggest that, in order to get a full understanding of people’s tendency to dehumanise others, it is important to analyse the processes that underlie both ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation.

DIMENSIONS OF DEHUMANISATION

Our previous focus on the target of dehumanisation should not conceal the fact that in order to get a full understanding of the dehumanisation process it is important to analyse the content and meaning of the characteristics that are denied to dehumanised others. In this section we will discuss some recent developments that unveiled possible intercultural differences in people’s folk conception of humanness.

As stated earlier, Haslam (2006) differentiated between two senses of humanness, human uniqueness and human nature, that when denied to others lead respectively to two forms of dehumanisation, animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. Both forms of dehumanisation have been found in intergroup relations and can lead to different biases that are not necessarily opposites. Research in which both biases were measured has often shown that the attribution of one sense of humanness is not correlated with the other sense of humanness, suggesting that both judgements are indeed independent and should be seen as complementary.

Importantly, denying human nature or human uniqueness is not exclusively relevant in a specific context. Objectification is sometimes presented as more closely linked to mechanistic dehumanisation (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2009; Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009). Denying human nature should make a person resemble more a machine or even an object. However, objectification is often linked to gender and it suffices to note the frequent associations between animals and sexy women: “they really are animals”, “they are panthers [eating rich old men], or cougars [eating younger men]”. Measuring the human–animal dimension, Vaes, Paladino, and Puvia (2011) indeed showed that sexually objectified women were dehumanised. In a similar vein, technical dehumanisation as used in medical practice may recall the association of others with automata or robots. Recent research has demonstrated the relevance of the denial of uniquely human emotions in this context (Vaes & Muratore, 2011). Aliens, besides their obvious association with mechanistic characteristics, can also be dehumanised on the human-animal dimension. Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) presented their participants with the story of a movie plot in which a group of aliens were either accidently or intentionally killed by human interference. Results confirmed the hypothesis that the aliens were associated with less uniquely human emotions when the human ingroup was responsible for their deaths. These examples clearly suggest it is
impossible to claim that the denial of one sense of humanness is uniquely relevant in a specific context. It seems more correct to state that both senses of humanness are complementary dimensions of social judgement that contribute in specific ways to the way we perceive and behave towards others.

**Intercultural differences**

Since Haslam (2006) introduced his model that differentiated between two senses of humanness, the human concept, which until then had been vague and all-inclusive, became for the first time manageable and easier to compare between cultures. Even though different studies have confirmed the existence of these two senses of humanness across a variety of cultures (see Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008; Loughnan, et al., 2010), and a fair amount of similarity has been observed in people’s understanding of both concepts (Park, Haslam, & Kashima, in press), there are several reasons why differences might exist in the way these two senses are adopted cross-culturally. Recent work on dehumanisation, for example, has shown that people in different cultures prefer to dehumanise others on one but not on the other dimension. Bain, Park, Kwok, and Haslam (2009) confronted Australian and Chinese participants. Results indicated that Australians dehumanised Chinese only on the human nature dimension, while Chinese participants differentiated between Australians and themselves mainly on uniquely human characteristics. In contrast, Italians tend to differentiate their ingroup from different types of outgroups on both human dimensions (Vaes, 2010). As far as humanness is central in shaping one’s social identity, these results suggest that different dimensions of humanness are important in different cultural contexts. Bain, Vaes, Kashima, Haslam, and Guan (2012) tested this idea by asking participants from Australian, Chinese, and Italian samples to name all the characteristics that came to mind when defining what it means to be human, judging these traits afterwards on the human nature and human uniqueness dimensions. Figure 4 summarises the standardised ratings of both senses of humanness for these participant-generated characteristics. Not surprisingly participants named more characteristics that were high in human nature, given that they constitute core human characteristics. More interestingly for our purpose, this main effect was qualified by participants’ culture. Australians mostly named traits that were high on human nature, but low on human uniqueness and the reverse was true for Chinese participants, while Italians incorporated both human nature and human uniqueness characteristics in their definition of humanity. These results suggest that different cultures define what it means to be human in different ways, emphasising the sense of humanness that is most salient to them when making intergroup comparisons.
Undoubtedly more research is needed that includes more cultures and that could make it possible to unveil the cultural dimensions that determine whether a specific sense of humanness will be seen as primary by the members of a certain culture. At the same time this study could help to explain some of the inconsistent findings on dehumanisation (e.g., Bain et al., 2009) that were reported in different cultural settings, and could help future researchers to frame their findings within a specific cultural context. Cross-cultural differences in folk conceptions could also help to explain why certain treatments and practices are accepted in some countries but seen as inhuman in others (e.g., the death penalty, extreme work conditions; see also Bastian et al., 2011).

Summary

In this section we have focused on the definition of humanness. First of all we wanted to highlight that both senses of humanness are complementary and that none has a privileged area of research. While the terms objectification and technical dehumanisation as used in medical practice may recall the association of others with automata or robots, recent research has demonstrated the existence of the denial of uniquely human attributes in both cases (see Vaes, Paladino, & Puvia, 2011; Vaes & Muratore, 2011). A more important variable that determines whether people will differentiate between groups in terms of one or the other sense of humanness consists in one’s culture. Indeed, cultural variables seem to play a role in people’s folk conception of humanness (Bain et al., 2012) and could help to explain why they prefer one dimension of humanness

Figure 4. Mean standardised ratings of human uniqueness and human nature for participant-generated characteristics.
over the other when differentiating their own group from a relevant outgroup (Bain et al., 2009).

CONCLUSIONS

In the last decade research on dehumanisation has witnessed a surge of interest that is fuelled by some recent extensions of the concept which depict dehumanisation as a general and pervasive phenomenon in intergroup relations (Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000). Over 100 studies have been published to date, and advance our knowledge in many ways. The present review has proposed an integrative framework that aimed to organise this vast and growing literature. The framework was built around the structural elements of intergroup relations, discussing the often unique variables that moderate and determine people’s tendency to dehumanise the outgroup and humanise the ingroup separately. Dehumanisation indeed pervades all aspects of intergroup relations. It affords a crucial importance to boundaries, affects relations more than it mirrors them, and is nourished by ideology.

This framework also allows us to identify some limitations and formulate interesting avenues for future research. The present overview shows that the research programme on dehumanisation relies heavily on correlational or descriptive data. Often the moderators that were discussed earlier were measured rather than manipulated. In part this is a direct consequence of the fact that this research programme is grounded in real life, often testing its hypotheses with real groups and using existing differences in socio-structural relations to test their moderating role. There is great value in testing one’s ideas in real-life settings, but this should not reduce the importance of using experimental methodologies. In order to get a better understanding of the processes that underlie and drive people’s tendency to dehumanise the outgroup and humanise the ingroup, experimental studies are a necessary tool and should play a more central role in future research.

More than the methodology, it is important to think about the processes that cause or exacerbate people’s tendency to dehumanise others. The present review shows that separating outgroup dehumanisation from ingroup humanisation is important, because they are often determined by separate variables. Outgroup dehumanisation has been the main focus of research until now, but a greater emphasis on ingroup humanisation is warranted. Often it is people’s tendency to humanise the ingroup that causes groups to be seen differently on the human dimension. Ingroups are psychologically primary (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). People live in them, and sometimes for them, and ingroup humanisation resolves people’s basic needs like existential concerns (Vaes et al., 2010). Table 3 is informative, in that it documents the main gaps in the literature.
While boundary variables have been studied less in the case of outgroup dehumanisation, both ideological and relational variables should be the scope of future research on ingroup humanisation.

Finally, dehumanisation is bound to have a privileged connection with behaviour. While earlier accounts of dehumanisation demonstrated some of its behavioural consequences (Carella & Vaes, 2006; Vaes et al., 2002, 2003, 2004, 2011), more recently this link has received less attention (but see Greitemeyer & McLatchie, 2011). Here too, differentiating between the roles of ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation is likely to be important. Ingroup humanisation may not be directly linked to the negative treatment of others, but could indirectly promote and justify the unequal treatment of others (cf., Brewer, 1999). Instead, outgroup dehumanisation is likely to have direct negative consequences for outgroup members.

Dehumanisation is an important phenomenon that uniquely contributes to our understanding of intergroup relations. Many interesting questions remain and should further our knowledge on how groups relate and deal with their differences. It is our hope that the framework proposed in the present review can help to integrate the existing literature on dehumanisation and direct the field in its future endeavours.

REFERENCES


